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THESIS SUMMARY
In this thesis I argue that formal political power is a human-created artificiality, 
erected over previously unfettered lives for a specific purpose. As such, the act of 
establishing and maintaining political power can be assessed like any other person- 
affecting act, ethically, and must always be justified if it is to be considered 
legitimate.
I show that underlying all such attempted justifications for political power is an 
implicit, but necessary, ethical contract: that political power X is justified only 
because it makes life ‘better’ for ‘people’ than it would be without it.
Utilizing a form of ethical constructivism, I unpack a plausible account of what this 
universal political teleology can be said to objectively demand, constructing first a 
reasonable account of which ‘people’ we can justifiably say ought to be considered 
within the ethical contract (everyone affected), and then, working from that definition, 
and what we can reasonably claim to know of the shared goals and interests of such 
people, constructing a plausible account of what could be said to constitute a ‘better’ 
life for them (the protection and fulfilment of seven basic and universal ‘species- 
interests’).
I use this account as a critical tool, showing that, despite the multiplicity of varied 
political structures which have historically traded on divergent interpretations of this 
same underlying contract, once we have unpacked a compellingly objective account 
of its terms by which to judge each interpretation, there appears to be only one form 
of political power seemingly capable of fulfilling its requirements and thus achieving 
the legitimate goals of an objectively justified politics: a form of federated, small- 
scale anarchism, which I describe as ‘authentic democracy’.
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A Critical Examination of Ethical Justifications for Political Power
1. Preliminaries: Power, Meta-ethics, and the Rationally Autonomous Self
‘Obedience or subjection becomes so familiar, that most men never make any 
enquiry about its origin or cause, more than about the principle o f gravity, 
resistance, or the most universal laws o f  nature. Or i f  curiosity ever move 
them; as soon as they learn, that they themselves and their ancestors have, for  
several ages, or from time immemorial, been subject to such a form o f  
government or such a family; they immediately acquiesce, and acknowledge 
their obligation to allegiance. ’
- David Hume, O f the Original Contract1
1.1: A Statement of Intent
This thesis has several aims. The first aim is to make clear the understanding that 
political power is not a natural and inevitable phenomenon in the world, but rather a 
human-created artificiality, erected over previously unfettered lives for a specific 
purpose. As such, I will argue, the act of establishing political power, and of 
maintaining it, always has to be justified in some way if it is to be considered 
legitimate, and can therefore be judged like any other act we might attempt to 
evaluate ethically, in terms of whether or not the act is ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, or 
‘wrong’ for the people it affects.
Further still, as I shall show, acknowledgement of this often obscured truism is 
embedded implicitly within any articulated endeavour to try and justify and legitimate
’Hume, D. Of The Original Contract, in, 1987. Essays Moral, Political and Literary, p. 470. (Liberty 
Fund; Indianapolis)
a political power to the people over whom it has been established. Indeed, underlying 
all attempted justifications for legitimating the existence of political power over and 
above pre-political life, is a universal ethical and, specifically, contractarian 
argument: that political power X is justified only because it makes life ‘better’ for 
‘people’ than it would be without it.
Alongside exposing the necessary existence of this universal ethical contract, I aim 
to show that such an argument has two important implications. Firstly, it implies the 
existence, within any legitimate structure of political power, of a necessary 
justificatory purpose or, as I shall be calling it, a political teleology: that is, an ethical 
goal of politics on which its justification rests, and thus a concession that legitimate 
political power is not natural, absolute and unaccountable, but synthetic, limited and 
conditional; there to serve a specific and certain purpose -  that of making life ‘better’ 
for ‘people’ than it would be without it -  and if it fails to authentically fulfill this 
teleological role, then its legitimacy can no longer be ethically justified.
Secondly, and the reason that the words ‘better’ and ‘people’ have thus far been 
written in scare-quotes; once we have unearthed the terms of the ethical contract -  
that political power X is justified only because it makes life ‘better’ for ‘people’ than 
it would be without it -  then we have the rudimentary apparatus to start developing a 
plausible account of what fulfilling such a contract must objectively entail.
A coherent political teleology must be built upon an equally coherent teleological 
conception of the goals and purpose of those people to whom political power is 
contractually obliged to make life better. By working out who, therefore, must count 
as ‘people’ in this context, we can then look at those ‘people’, so defined, and see 
what we can claim to objectively know to be true about their goals and interests, in
2
order to help define what, then, could be reasonably said to make life ‘better’ for 
them.2
I will attempt to do precisely that, utilizing a form of ethical constructivism to 
construct first a reasonable account of which ‘people’ we can justifiably say ought to 
be considered within this political teleology; and then, working from that definition, 
and what we can objectively claim to know of the goals and interests of such people, 
constructing a logical account of what could therefore be reasonably said to construe a 
‘better’ life for them. This process will, in turn, further help confirm or deny our 
original designation of who should count as ‘people’, thus further sharpening our 
depiction of what would make life ‘better’, and so on, until a harmonization between 
the two terms is met.
Once the complete picture of political teleology has been plausibly constructed, it 
will then transform the underlying ethical contract from a mere point of academic 
interest, into an essential critical tool with which I can objectively assess how the 
diverse reality of existing political systems asserting their authority under its mantle, 
actually match up to the ethical obligations their justification demands.
This constructivist analysis of the ethical contract will show that, despite the 
multiplicity of varied political structures which have historically traded on divergent 
interpretations of the same underlying ethical argument -  that they are justified 
because they make life ‘better’ for ‘people’ than it would be without them -  once we 
have unpacked a compelling account of who should objectively count as ‘people’ and 
what we can justifiably say would make life ‘better’ for them, there appears to be only
2 The notion of ‘objectivity’ herein is not being used to denote a completely absolute Archimedean 
point of analysis, but rather to identify a point of independent evaluation o f all available facts, as far 
removed from any undue distorting influences -  such as received social conventions or unvindicated 
bias and prejudice -  as is possible. For more on this, see my discussion on facts and values and ethical 
constructivism below.
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one form of political power seemingly capable of truly fulfilling the terms of that 
contract and thus achieving the legitimate goals of objectively justified politics: a 
form of federated, small-scale anarchism, which I describe as ‘authentic democracy’.
A detailed and critical analysis of the gap between the ideal ‘authentic democracy’ 
demanded by the underlying universal political teleology and the real-world 
democracies of the twenty-first century follows, showing that not only are the sorts of 
systems we describe as democracies today a far cry from the ‘authentic democracy’ 
demanded by the justificatory argument upon which their very existence rests; but that 
contemporary democratic structures of political power inherently fail to fulfill the 
ethical obligations of the social contract which ostensibly legitimate them, leaving 
such systems arguably illegitimate, and their citizens, whose consent to such systems 
ultimately rests on their conscious or unconscious belief in the existence of such a 
contract, with a forceful and urgent ethical obligation for radical change towards 
anarchist ‘authentic democracy’, if they are to truly fulfill the promise of their, 
already held, political teleology and its justifications.
The concept of a ‘social contract’ is an old one, and some might even say outdated in 
terms of the debates of modem political theory, having been traded in for more 
fashionable ideas such as constitutionalism or legal coherency. But I shall maintain 
the use of the ‘outdated’ concept of a social contract, precisely because I am not 
arguing about historically specific political systems, the justness or un-justness of 
particular legal frameworks, nor the relativist assumptions of the apparent ethical 
demands of already constituted societies; but rather about the underlying ethical 
arguments which I believe must necessarily be used to justify and legitimate the very 
existence of any kind of external political power over pre-political society prior to the 
creation of any formal constitutional structure -  indeed, as you will soon see, by the
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terms of my argument, a constitution or coherent legal system can only themselves be 
said to be legitimate in as far as they fulfill the underlying ethical demands of the 
universal justificatory contract between a political power and the people over whom it 
is claiming authority.
Without that initial contract, everything else becomes immediately invalid.
Before we begin this far-reaching examination then, of the ethical justifications for 
political power, I will start with a few preliminaries on which to lay some theoretical 
groundwork regarding certain terminologies, methodologies, and foundational 
assumptions that will be used in the arguments herein.
1.2: Rejecting Abstract Notions of Power for a Concrete Ethical Theory
As the concept of ‘political power’ is one with a long and diverse theoretical history, 
to begin with I will make clear exactly what /  will be meaning by the term throughout 
my argument, so as to avoid unnecessary confusion with competing historical 
conceptualizations of this multifaceted idea. The large body of literature in social 
theory and political philosophy which has attempted to define the concept of political 
power has had varying degrees of success, and though I shall now briefly review 
those definitional successes here, ultimately I shall be rejecting such a strong 
methodological emphasis on passive, abstract, theories of power, for a more concrete 
and critical ethical approach to its analysis, by which the legitimate limits and 
obligations of such power can be better understood and evaluated.
These traditional theories of political power have been most influentially recorded 
and analysed by Steven Lukes. Lukes argues that earlier research into
3 Lukes, S, 2005. Power: A Radical View, 2nd Edition, (Palgrave Macmillan; Basingstoke)
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conceptualizing power found itself severely lacking by taking only a one or two 
dimensional approach to a concept which he feels is much more complex.
Starting with the work of Dahl in 1961, theoretical attempts to create a working 
definition of ‘power’ were limited to a one-dimensional reliance on only observable 
behaviour and conflict. Dahl put forward what he called an ‘intuitive idea’ of power 
as simply: ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do’4, and attempted to turn such an explanation into quantifiable 
research by analysing policy decisions made in areas in which there was conflict, and 
then tallying the result of who won what, and how often. Essentially for Dahl, 
political conflict led, eventually, to one side of the conflict winning the argument, 
with the winning group then said to hold power.
Contrary to previous elite theories which had posited such power as resting only in 
the hands of a few select and privileged groups, Dahl saw true political power as 
belonging to different groups at different times, creating an overall ‘pluralism’ of 
power within a society. Put succinctly by Lukes: the ‘one-dimensional, view of 
power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which 
there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy 
preferences, revealed by political participation.’5
Problems with such an approach, however, were exposed by Peter Bachrach and 
Morton Baratz a few years later, when they presented the idea of ‘a second face’ of 
power missing from Dahl’s account; what Lukes calls the ‘two-dimensional view’. 
Although Dahl was right by identifying power in the concrete political decisions made 
within a society, this was not the only area in which power resided. As Bachrach and 
Baratz point out:
4 In: Ibid., p. 16
5 Ibid., p. 19
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power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social 
and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political 
process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous 
to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical 
purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously 
detrimental to A’s set of preferences.6
In other words, as well as the eventual decisions made on conflicting policy issues 
showing who holds power -as described by Dahl -  there is also the question of who 
decides in the first place what decisions will ever be brought to public debate at all, 
and once there, which opinions will be brought forward into public discourse and 
which ones will be suppressed.
Whereas Dahl looked only at tangible decision-making behaviour in society, the 
two-dimensional approach looks also at non-decision-making behaviour. As Lukes 
describes, it is a progression from the one-dimensional approach because it increases 
the scope of observable behaviour up for analysis, and also allows for the 
consideration of potential decision-making behaviour, prevented by certain 
institutional or cultural practices, within our final conclusions.7
Although acknowledging its improvements on Dahl’s pluralism, however, Lukes 
still saw fundamental flaws in the two-dimensional approach. Firstly, it was still 
committed to behaviourism in its methodology, albeit of an extremely qualified form. 
Whilst its qualifications allowed a broader focus than Dahl’s more limited account of 
power-related behaviours, there were still instances of power which could not
6 Ibid., p. 20
7 Ibid., pp., 24-25
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necessarily be exposed by observable behaviour. Such unobservable behaviour can 
occur in group situations, when it is impossible to pinpoint a specific decision- 
making-behaviour to any one individual, and also when power has been used to 
completely nullify the very existence of certain decision-making or non-decision­
making behaviours before they even come up. This idea leads to Lukes’ second, and 
most important, objection to previous power theories: ‘both Bachrach and Baratz and 
the pluralists suppose that because power, as they conceptualize it, only shows up in 
cases of actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this 
is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to
o
prevent such conflict from arising in the first place.’
Power does not always stem from observable conflict. In fact it could easily be 
argued that instances of conflict are examples of power breaking down. The 
manipulation and strategies of thought control put in place by certain ideologically- 
motivated powers are explicitly designed to eliminate areas of probable conflict 
before they arise, and instead create an environment of well-managed, willing and 
obedient acquiescence.
There is also missing from the conflict-centred account of power the ability to 
analyse circumstances, such as those ostensibly created in modem democracies and 
by similar constitutional governments, where there has been a willing acceptance of 
authority (whether or not that authority can be considered objectively legitimate) by 
people happily subordinate to it. Conflict with edicts given out by such a well- 
accepted authority will potentially never demonstrably arise, even if they exist in the 
population’s minds.
8 Ibid., p. 27
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Connected to this idea is Lukes’ third and final major objection to the two- 
dimensional approach. If there are no observable grievances denied entry into the 
political process as ‘issues’, then the behaviourist-bound and conflict-dependent 
Bachrach and Baratz are forced to assume the presence of a consensus (despite there 
being no more evidence for such a consensus than simply a lack of evidence for there 
being a conflict). Doing this not only rests on the shaky assumption that consensus is 
the only explanation for a lack of grievances, but it ignores the crucial point that 
manipulative power, at its most dangerously subtle, can be used to ensure a populace 
remain completely unaware that they even have grievances (one need only look at the 
centuries of previously socially acceptable repression and subordination of women 
and people of colour as matter of course, to see that the lack of observable and 
demonstrable grievances within a society about a particular policy, does not 
necessarily mean that such grievances do not exist).
Lukes concludes,
The three-dimensional view o f  power involves a thoroughgoing critique o f  the 
behavioural focus  o f  the first two views as too individualistic and allows for 
consideration o f  the many ways in which potential issues are kept out o f  politics, 
whether through the operation o f  social forces and institutional practices or through 
individuals’ decisions. This, moreover, can occur in the absence o f  actual, observable 
conflict, which may have been successfully averted -  though there remains here an 
implicit reference to potential conflict. This potential, however, may never in fact be 
actualized. What one may have here is a latent conflict, which consists in a 
contradiction between the interests o f  those exercising power and the real interests o f  
those they exclude. These latter may not express or even be conscious o f  their
9
interests, but.. .the identification o f  those interests ultimately always rests on 
empirically supportable and refutable hypotheses.9
Peter Digeser has argued, however, that even this three-dimensional approach is still 
not enough to fully define the concept; and that the radical theoretical work of 
Foucault has in fact revealed a ‘fourth face’ of power, which could potentially 
undermine all previous power accounts.10 Foucault took this idea of ‘latent conflict’ 
to the extreme and discovered ‘power operating in structures of thinking and 
behaviour that previously seemed to be devoid of power relations’.11 Indeed, echoing 
Nietzsche, who claimed that the entire world is ‘will to power -  and nothing else
1 9besides!\ whereas previous power theorists looked for concrete empirical examples 
of power (or in Lukes’ case, also concrete and empirically justifiable potentials of 
power and latent conflicts), Foucault took his ‘ultra-radical’ view of power into 
extreme flourishes of ‘Nietzschian rhetoric, within which power excluded both 
freedom and truth.. .according to this rhetoric, there can be no liberation from power, 
either within a given context or across contexts; and there is no way of judging 
between ways of life, since each imposes its own “regime of truth’” 13:
In any society, there are manifold relations o f  power which permeate, characterise and 
constitute the social body, and these relations o f  power cannot themselves be 
established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, 
circulation and functioning o f  a discourse. There can be no possible exercise o f  power
9 Ibid., pp., 28-29
10 Digeser, P: The Fourth Face o f Power, in The Journal of Politics. Vol. 54, No.4, (Nov., 1992), 
pp977-1007
11 White in Digeser, Ibid., p. 977
12 Nietzsche, F (translated by Kauffman, W and Hollingdale, R. J), 1968. The Will To Power, p. 550, 
section 1067. (Vintage Books; New York)
13 In Lukes, S, 2005. Power: A Radical View, 2nd Edition, p. 91. (Palgrave Macmillan; Basingstoke)
10
without a certain economy o f  discourses o f  truth which operates through and on the 
basis o f  this association. We are subjected to the production o f  truth through power 
and we cannot exercise power except through the production o f  truth.. .Power never 
ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration o f  truth: it institutionalizes, 
professionalizes and rewards its pursuit... In the end, we are judged, condemned, 
classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode o f living or 
dying, as a function o f  the true discourses which are the bearers o f the specific effects 
o f power.14
Foucault looked into the micro-practices of society and saw relations of power in 
every interaction and event. By illuminating areas of power relations where 
previously none had been seen, he radicalized previous power conceptions. And by 
arguing that power within a society could be a productive and positive element of life, 
necessary for creating people as situated and scrutinized subjects with collective 
norms and practices, he questioned also the prevailing view that power must be 
understood as a repressive and negative concept.
Between power theorists the debate rages on, and the conceptual mapping of what 
exactly is meant by power remains in constant theoretical fluctuation. For my present 
purpose, however, as I have already stated, I will not be picking one specific side in 
the debate, and shall instead be rejecting the very idea of power understood merely as 
a theoretically abstract and hypothetically conceived entity.
Whilst Foucault opened up the definition to include important instances of power 
relations hitherto ignored, and Lukes gave us the valuable tool of unobservable latent 
conflict alongside traditional observations of more visible behaviour; because of the 
inherent necessity of an ethical theory of political teleology inseparably connected to
14 Foucault, M, in Rosen, M & Wolff, J (eds), 1999. Political Thought, p. 361. (Oxford University 
Press; Oxford)
any structure of political power (either in its application or its absence) that I shall be 
arguing for within this thesis, I believe that a theory of political power on its own, 
remains severely deficient without an ethical component with which to evaluate the 
way in which such power operates. Until we have a firm idea first of the underlying 
ethical contract that sets the terms of legitimacy for all political activity (and thus a 
workable concept of the appropriate limits of justified power), traditional theoretical 
definitions of political power as X or Y remain merely descriptive distractions, and 
not altogether helpful. Until we can determine whether the described power relations 
are ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘acceptable’ or ‘unacceptable’; no matter how well defined our 
conceptual map of power may be, our descriptions of who holds it and what counts as 
a power relationship remain incapable of leading us to any compelling conclusions 
about the legitimacy of that power; which is the purpose of my enquiry.
Although these established views of power each have their respective merits as 
methodological tools for analysing and describing specific instances of power, 
political or otherwise, this thesis is primarily concerned with looking at the underlying 
ethical justifications used by societies to validate the very existence of political power 
in the first place, and in determining its legitimate distribution. I am more interested, 
therefore, in ascertaining a concrete moral theory first, with which we can then 
consider the ethical legitimacy of existing, historical, and potential, structures of 
political organization and power, than in simply defining and describing abstract 
notions of the concept of power alone.
Whilst a theory of political power without a theory of ethics remains, I believe, an 
incomplete (or at least an arguably inconsequential) account of the phenomenon, I 
believe that a theory of ethics necessarily leads to a consequential theory of political 
power and the ethics of its distribution. Indeed, I believe that this is the only way in
12
which we can make sense, or give meaning to, the ‘essentially contested’ 15 idea of 
such power. Power, taken in the abstract, has the potential to define itself into 
meaningless ubiquity and those definitions can only be made critically useful again if 
applied to an ethical theory which can then define the appropriate limits and 
boundaries in which that power is legitimately applied.
What needs to be established for this line of enquiry, therefore, is not what political 
power is or has been described or conceived as, but what political power ought to be, 
based on the underlying ethical arguments which we must necessarily use to 
legitimate it.
Power, as a natural and ever-present multifaceted force in the world, ultimately 
exists regardless of its context, as an amoral energy and phenomenon that has no 
intrinsic concept of being political or non-political, ethical or unethical, in itself. 
When electrical power is distributed amongst electrical items, for example, the power 
itself has no opinion on whether it will be used on a cooker hob to heat up soup to 
feed the homeless, or in an electric chair to murder an innocent man. It is only in 
power’s distribution and utilization by individual moral agents, that we can begin to 
make normative judgments about the legitimacy of a specific power’s particular 
application.
Whether we think that power is observable in an accumulation of votes, the actions 
of those with unaired grievances, the controllers of the political agenda, or within 
every single social micropractice that occurs in life, the only way that we can make 
evaluative sense of those observations and say anything meaningful about them, is by 
assessing first the ethical context in which power is being used and distributed.
15Gallie in In Lukes, S, 2005. Power: A Radical View, 2nd Edition, p. 30. (Palgrave Macmillan; 
Basingstoke)
13
The distinction of political power from non-political power within this thesis, 
therefore, is simply to distinguish an accountability between abstract power, natural 
power, or the power that is utilized by a single moral agent or group of moral agents 
in an autonomous and individual act, and power that has been communally distributed 
by those individual moral agents (or taken from them) into a far-reaching political 
structure, whatever its form, to be utilized for purposes of social organization and 
ostensibly authoritative force. It is a purely descriptive term used to distinguish 
power used in a political context -  that of socially recognized authority claimed 
through socially recognized political structures and institutions -  from all other 
instances where power of some description (one dimensional, three dimensional, etc) 
is at play, but can, in itself, get no nearer to answering questions of the objective 
legitimacy of such power through mere description alone.
All individuals hold, to greater or lesser extent, some sort of power, and thus power 
and power relations arguably operate all around us at all times and in every 
interaction. As such, being able to identify the source of a particular operation of 
power is essential, and this is especially true of political power as, once established, 
by its very nature, it then becomes a legitimating institution in its own right, and, if its 
own existence is not itself first justified, can be used to establish pseudo-justifications 
and apparent license for many other illegitimate powers or acts.
Consider, for example, the crime of rape. Rape is the forcing of non-consensual 
sexual intercourse by one person onto another, and if an individual ties up another 
person in their home and rapes them, in a very obvious and very brutal way they are 
exercising power over their victim. The type of power they exercise is not 
specifically political power, though. That power can become political however, when 
it is sanctioned, or even ordered, by a socially recognized structure of authority,
14
perhaps through giving the rapist some sort of legal protection to commit such acts 
without reprimand, whilst denying the victim a legal right against them (as occurred, 
for example, in the Serbian rape camps in Bosnia, or in the acts of sexual humiliation 
administered by U.S. soldiers to Abu Ghraib prisoners). When this happens, then the 
exercise of autonomous individual power becomes the exercise of political power.
In terms of the metaphysics of power, that it is political power or that it is non­
political power makes no essential difference; power, however construed, is power, 
and the nature of that power does not change dramatically simply because we have 
used a descriptive prefix in one case concerning the scope of its application. But what 
it does do is allow us to recognize the source of where that power comes from in each 
situation, which allows us to better judge the legitimacy of its use. This, in turn, 
allows us to hold the wielders of such power to account for their actions.
In the first example for instance, although the rapist clearly has power over their 
victim, it is a power gained through a questionable autonomous decision to commit a 
particular act, and the legitimacy of that act is immediately dubious, needs significant 
justification, and, we can see quite clearly, it is the individual attacker who needs to 
do the justifying. In the second set of examples, however, it is not just the individual 
rapist who must justify their actions, but also the political institutions which approve 
and validate them.
The distinction is important because although the questionable nature of the act 
holds equally true in both scenarios, when extra power is granted politically, and an 
act, no matter how heinous, is bolstered by the strength of endorsement from a 
socially recognised authority and protected by a system of laws and institutional 
norms, then the perceived legitimacy of that act is less commonly questioned despite 
it being the exact same questionable act in both cases. A brief reminder that until
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very recently forced sexual intercourse between a husband and wife was not legally 
considered ‘rape’ illustrates this fact quite starkly, as conventional wisdom held that, 
in the socially recognized and thus ostensibly legitimated institution of marriage, a 
husband had the right to demand sexual gratification from his wife whenever he 
wanted it, regardless of her own particular wants or desires.16 Such a right, it was 
believed, and legally enshrined, formed part of the binding agreement of matrimony, 
and illustrates the limits of a passive definition and description of power without an 
active evaluative component.
Jeffrey Isaac holds, along with many other power theorists, that ‘to locate the 
sources of power in society is to locate the enablements and constraints that operate
1 7on all of us.. .to locate power is to fix moral responsibility’, and whilst on the one 
hand this is true, I believe that we cannot fix that moral responsibility or comprehend 
fully the validity of our constraints or enablements, unless we have first a coherent 
theory of the ethics by which we can assess how the power under question, whatever 
its source or manifestation, ought to be operating.
Whilst the distinction of political power from non-political power is necessary for 
locating the accountability and source of a particular act of power; once located, the 
social recognition of its perceived authority is not enough to determine any objective 
legitimacy to that authority, and so once we have identified the political source of a 
particular act of power, we still need something more than its mere distinction from 
other sorts of power with which to critically assess the legitimacy of what has been 
socially recognized.
16 In the UK ‘marital rape’ was not a crime until 1991, when it was finally deemed so in the case: R v R 
[1992] 1 A.C. 599, House o f Lords. It was established by the UN as a human rights violation in 1994 
when the High Commissioner for Human Rights published their Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women: Febuary 23rd, 1994.
17 Isaac, J in Ball, T, Power, in Goodin, R and Pettit, P (eds), 1995. A Companion to Contemporary 
Political Philosophy, p. 549. (Blackwell Publishing; Oxford)
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‘Authority’ here is another contestable term, as it could arguably be used to apply 
both to whatever is determined as legitimate and consensual political power, and also 
de facto political power, coercively claimed and maintained only through the threat of 
violence. Whilst famously Max Weber discounted the latter circumstance as being 
one of genuine authority, marking the distinction of authority from pure power 
precisely in the idea of its legitimacy;181 feel that it remains intelligible to speak of 
illegitimate circumstances of political power -  say, a military coup d’etat which 
implements the violent rule of an oppressive dictatorship over a frightened populace -  
as, within the context of its illegitimate rule, claiming to have some sort of authority 
within that society. The authority in question may exist only tenuously, because 
people are too scared and endangered to risk resistance, and it may be an authority 
that is riddled with conflict and defiance; but it is still intelligible as being somehow 
authoritative in that it demands of those over whom it is claiming its authority, what 
Joseph Raz calls, ‘the duty to obey’.19 As Raz explains, ‘the exercise of coercive or 
any other form of power is no exercise of authority unless it includes an appeal for 
compliance by the person(s) subject to the authority’20, and again, this is why the idea 
of social recognition of an authority alone does not imply its objective legitimacy. As 
Raz astutely notes, it is a mistake ‘to think that since there can be political authority 
which is not owed a duty of obedience there can also be one which does not claim that
• •  91it is owed such a duty.’ All holders of political power claim authority of some 
description, and, importantly, they desire this claim to be recognized by the people 
over whom they are asserting this declared authority. The important question lies not
18 In Goodwin, B, 1997. Using Political Ideas: 4th Edition, pp., 311-312. (Wiley; Chichester)
19 Raz, J, 1988. The Morality o f Freedom, p. 26. (Clarendon Press; Oxford)
20 Ibid., pp., 25-26
21 Ibid., p. 26
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just in recognizing this, but in asking how we can separate legitimate claims to 
authority from illegitimate claims.
It will be this area of legitimacy, and the attempted claims made to justify the 
authority of political power over people, which will be the central concern of my 
argument, and why I will eschew the limited project of abstract conceptualization, for 
the more concrete task of attempting to construct an objective account of the ethical 
arguments that necessarily must underlie all such claims to legitimate political power 
if they are to be intelligible.
Whilst it will soon become clear that all structures of political power ultimately 
attempt to justify their existence on different variations of the same ethical claim to 
legitimate authority; we shall also see that, due to the vast possibilities for pervasive 
ideological manipulation within a population, the perception and social recognition of 
their accomplishments or failures in fulfilling the terms of this necessary ethical 
contract, do not always map on to the reality of their rule.
1.3: Political Teleology and the Plausible Construction of Fact-Based Values
A second piece of preliminary groundwork must be covered before I enter into my 
main arguments. As I have already made clear, this thesis will be a work of 
normative political theory; critically assessing the ethical justification for political 
power, and, as a result, much of the work I will be doing will involve analysing 
certain known facts about the world, and from those facts, reasonably extrapolating 
and constructing an in-depth theory of both human and political teleology.
In short, I will be attempting to derive multiple ‘ought’ statements from a wide 
variety of ‘is’ statements, and, as such, and aware of the meta-ethical claim that such a 
task is impossible due to a presumed unbridgeable chasm between ‘facts’ and
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‘values’, I shall now attempt to justify my methodological rejection of the alleged 
fact/value dichotomy.
What follows is not intended as a comprehensive argument by any means; to fully 
refute this longstanding meta-ethical problem and address all its many complexities 
would be another thesis in itself. What I do hope to do in this limited space is 
articulate some of my key doubts about the claim and show enough reasonable 
scepticism about the alleged impossibility of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, that we 
can proceed hereafter on the assumption that such extrapolations can justifiably be 
made, at least in the context of practical political theory.
This idea that one cannot coherently derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, was first 
attributed to David Hume.
In every system o f  morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way o f  
reasoning.. .when o f  a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead o f the usual 
copulations o f  propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is 
not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; 
but is, however, o f  the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, 
expresses some new relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it should be 
observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, 
for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a 
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.22
It seemed to Hume, that each time we leave the realm of fact-based ‘is’ statements 
and jump into ethical value-statements about what we ‘ought’ to do, we are making a
22 Hume, D, 1985. A Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 521. (Penguin Classics; London)
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leap via a supposed logical connection that simply isn’t there. For example; though 
we might have knowledge of both the fact that a person standing in front of us has 
stated a clear interest in not wanting to die, and the fact that by shooting that person 
point blank in a vital organ, it would kill them; reaching the conclusion from these 
two factual statements that therefore we ought not shoot that person point blank in a 
vital organ does not follow, because we have inexplicably gone from an area of 
descriptive language, to an area of prescriptive language. To borrow Humean 
terminology: there is no necessary connection between the matters offact and their 
corresponding ‘ought’ statements.
This is because, although the ‘is’ facts are observable and demonstrable, the ‘ought’ 
obligations we determine from them require some extra independent and implicit 
normative judgment behind them that is not part of the original ‘is’ statements and so 
are not empirically verifiable.
When I recount the facts that the person does not want to die and that to shoot them 
in a particular way will kill them, to reach the conclusion that they therefore ought 
not to be shot in that way involves extra normative opinions: that what that person 
wants ought to be taken into account, that life ought to be valued over death, that the 
right of the shooter to shoot is less important than the right of the person to live, that 
one shouldn’t shoot if it will cause certain types of harm, etc. None of these value- 
statements, it is claimed, can be said to be facts though, they can only be judgements. 
There is no demonstrable empirical evidence to emphatically support a statement such 
as: a person’s wants should be taken into account, or that life should be valued over 
death. There are people, there are wants; there is life and there is death; but the value- 
statements we conclude from these facts are never anything more than assertions of
20
personal opinion, smuggled into our conclusions and distorting what can reasonably 
be said to be true.
However, Alasdair MacIntyre compellingly questioned whether this absolutist 
conclusion was actually what Hume originally intended. ‘It would be odd’, he points 
out, ‘if Hume thought that "observations concerning human affairs" necessarily could 
not lead on to moral judgments since such observations are constantly so used by 
Hume him self23. Rather than ‘trying to say that morality lacks a basis’, MacIntyre 
suggests, Hume was actually ‘trying to point out the nature of that basis’, arguing that 
the passage responsible for the conventional error was merely ‘asserting that the 
question of how the factual basis of morality is related to morality is a crucial logical 
issue, reflection on which will enable one to realize how there are ways in which this 
transition can be made and ways in which it cannot.’24 Read not as an isolated 
passage but in tandem with the entirety of Hume’s Treatise and other works of 
philosophy, MacIntyre reminds us that,
Hume does not actually say that one cannot pass from an “is” to an "ought" but only 
that it "seems altogether inconceivable".. .he may be taken to be suggesting either that 
it simply cannot be brought about or that it cannot be brought about in the way in 
which "every system o f  morality which I have hitherto met with" has brought it about.25
Such obfuscation is typical Hume, the total sum of whose arguments often turns out 
to be more significant than the minor conclusions of its parts; and whether or not 
Hume actually subscribed to the position which contemporary meta-ethics continues
23 MacIntyre, A. C., Hume on “Is” and “Ought”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 68, No. 4. (Oct., 
1959), pp. 451-468. (Duke University Press; North Carolina)
24 Ibid
25 Ibid
26 Craig, E, 1996. The Mind o f God and the Works o f Man. (Oxford University Press; Oxford).
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to ascribe to him is therefore debateable. What remains irrefutable, however, is that 
the common interpretation of this passage, and the supposed presence of an 
intractable ‘fact/value’ dichotomy has convinced many ethical philosophers for 
generations that we cannot possibly get a valid ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.
Whilst it is true that the kind of statements we consider facts and the kind of 
statements we consider to be normative judgments are, on a superficial level, doing 
different sorts of things, I don’t believe it is possible to fully separate the two; a view 
championed by Hilary Putnam, who argues that ‘if we look at the vocabulary of our 
language as a whole, and not the tiny part that was supposed by logical positivism to 
be sufficient for the description of “facts”, we will find a much deeper entanglement
97of fact and value’.
Putnam suggests that belief in there being a fact/value dichotomy is a throwback to 
the once-popular philosophical school of logical positivism and its self-refuting idea 
that there are only two types of thing that we can possibly call truths -  synthetic and 
analytic -  and nothing more. Synthetic truths are those considered empirically 
verifiable or falsifiable; analytic truths are those considered true or false by the logic 
of meaning alone; with every other kind of statement that is neither an analytic truth 
nor a synthetic one, considered by logical positivists to be ‘cognitively 
meaningless’.28
The reason I call this position self-refuting, is because its own definition leaves itself 
out in the cold. The claim that statements can only be true if they are empirically 
verifiable or verified by the rules of logic alone is, itself neither an empirical truth, 
nor verifiable by the rules of logic alone, and is therefore, itself cognitively 
meaningless -  making logical positivism, on its own terms, a nonsense.
27 Putnam, H, 2003. The Collapse o f the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, p. 34. (Harvard 
University Press; Cambridge)
28 In Putnam, ibid., p. 10
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This criticism is an old and successful one, and a major part of what eventually put 
an end to logical positivism’s fashionable ascent. The other significant nails in the 
logical positivist coffin were the arguments of Quine, who collapsed the analytic- 
synthetic dichotomy even further by suggesting it to be impossible to reduce all 
statements as being either ‘factual’ or ‘conventional’ in this way, because in reality 
meaningful language necessarily interlaces both these components as one. ‘It is 
nonsense,’ he argued, ‘to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in
9Qthe truth of any individual statement.’
It is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and extralinguistic fact.
The statement 'Brutus killed Caesar' would be false if the world had been different in 
certain ways, but it would also be false if the word 'killed' happened rather to have the 
sense of'begat'... a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not 
been drawn.30
It is this aspect of Quine’s argument which Putnam incorporates into his meta-ethical 
theory, asking ‘if the whole idea that there is a clear notion of fact collapsed with the 
hopelessly restrictive empiricist picture that gave rise to it, what happens to the 
fact/value dichotomy?’
For Putnam, not only is the logical positivist conception of ‘fact’ that the fact/value 
dichotomy rests on outdated and invalid, but the same entanglement Quine found 
between supposedly distinct synthetic and analytical statements can be found between 
factual statements and normative statements. Whilst there is certainly a
29 Quine, W. V, Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas o f Empiricism, in The Philosophical 
Review, Vol. 60, No. 1, Jan., 1951, p. 39. (Duke University Press; North Carolina)
30 Ibid., p. 34.
31 Putnam, H, 2003. The Collapse o f the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, p. 30. (Harvard 
University Press; Cambridge)
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trivial distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘values’ in that we know what we mean when 
we say that we can distinguish the two, philosophically speaking, this trivial 
distinction doesn’t mean all that much, because facts and values are usually far too 
intertwined with each other to be meaningfully separated.
Far from a dichotomy, there is only a constant entanglement.
Putnam uses the example of ‘cruelty’ to show this entanglement (i.e. we may say 
that a king was ‘cruel’, but cannot say what we mean by this without describing the 
facts of his reign: the body count left in his wake, the laws he laid down, etc.. .nor 
could we describe those particular facts without concluding with the normative 
judgement that he was cruel). As he puts it; ‘to split thick ethical concepts into a 
“descriptive meaning component” and a “prescriptive meaning component” founders 
on the impossibility of saying what the “descriptive meaning” of, say, “cruel” is 
without using the word “cruel” or a synonym.’
Defenders of the fact/value dichotomy however, will tell you that this blatant 
entanglement does not negate the fact that there are still two separate entities being 
entangled here, and though they intertwine in our conventional usage, they are both 
still mutually exclusive categories with no way of intertwining metaphysically and 
therefore any insistence that a value can be a fact or a fact a value, is purely mistaken.
Whilst we could try to say that our judgment of a description of a king’s actions 
leaves us no choice but to determine him ‘cruel’, and that this is proof that descriptive 
facts necessarily give rise to a normative judgement; it could also arguably be said 
that such a normative evaluation only takes place if one makes a separate, non-factual, 
normative evaluation about the facts that they are offered. It is still a separate 
thought-process, and not at all entangled anywhere with the pure facts of the matter;
32 Ibid., p. 38
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reducing the idea’s credentials as a ‘fact’ to the dismissive realm of expressivist 
emotivism.
When I claim that the facts of a king’s reign shows that he was cruel, what I could 
really be saying, is that when I hear those particular facts I have a separate and 
subjective emotional response that gives rise in me to feelings of negativity and 
disgust, and so use an appropriately understood word in my language with which to 
express my arbitrary and individual disapproval: ‘cruelty’. It is not inconceivable that 
someone else could hear the same facts of the king’s reign, and, not having the same 
specific psychological make-up as me, not think that he is cruel, remaining unmoved 
by the descriptions; even applauding them.
However, I would reject this objection, and not simply because I believe that under, 
to borrow Michael Smith’s phrase, ‘conditions of full rationality’, unclouded by 
misinformed biases and conditioned prejudice, the only conceivable reaction would, 
as Putnam suggests, be a judgement of cruelty; but also for a more fundamental 
reason concerning the fallacious but popular, either/or, meta-ethical claim that one 
can either be a cognitivist or a non-cognitivist, and that moral judgements which rely, 
in part, on non-cognitivist states such as desire or emotion are somehow to be 
dismissed as facts.
I would not deny for a second that part of the entanglement Putnam speaks of comes 
from an emotional response to the facts of the matter that help inform our normative 
conclusions; I would, however, deny that these emotional aspects to such evaluations 
are to be bracketed as somehow outside the scope of acceptable rationale when 
deducing factual conclusions, or that their presence in our judgements necessarily 
cloud objective cognitive verifiability. Instead, I would say that the presence of
33 Smith, M, 2000. The Moral Problem, p. 187. (Blackwell Publishers; Oxford)
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emotional responses and related attitudes and psychological states is a crucial and 
intractable empirical fact of the human experience, necessarily to be accounted for in 
any serious empirical consideration of an agent’s actions. It is not a situation of 
either/or between cognitivism and non-cognitivism, but rather, as Rachels puts it, that 
‘our cognitive capacities can play a significant part in forming, shaping, and 
sustaining our attitudes. They need not merely “serve and obey” whatever attitudes 
we already happen to have.’34
Although the specific emotions, attitudes and psychology of each individual human 
being might well be very different, what remains a universal fact of all human beings 
is that all individuals, all things being equal, have some sort o f  emotional, attitudinal 
and psychological reaction to states of affairs, and this truism must be taken into 
account, rather than simply dismissed, when considering the full ramifications of an 
act. Further still, due to the universally held nature and biological basis for these 
emotions, attitudes, and psychology, there is an arguable commonality and 
predictability of what they might likely be in any given situation, under ‘conditions of 
full rationality’.
For instance, although one could hypothetically imagine someone who remains 
unmoved by the description of a king who, say, killed the children of citizens who 
refused to pay taxes, cooked up their bodies, and then beat the mother of those 
children whilst force-feeding her their charred remains, the likely human reaction to 
such information (not the prima facie right or wrong reaction, simply the most likely), 
the most logical emotional, attitudinal and psychological reaction under ‘conditions of 
full rationality’, would be to agree that such a king was ‘cruel’ and that such acts were 
‘wrong’.
34 Rachels, J: Naturalism, in LaFollette, H (ed), 2000. The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, p. 80. 
(Blackwell Publishers; London)
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Importantly, as I am not trying to completely equate normative claims to the 
presence of non-cognitive states, but just simply acknowledge the necessity of 
incorporating non-cognitive states into our full rational considerations due to their 
integral place in human consciousness, then the presence of the anomalous few who 
might not immediately see this entanglement between the descriptive facts of the 
matter and a commonly deduced normative conclusion does not immediately negate 
the argument of entanglement. It simply means that they have reached different 
normative conclusions than most, but must still, as thinking and feeling human beings 
in possession of emotions, attitudes and a psychology of their own, have seen an 
entanglement of some value within the facts, albeit one deduced with a rationale 
which, for some reason, clearly conflicts with majority opinion on the matter.
Whilst such a rationale might certainly seem questionable, what this at least means is 
that this area of moral dispute can be meaningfully debated between clashing rational 
agents on mutually comprehensible grounds -  there must be some perceived rational 
basis (‘some reason’) as to why one person’s rationale determines from a specific set 
of facts that such acts are cruel, and another’s that they are morally acceptable. The 
conflicting parties can thus enter into a meaningful and logical discourse about their 
conclusions and the facts which support them, attempting to defend their respective 
positions; and under ‘conditions of full rationality’ it is arguable that one view would 
be proved logically superior to the other based on a complete understanding of all the
' y c
relevant evidence. As Rachels concludes,
we need never assume that moral disagreements are expressions of intractable 
differences between people. More mundanely, and more frequently, disagreement will
35 The concept o f ‘cruelty’, as Putnam acknowledges, is a thicker ethical concept than I would be 
comfortable calling entirely unproblematic. That said; the above argument could equally apply to the 
entangled conclusion, made from hearing the facts of the king’s rule, that his actions were ‘wrong’.
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be the result of ignorance, prejudice, self-deceit, and the like. Our working hypothesis 
may be that we are enough alike that we could be brought to agree about most things, if 
only the sources of error could be eliminated.36
Indeed, I believe that a major source of error in the argument of those who defend 
the idea of a fact/value dichotomy is a key misunderstanding of what makes 
something a ‘fact’.
An ethical position not grounded in some sort of factual belief doesn’t make any 
sense. Critics can reduce moral thought to a series of gut-reactions, prescriptions, and 
cries of boo or hooray; but to do so misses the crucial point that to have such a gut 
reaction, or think something worthy enough to prescribe or cheer for, can only come 
from having reasons for doing so; reasons about the facts of the matter.
When we say something like ‘murder is morally wrong’ -  regardless of what 
specific acts one counts as murder -  it is because in the mind of the moralist, there are 
strong, fact-based reasons for believing that it is wrong. Some are purely biological 
facts about the human body and its physical limits, others are psychological facts 
about possible emotions, feelings and attitudes murder might evoke, both in the 
victim, and in others affected by the murderer’s actions, all plausibly extrapolated 
from facts known about one’s own emotions and attitudes towards the issue.
To say that murder is wrong, or that one ought not to murder, makes no sense 
without the rationale for such a position coming from the facts as the agent sees them, 
and this is exactly why there can be such discrepancies between people about things 
like animal rights, abortion or euthanasia: because there is a variance in belief about
36 Rachels, J: Naturalism, in LaFollette, H (ed), 2000. The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, p. 88. 
(Blackwell Publishers; London)
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the facts of the situation (including emotional, attitudinal and psychological facts) that 
support a person’s ultimate moral evaluation.
Now, the person could be wrong about the facts in question and still hold the ethical 
beliefs that logically follow from such faulty information -  but I do not see why, if the 
evidence is there, in just the same way that we can say that they are wrong about those 
facts despite believing them to be true, we can’t also say that, therefore, these 
misinformed ethical beliefs, based on these invalid premises, are also wrong.
The fact that we can use normative words like ought, good, should, right, etc in 
entirely uncontroversial ways when discussing incontrovertible fact statements of a 
non-moral nature, shows that the real problem with the supposed fact/value 
dichotomy is not anything to do with a logical inability to get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ 
(we do that all the time), but actually that when it comes to making ethical normative 
statements from what we know factually about the world, we often find it hard to 
agree on the facts.
For example, if I were trying to build a television set, I would base my actions on 
certain known and agreed upon facts about televisions -  because I know what a 
television set is I therefore know how I ought to build one. I would need specific 
parts, I would need to construct them in a certain order, and I would need to ensure 
that all of my actions in building, led to the creation of something that worked 
successfully at receiving television signals and allowing me to watch television 
programmes on it, etc. Within this process, there are many facts about what is, but 
every single one of them leads unproblematically to clear ought statements about what 
I should do and what I should not do.
When I try to argue for a more controversial normative statement, however -  that 
you ought not to kill another human being, for example -  there are no definitively
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known and agreed upon ‘facts’ to support this claim other than by the construction of 
some sort of reasonable, yet ultimately unverifiable, argument.
Being essentially randomly evolved, sentient, biological organisms with certain 
particular but finite psychological capacities, capabilities, needs and interests, there is 
not an inarguable and authoritative instruction manual one can point to, clearly stating 
unquestionably how one categorically ought to act as a human being that we could 
call objectively true in the same way that we could about an instruction manual about 
how you ought to build a television set. There is no emphatic way of objectively 
verifying the conclusions of any constructed argument on this matter, no matter how 
convincing; there is only, ultimately, the particular logical force of the argument 
itself, and the persuasive solidity of the evidence used to support it.
A given position about what one ought or ought not do to another person may be 
plausible, reasonable, rational and convincing; but there can still be no unassailable 
answer from an impartial and knowledgeable vantage point as to whether it is 
absolutely objectively true and thus considered an irrefutable fact, and this is why 
ethical evaluations and normative judgments are still seen by some as separate and 
distinct entities from facts, regardless of claims of an entanglement between the two.
However, I would again reject this objection and contend that the same problem of 
finding completely objective verifiability is true of any so-called fact claim, not 
simply controversial fact claims positing normative conclusions; and that all alleged 
facts are, in a sense, arguable constructions from foundations of potentially debatable 
evidence.
Consider once again, for example, the television set I am trying to build. To say 
even the uncontroversial and empirically verifiable fact that that X is a television set, 
we have to first decide on whether or not the evidence for X being a television set and
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fulfilling the necessary requirements of operation and function that define something 
as a television set as opposed to any other inanimate object, is good or bad evidence; 
and this judgement is based on our equally evaluative definition of ‘television set’ 
arrived at via a collection of normative considerations about what should and should 
not count as being included within that definition.
In other words, an element of evaluation is both linguistically and descriptively 
necessary to the discovery of any so-called ‘objective fact’. We simply cannot say 
that X is the case, without first using our evaluative reason to ascertain that X is true 
and, importantly, whether or not our reasons for believing that X is true are sound. In 
short: without using normative judgments; which returns us once again to Putnam’s 
‘entanglement’, and the reason Alasdair MacIntyre pejoratively called ‘fact’ a ‘folk- 
concept’, reminding us that,
If all our experience were to be characterised exclusively in terms o f  this bare sensory 
type o f  description... we would be confronted with not only an uninterpreted, but an 
uninterpretable world, with not merely a world not yet comprehended by theory but 
with a world that never could be comprehended by theory.37
The assumption that normative conclusions are somehow more evaluative than other 
non-normative assertions of ‘fact’ is simply not true. There is not a statement of fact 
we could utter that is not based, in some part, upon the evaluation of some evidence, 
and which could not be just as easily rejected should new counter-evidence come to 
light. This can be true of controversial normative fact claims, such as, say, the claim 
that there is a moral obligation not to murder someone; or of non-controversial 
empirical fact claims such as, say, the claim that there is a cup of coffee on my desk.
37 MacIntyre, A, 1981. After Virtue, p. 76. (University of Notre Dame Press; Indiana)
31
In both cases, new evidence and argument could prove such alleged facts to be false; 
but, importantly, until it does, then to the best of our knowledge and on the basis of all 
the relevant information and argument at our disposal: if the evidence that we do have 
supports the conclusion convincingly, then we have to concede that there is no good 
reason to believe that either alleged fact, normative or non-normative, is not true.
Let us not forget, that there was once a time when it was widely held as fact that the 
earth was flat, or that the sun revolved around it. It is only analysis, constant re- 
evaluation and the procurement of all the relevant information about something, that 
allows us to plausibly say that X is true; and even then it is only plausible to say it is 
so as a product of tentative evaluation, leaving descriptive facts just as fluid as 
normative ones.
Ultimately, any purported fact-claim, be it normative or non-normative, needs a 
basis of reasons and evidence that support it, and just like any other fact-claim, a 
normative fact’s basis of reasons and evidence can be hard to obtain to complete 
satisfaction; but if obtained and reasonably supported and sustained, it seems to me to 
be no different from the conditions we accept as basis forjudging any wow-normative 
fact-claim to be considered true, and unless we want to deny the validity of all fact- 
claims and speak only ever again in relativist terms or of meaningless subjectivity, 
then we are committed to also say, therefore, that a normative statement can be 
considered just as factual as any of our other accepted non-normative facts.
This is not an attempt to denounce the idea of possible objectivity; I am not going to 
take that next step into extreme relativism that the postmodernists insist upon and 
conclude that, because any attempt at objectivity can only come about via subjective 
evaluation of evidence, all claims to objectivity are therefore subjective and thus there 
can be no such thing as objective truth or falsehood. I am simply pointing out that our
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claims to objectivity must always be supported by evidence and argument, and that 
any claim about how things are, necessarily involves an evaluation of any presented 
fact, and the reasons that there are for believing it to be true. Truth exists, and so too 
does non-truth; but most truths and therefore facts should always be accompanied 
with the cautionary proviso: to the best o f our knowledge.
Though seeming more sceptical of truth-claims than it actually is, the proviso is 
actually an unspoken assumption in all truth-claims that we make anyway. Without 
getting too bogged down here in a tangential epistemological discussion that distracts 
us from the main focus of our political discussion; when I turn from my desk and see 
my girlfriend sitting across the room from me, I have excellent reasons for saying as a 
fact that she is in the room with me; but even with this excellent first-hand 
observational reason for my belief, I still only know it to be true to the best o f my 
knowledge. It could be that there is an elaborate system of smoke and mirrors in place 
and all I am actually seeing is an illusion; it could be that a lifelike mannequin has 
been set in her place -  sometimes you simply can’t know everything -  but from what 
you do know you can give good and compelling reasons to say that something is the 
case to the best o f your knowledges and as the chances of smoke, mirrors, and 
mannequins are very unlikely, the best of my knowledge in this instance seems pretty 
complete. If however it did turn out that I was merely looking at a wax-work replica 
of my girlfriend and she was in actual fact not sitting across the room from me; I 
would simply have to say that what I -  to the best of my knowledge -  previously 
believed to be a fact, was wrong.
The belief that facts hold some essential property which values do not is misguided. 
All that facts are, ultimately, are statements which are true. And all that we can ever 
know to be true is that which, once all the evidence is in, it is reasonable to believe is
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plausible to the best o f  our knowledge. Whilst there might be definitively objective 
facts and immortal truths ‘out there’ in the world about what is; not being bom with 
an innate encyclopaedic knowledge of exactly what those facts and truths are, the only 
way we can ever come to have reasonable knowledge about what is, is by using our 
reason and assessing whatever relevant evidence we can obtain to make an evaluative 
judgment about whether or not we ought to believe that X is the case; and the same 
can be said about the way we make evaluative judgments about certain pieces of 
evidence which give rise to evaluations that are ethical.
A value statement, whilst a different type of factual statement from a purely 
descriptive factual one, is in no way necessarily less factual simply because it 
incorporates normative terms; and to speak of normative statements as lacking the 
noble validating characteristics of factual statements, is to miss the point entirely of 
what normative statements are: a certain kind of factual statement about how a 
rational and autonomous individual should reasonably choose to act when taking into 
account all the non-normative facts about a situation, considered in conjunction with 
the acknowledgment of some sort of goal that, if it is wished to be achieved, requires 
certain things to be done, and certain things not to be done.
This idea was noted by Max Black, who used the example of a chess game in 
progress to illustrate it:
Fischer wants to mate Botwinnik.
The one and only way to mate Botwinnik is for Fischer to move the Queen.
Therefore, Fischer should move the Queen.
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As Black puts it, ‘here, it seems to me, both premises state matters of fact, while the 
conclusion is a nonfactual "shouldM-statement\38 Unfortunately Black, ultimately 
influenced by the meta-ethical debates of the time, concludes rather weakly from this 
only that ‘some nonfactual conclusions do follow and can be shown to follow from 
factual premises’39, continually relegating the achieved ‘should’ statement to the 
realm of the ‘nonfactual’; but I see no real reason to assume that such conclusions 
cannot be considered as facts. That Fischer ought to move the Queen seems 
inarguable when rationally concluded from all the available information: 1) that 
Fischer wants to mate Botwinnik (which he does) and 2) that the one and only way to 
mate Botwinnik is for him to move the Queen. There is nothing within this pattern of 
logic to suggest that the conclusion is in any way less empirically grounded than any 
other commonly accepted fact-claim.
Similarly, it is precisely the acknowledged fact of my existing goal to build a 
television set, which allows us to translate the descriptive facts of what a television is 
into prescriptive facts of what I ought to do in order to achieve that goal. Without the 
goal of wanting to build a television set being in place, then the claim that I ought to 
act in a particular way conducive only to the assured creation of a television set, 
becomes incoherent.
There is no mysterious step of logic here that we cannot comprehend or mystical 
property of oughtness that we should not be able to fathom; just the common meaning 
of ‘ought’ in our language as a prescriptive word used in concurrence with a rational 
goal and a fact-based argument as to what option it would be most logical to choose in 
order to achieve that goal.
38 Black, M: The Gap Between “Is” and “Should', in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 73, No. 2. (Apr., 
1964), p. 169.
39 Ibid., p. 180
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Put another way, oughtness can be reduced to this simple equation: if X is the goal 
of Y, and Z leads to goal X but Q does not, then Y ought to do Z not Q. Far from not 
being able to get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, without the is, the ought would make no 
sense, and further still, as choice-making people with emotions, attitudes, psychology 
and thus, ultimately interests, we can only have so many ‘is’ statements before an 
‘ought’ conclusion logically follows.
As we experience and evaluate the world, certain supported facts become accepted 
as true to the best of our knowledge; and when we combine this knowledge of things 
with the necessity in life to rationally choose our actions as autonomous human 
beings with particular goals and interests amid an infinite variety of choices, then it 
seems entirely appropriate to say that, all things considered, certain choices make 
more sense than others in terms of achieving those goals and interests, and so, 
therefore, it becomes a fact that in order to achieve those goals and interests we ought 
to make those choices and not other ones.
Of course, one might reasonably argue that such a position solves nothing, as we still 
have the question of why choose one goal over another? Indeed, Charles Taylor 
argues that ‘an agent who could not evaluate desires at all would lack the minimum 
degree of reflectiveness which we associate with a human agent, and would also lack 
a crucial part of the background for what we describe as the exercise of will.’40
That we have to choose between options may be true to the point of inconsequence, 
but that truth leads us no closer to a valid explanation of why we ought to choose one 
goal from another. Whilst the claim that normative statements require their ‘ought’ 
component to be in relation to desired goal X might well be accurate, it still leaves the 
question open as to why I ought to want goal X?
40 Taylor, C, 1996. Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I, p. 28. (Cambridge 
University Press; Cambridge)
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In the case of wow-ethical uses of the normative word ‘ought’ there is no problem 
here, as such goals can be completely arbitrary and unjustified. That my goal is to 
make a television needs no real validation as it is not intended as a moral prescription 
for anyone else, merely a low-impact personal choice of my own. However, when I 
say that the goal of ‘being moral’ necessitates that I ought not kill when faced with a 
particular choice, we have a tautology where one seems to be saying that if your goal 
is to be moral, you ought to make the moral choice, but without supplying any 
rationale for why being moral should be a desirable goal, what being moral actually 
means, and leaving us without the necessary tools to make, what Taylor would call, a 
‘strong evaluation’ about our desires. Without an answer to the question ‘why be 
moral?’ we are left with little or no compelling rationale for choosing to be moral 
rather than z/wmoral, and the worry that morality itself as a goal, is insufficient, 
reducing ethics to an arbitrarily chosen instrumentalism whereby we only make moral 
choices to achieve some sort of randomly selected objective.
This, however, is where the idea of political teleology will come into the equation. 
As I will soon show, a necessary conception of what I am calling ‘political teleology’ 
(an underlying goal and justificatory purpose for which a political system is required) 
is unavoidably presupposed by any claim to legitimacy in politics, and this political 
teleology cannot be made sensible unless made in syndicate with a correlative theory 
of human teleology (the goals and interests of the people within that society, which a 
legitimate political system is obligated to fulfill). For politics to be comprehensible 
therefore, and hold any attempted claim to authority, so too there must be certain 
ethical claims, and, as such, practical political philosophy unavoidably takes place 
only in circumstances in which the conclusions of certain meta-ethical disputes have 
already been necessarily decided upon, and in which a pragmatic presupposition of
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meaningful ethical language is automatically manifest, regardless of any remaining 
possibilities of theoretical doubt in other contexts.
When it comes to normative discussion of political power, therefore, the existence of 
this necessary political teleology will fill the X of our equation: in terms of legitimate 
politics, we will know what is, or is not, justifiable because the necessary fact of this 
teleology as the presupposed goal of political enterprise is inseparable from any 
further normative consideration about its scope and application, and thus only acts 
which further those legitimate goals can be plausibly vindicated. Further still, as the 
existence of this political teleology implies -  by necessity -  a teleological conception 
of the people in whose interests politics finds its legitimate purpose (the people need 
X, therefore they establish a political system to ensure X, not Y, in their lives), the 
admission of the necessary meta-ethical underpinnings of practical political 
philosophy must also concede a more general intelligibility about everyday ethical 
discussion; replacing the X of the equation in these circumstances with human 
teleology and allowing us to reasonably say that as this teleology (X) is the goal of the 
individuals who hold it (Y), and Z leads to goal X but Q does not, then Y ought to do 
Z not Q.
Obviously a lot more concrete argumentation must be provided to prove the 
necessary existence of these posited teleological theories upon which the equation 
now relies, and I shall do precisely that concrete arguing in the following chapters.
For now though we can agree that, regardless of whether or not these human and 
political teleologies do actually exist, what matters is that i f  they exist -  and in the 
context of practical political discussion it appears that such an assumption is a 
necessity -  and some intelligible ‘goal’ of human or political action can be reasonably 
deduced or adopted; then we would have no problem answering the question: if X is
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the goal of Y, and Z leads to goal X but Q does not, then Y ought to do Z not Q; but 
why ought one choose goal X?
Perhaps that is not as definitive an argument as some might like, but it seems to me 
that all too often philosophers in the field of meta-ethics are looking for something in 
ethical thinking that is unnecessary, irrelevant, and simply not there to be found in our 
moral knowledge: absolute certainty. Within most cultures, moral laws are depicted 
as something deeper and more intrinsically unbreakable than conventional, human- 
made, laws. In fact, it is only this sense of absoluteness, of profound and other­
worldly wrongness at breaking them, which seems to give the justification for the 
extremes of punishment we give to those who do violate their edicts; not only within 
the tangible workings of human systems of criminal justice, but in the myths of 
human theology. If a person breaks a man-made law and gets away with it (say, by 
parking on double yellow lines and not getting a ticket), we have little problem with 
their escape from ‘justice’ and accept that they got away with it. If a person breaks a 
moral law however, we demand something more; we want the wrongness of their act 
to exist independently of observed censure and punishment; we want it to somehow 
exist as an absolute wrongness out there in the world, to which a blind eye cannot 
possibly be turned. To that end we have invented numerous religions that assure their 
followers that those who do break such absolute moral laws, whether or not caught 
and punished in their life here on earth, will still be unable to escape their final 
judgment by an all-seeing, all-knowing god.
If I do not do as I ought to do when building my television set, all that happens is 
that I do not have a television set. If I do not do as I ought to do morally, we want the 
repercussions to be much more profound. This is the kind of thing most are looking 
for in their theories of ethics, and I believe it is this desired absolutist quality that
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Mackie was looking for, and could not find, in his famous ‘argument from 
queemess’.41 Mackie claimed that ‘if there were objective values, then they would be 
entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything 
else in the universe’,42 and he claimed this because he believed that an ethical truth 
would need to be ‘intrinsically prescriptive’,43 with any wrong action having to have a 
‘not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it’ 44 Such an entity would certainly be, in 
Mackie’s archaic phraseology, very queer indeed; but this queemess is not a blow to 
morality itself as Mackie thought -  it is simply a blow to Mackie’s, and other 
similarly flawed theories of what morality ‘must’ be. To look for an intrinsic 
prescriptive quality within a moral tmth, is mistaking the forest for the trees -  a moral 
fact is a prescription, and it is its prescriptiveness which constitutes it as a normative 
fact rather than a non-normative fact; but its prescriptiveness is not a separate part of 
it, nor something metaphysically significant: a moral fact is simply a truthful 
prescription made rationally about what one ought or ought not to do based on all the 
descriptive facts of the matter, as known to the best of one’s knowledge. And just as 
the truthfulness of a descriptive fact has within it no innate ‘truthiness’45 that makes 
one compelled to believe it (other than a convincing and reasonable sum of evidence 
which persuades one of its factuality), neither is there any further innate and magical 
compulsion-giving property within these ethical prescriptive facts to ensure that they 
are actually followed, other than the weight of the available evidence on which the 
veracity of the prescription has been constructed.
Such a view is similar to Thomas Scanlon’s contractualist account of ethics, which 
‘holds that an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be
41 Mackie, J. L, 1977. Ethics. (Penguin Books; Middlesex)
42 Ibid., p. 38
43 Ibid., p. 40
44 ibid
45 Colbert, S, 2005. The Colbert Report, Comedy Central Television
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disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one 
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.’46
The compulsion to follow moral prescriptions, as with any proposed law or 
instruction, can only ultimately come from the rational autonomous agent themselves, 
individually convinced by the understandable and compelling logical rationale given 
for what they ought to do, over what they ought not to do. And if the moral agent is 
not convinced by the given rationale, like our imaginary individual discussed earlier 
who was not moved to determine our child-killing, mother-beating, cannibalizing king 
as being ‘cruel’, then they can either explain in mutually comprehensible terms why 
they are not convinced, and give a better, more compelling, reason for holding a 
different conclusion (perhaps utilizing new facts that were unavailable before, or an 
alternative but viable interpretation of key information) or they can choose to ignore 
the logic and rationale of the given facts and ignore the edict -  but just like those who 
still believe the earth to be flat and the sun to revolve around it, we can say, quite 
reasonably and factually that these people who do not acquiesce in certain well- 
supported and reasonably constructed ethical positions without offering us a 
compelling justification for why they do not are, to the best of our knowledge, wrong.
Put bluntly, the quest for an absolute, unarguable and all pervasive complex set of 
moral laws by which we are to live our lives will always be a folly that is destined to 
fail; and history shows us a myriad of gruesome examples where certain groups or 
individuals have attempted to impose such ridiculous fictions on others and nothing 
but conflict and bloodshed has been achieved. But such mystic absolutism is 
unnecessary for a persuasive ethical theory, so long as there are rational and
46 Scanlon, T. M. 2000. What We Owe to Each Other, p. 153. (Harvard University Press; Cambridge)
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compelling fact-based justifications for an ethical position held at any given time. As 
Renford Bambrough eloquently illustrates:
My proof that we have moral knowledge consists essentially in saying, ‘We know that 
this child, who is about to undergo what would otherwise be painful surgery, should be 
given anaesthetic before the operation. Therefore we know at least one moral 
proposition to be true.’ I argue that no proposition that could plausibly be alleged as a 
reason in favour o f  doubting the truth o f  the proposition that the child should be given 
anaesthetic can possibly be more certainly true than that proposition itself.47
Despite the position’s analytical appeal, the problem has never really been that we 
cannot get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. The real problem has always been that we simply 
cannot always agree on exactly what is; or even if we do finally agree on it, decide 
that the obvious and logical ought that follows from it needs something more to call it 
an ethical truth because we have been told for so long that a viable ethical theory must 
come from somewhere external and transcendent to us, rather than from constructing 
our own rational and autonomous evaluation of all the relevant facts we have about a 
particular ethical situation, to the best of our knowledge.
This seeming necessity of there having to be ‘something more’ to normative truth- 
claims than we need from non-normative truth-claims, however, is an illusion with no 
compelling basis; yet it is precisely this illusion that the meta-ethical obsession with 
this theoretical fact/value dichotomy appears to be chasing, hunting for imaginary 
absolutist ethical phantoms in the shadows of what is actually a completely mundane 
and pedestrian use of everyday language.
47 Bambrough, R, 1979. Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge, p. 15. (Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Ltd; London)
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As autonomous and rational individuals constantly faced with a variety of options of 
how we are to act in any given situation and the intellectual freedom to select from 
these multiple alternatives whichever option we ultimately decide to be most credible, 
we are inescapably bound to make choices about all that we do. These choices are 
inexorable, for even to choose not to choose is ultimately a decision to opt out of 
choosing and thus a choice; therefore we are constantly seeking convincing rationales 
for choosing one thing over another. We have to choose something, so we try to make 
sure that we don’t just choose owything if  certain choices will have evaluatively 
‘better’ outcomes than others. In this way we are intractably condemned to the 
responsibility of moral realism: not all of our choices will have the same results and 
so we must work out along some plausible basis, which results we can justifiably 
choose to bring about over others.
What the methodology of ethical constructivism does better than any other ethical 
theory is recognize this truism, and attempt to rationally construct a practical account 
of what we can reasonably say would be the ‘right’ choice or the ‘wrong’ choice, to 
the best o f our knowledge, in any given situation. This is why I shall be utilizing the 
constructivist approach to ethical justification within this thesis. Whilst rejecting the 
fact/value dichotomy as a meaningful obstacle to sound ethical theory, I also reject the 
equally problematic idea that normative conclusions can simply be asserted without 
any evidence whatsoever, on the spurious grounds of unvindicated claims to 
knowledge of unknowable metaphysical ‘facts’ about the world or transcendental 
ideological assertions of ‘reality’.
Until constructivism came along, creating a plausible account of ethics was either an 
incredibly hard, or incredibly easy, task. If one took a purely linguistic approach to 
ethical theory, and concerned oneself solely with determining definitive meanings to
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words like ‘good’, or answering questions about how the language of ‘ought’ could 
logically be derived from the language of ‘is’, then speaking sensibly about the very 
idea of using ethics became a monumental task of analytical endurance, with most 
attempts to draw up a more substantive account of ethical content felled at this first 
semantic hurdle. Conversely, if one entirely forsook the genuine concerns of the 
meta-ethicists, and decided that moral language needed no justification at all; then all 
too often we would find ethical theories resting on metaphysically dubious 
foundations; claims about the will and nature of an unproveable god perhaps, the 
assertion of an invisible world of perfect forms for which there is no evidence, or a 
reliance upon the unconfirmed abstract idea of an unsubstantiated transcendental self.
As the history of ethical thought evolved and the linguistic turn in philosophy grew 
in significance, outdated and implausible metaphysics became easily dismissible in 
modem thinking as unfounded superstitions and baseless assumption; meaning that 
ethical theories which had previously grounded their strong moral claims in such 
questionable conjecture were left untenable and simply rejected. This of course gave 
support for rejecting ethical realism within the philosophy of language and very little 
intellectual weaponry left over for those wishing to defend ethics from its critics and 
provide a compelling justificatory basis for normative thought.
A solution to this problem began to unconsciously formulate itself though in ethical 
writing within political philosophy during the 1970s, primarily with the publication of 
John Rawls’ 1971 book, A Theory o f  Justice. In many ways implicitly acknowledging 
the idea that there is no irrefutably objective knowledge of anything -  simply 
rationally plausible evaluations of all relevant information that lead to conclusions of 
fact to the best o f our knowledge -  Rawls boldly attempted to constmct an account of 
political justice without incorporating any unvindicated metaphysical assumptions
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into his argument, instead trying to use only plausibly supported foundations of 
tangibly constructed knowledge to analyse and assess moral intuitions on the subject
A O
via a process of ‘reflective equilibrium’.
Debate about his perceived success or failure at achieving this ambitious task, and 
specifically about the particular conclusions of justice Rawls yielded, has shaped 
political philosophy to this day, and a wealth of literature continues to be produced 
either criticizing or building from where Rawls left off (including Rawls’ own follow- 
up works).49 A major legacy of the methodology of A Theory o f Justice, however, as 
well as the specific political and theoretical debates it stimulated, was this new 
constructivist approach to ethical discussion within politics, and the continued 
application of the idea that whilst a meaningful normative theory mustn’t rely upon 
disputable metaphysical foundations, this did not mean that a meaningful normative 
theory cannot still be plausibly built from firmer, well-supported, rational foundations 
of reasonably affirmed knowledge.
Robert Nozick said of Rawls’ work that ‘political philosophers now must either 
work within Rawls’ theory or explain why not’,50 and this remark held true as much 
about Rawls’ methodology as it did of his substantive conclusions about justice. 
Fittingly, the majority of clashing causes in political theory articulated in the years 
since A Theory o f  Justice, have thus been framed largely along constructivist grounds; 
the purest expression of which arguably came from Onora O’Neill in her 1996 book 
Towards Justice and Virtue, which attempted to construct a vindicated account of
48 Rawls, J, 2000. A Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
49 Some (but by no means all) key names to consider for-or-against Rawls, would be Robert Nozick, 
Michael Sandel, Ronald Dworkin, Susan Moller Okin, Brian Barry, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael 
Walzer, Norman Daniels, Amartya Sen, G. A. Cohen, David Miller, T. M. Scanlon, Thomas Nagel, H. 
L. A. Hart, Jurgen Habermas, and Joel Feinberg.
50 Nozick, R, 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 183. (Basic Books; New York: Basic Books)
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practical reason with which to bridge the growing theoretical gap between the 
competing factions of ethical universalists and ethical particularists.51 
As O’Neill explains, ‘to construct is only to reason with all possible solidity from 
available beginnings, using available and followable methods to reach attainable and 
sustainable conclusions for relevant audiences.’
Ethical constructivism is not designed to show absolutist and definitive moral proofs 
or grand ethical theories; but simply takes that which we can convincingly claim to 
know about the ethical subject we are analysing (what is) and uses that information to 
construct a plausible and transparent account of what it seems reasonable to suggest 
follows from those available facts about what we can justifiably say ought to be. It 
will be this technique that I shall ultimately utilize to construct an account of 
legitimate political teleology, and to unpack the terms of the universal ethical contract 
necessarily underlying all attempted justification for political power.
1.4: Confirming the Rational Autonomous Self
To that end, a final piece of preliminary groundwork is essential for the argument that 
follows. Several claims I have already made in this chapter have suggested that I hold 
a particular conception of human individuals as being rational and autonomous 
beings. To ensure that this conception is not groundlessly asserted, I shall briefly 
attempt to justify this view of humanity, as its role in the argument that follows is 
significant. Indeed, the very notion of political teleology and idea that externally 
constructed political power is something artificial to society which needs justifying if 
it is to be considered legitimate (upon which this thesis rests) relies on it being both 
true that the individuals within that society have the capacity to autonomously choose
51 O’Neill, O, 1996. Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f Practical Reasoning. 
(Cambridge University Press; Cambridge)
52 Ibid., p. 63
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not to accept the imposed authority of external governance, and also that the basis of 
the choices that they do ultimately autonomously make (either to accept the 
justificatory arguments of political power or reject them) are arguably rational; rooted, 
either consciously or unconsciously, in coherent and compelling argument rather than 
unexamined arbitrariness or instinctual obedience.
‘Rationality’, therefore -  another contestable term -  herein refers to the way in 
which a human being chooses between A and B; not only in terms of the method by 
which a particular goal can be achieved, but in terms of what goal they are ultimately 
choosing to endorse. It is the psychological requirement that we have comprehensible 
reasons for doing what we do; the capacity and necessity for each choice to be, in 
some way, motivated by an appeal to logical coherency: a rational interaction with all 
the available facts of the matter -  to the best of one’s knowledge -  that reaches a 
defendable conclusion, and is open to revision in light of new evidence.
I believe that the rational autonomy of human beings becomes self-evident as soon 
as we consider some alternatives. Immediately, for example, we would have to reject 
the idea of an innate irrationality to human thinking. This does not mean rejecting the 
potential for irrationality within human thought; there is clearly much evidence that 
occasionally people do not always act in the most rational manner possible. However, 
it does mean recognizing that these moments of irrationality can only be plausibly 
distinguished as irrational if they are set against a background of generally assumed 
rationality. Indeed, even then, it is arguable that our most irrational moments might 
actually be motivated by unconscious rationalizations: the slit-wrists a seemingly 
irrational expression of the perfectly rational notion of needing help; the unplanned 
one-night-stand a way of acknowledging to yourself the long-repressed thought that 
there are problems in your marriage that must be addressed; the unstoppable binging
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of the bulimic an irrational manifestation of rationally construed feelings of 
inadequacy and low self-esteem.
The position that people are primarily irrational is incompatible with the self-evident 
reliance on some form of reason all conscious humans depend upon when making the 
manifold choices that their everyday life confronts them with. In a world of infinite 
possibilities, we need to have some tool for analysing and assessing the competing 
strands of motivating input, and that tool is the logic of our rationality. Indeed, the 
necessity of rationality’s existence for this task has evolutionary roots; as Daniel 
Dennett remarks:
Suppose you just want to be alive on planet Earth. What do you need? Starting at the 
molecular level, you need not just DNA, but all the molecular tools -  proteins -  for 
accomplishing the many steps in DNA replication.. .These building blocks themselves 
had to be designed over time. The complete kit, which we share with all life on the 
planet today, got assembled and refined over several billion years, and it replaces 
simpler kits for our still simpler ancestors. We are dependant on our kit, and they were 
dependant on theirs, but we have more possibilities than they did, because the 
improvements in our kit made possible higher forms of aggregation, and these in turn 
made possible ever more devious ways of colliding with other things in the world, and 
exploiting the results of those collisions. When life began, there was just one way of 
being alive. It was do A or die. Now there are options: do A or B or C or D or.. .die.54
53 To pick out any specific recent papers or books from the wealth of psychological literature on 
unconscious repression, rationalization, displacement, and latency would be entirely arbitrary so I will 
simply suggest starting at the beginning: James, W, 1957. The Principles o f Psychology volumes 1 & 2. 
(Dover Publications; New York); Freud, S, 1965. The Interpretation o f Dreams. (Avon Books; New 
York); Freud, S, 1963. Early Psychoanalytic Writings. (Collier Books, New York).
54 Dennett, D, 2003. Freedom Evolves, pp., 143-144. (Allen Lane; London)
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As life became more complicated and the variety of options before the human 
animal as to what they should do increased in their complexity, it was the 
development of reason and logic which allowed us to adapt and survive within these 
baroque landscapes of choice.
We are the species that discovered doubt. Is there enough food laid by for winter?
Have I miscalculated? Is my mate cheating on me? Should we have moved south? Is 
it safe to enter this cave? Other creatures are often visibly agitated by their own 
uncertainties about just such questions, but because they cannot actually ask themselves 
these questions, they cannot articulate their predicaments for themselves or take steps 
to improve their grip on the truth. They are stuck in a world of appearances, making 
the best they can of how things seem and seldom, if ever, worrying about whether how 
things seem is how they truly are. We alone can be racked with doubt, and we alone 
have been provoked by the epistemic itch to seek a remedy: better truth-seeking 
methods.55
Whilst there is much to dispute about the perceived significance of evolution in all 
aspects of human life, and I do not intend to rely upon here, or debate, the more 
controversial assumptions of specific evolutionary psychiatrists and particular socio­
biologists; the basic fact of evolution itself is one, I feel, that there is great evidence to 
accept, and Dennett’s theory simply extrapolates known evolutionary behaviour into a 
plausible account of our developing and complex consciousness, and thus the 
evolutionary necessity of rationality in conscious human beings.
Returning to our question of autonomy, we will notice that this evolutionary 
explanation for rationality also implies an autonomous self: the need to rationally
55 Ibid., pp., 165-166.
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evaluate the competing options before us only making sense within the context of the 
choosing agent as an unbound individual, free to make any choice they ultimately 
decide upon.
When Rawls put forward his theory of justice, he was criticised by Michael Sandel 
for relying on a similarly construed idea of rational autonomy at work within 
individuals. Contrary to my own approach, which believes such a conception of 
humanity is necessary for a theory of political and human teleology; Rawls had 
rejected a teleological view of ethics for a specifically deontological theory ‘that 
either does not specify the good independently from the right, or does not interpret the 
right as maximizing the good.’56 This belief in the priority of right was, as Sandel 
argued,
both moral and foundational. It is grounded in the concept o f  a subject given prior to 
its ends, a concept held indispensable to our understanding ourselves as freely 
choosing, autonomous beings. Society is best arranged when it is governed by 
principles that do not presuppose any particular conception o f  the good, for any other
arrangement would fail to respect persons as beings capable o f  choice; it would treat
57them as objects rather than subjects, as means rather than ends m themselves.
For Rawls, the claim that the self was rationally autonomous meant that any ends or 
goals which that self claimed to hold must be arrived at only as a result of choice, and 
could not be construed as existing with any essentialism, prior to the existence of the 
rationally autonomous individual themselves and the choices that they make.
But this doesn’t necessarily follow.
56 Rawls, J, 2000. A Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, p. 26. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
57 Sandel, M, 1998. Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice 2nd edition, p.9. (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge)
Whilst a rationally autonomous individual would certainly have a freedom to choose 
between alternative ends, the requirements of rationality would cause their choices to 
be grounded in a foundation of reasons for making one choice over another, and it 
doesn’t seem incoherent to suggest that those reasons might include some notions of a 
teleological self whereby choice A would help one achieve certain rationally endorsed 
teleological goals and choice B would not; nor does it seem incoherent to suggest that 
a teleological self might possess as one of its goals the freedom to autonomously 
choose a variety of «o«-teleological goals as well, decided upon by the autonomous 
individual as a reasonable and justifiable self-interested end.
For Sandel though, this abstracted notion of the rationally autonomous self was alien 
to any conception of self we might recognize.
If all the se lf consisted in were a concatenation o f  various contingent desires, wants, 
and ends, there would be no non-arbitrary way, either for the self or for some outside 
observer, to identify these desires, interests, and ends, as the desires o f  any particular 
subject. Rather than be o f  the subject, they would be the subject. But the subject they 
would be would be indistinguishable from the sea o f  undifferentiated attributes o f  an 
unarticulated situation, which is to say it would be no subject at all, at least no subject 
we could recognize or pick out as resembling a human person.58
Evolutionary argument reduces Sandel’s complaint to inconsequence, however, by 
suggesting that the very notion of ‘self, as Hume unwittingly exposed when 
describing it as ‘nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions’,59 has its 
origins precisely in such contingent concatenation; the development of a situated and 
enduring ‘self a necessary ‘centre of narrative gravity’ in a shared social world.
58 Ibid., p. 20
59 Hume, D, 1985. A Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 300. (Penguin; London)
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We wouldn’t exist -  as Selves.. . i f  it weren’t for the evolution o f social interaction 
requiring each human animal to create within itself a subsystem designed for 
interacting with others. Once created, it could also interact with itself at different 
times. Until we human beings came along, no agent on the planet enjoyed the curious 
«o«-obliviousness we have to the causal links that emerged as salient once we human 
beings began to talk about what we were up to.60
The idea of a rationally autonomous self does not preclude that self, despite Sandel’s 
worries, from autonomously making choices in union with others with whom they 
live; indeed, within the shared community of a particular social life it is likely that in 
certain circumstances the most rational choice to autonomously make will be one 
which takes into account the communitarian ramifications of one’s actions. The 
admission of individual autonomy is not the necessary endorsement of strict 
individualism or egoism; but simply the claim that, ultimately, on the basis of all 
external evidence and input, each individual human being has no choice but to 
autonomously decide internally how they will act and what they will do in any given 
situation.
The self-evidence of humanity’s natural autonomy is at its most clear though, when 
we consider the opposing thesis; that human beings do not possess such autonomy, 
and are instead non-autonomous, instruction-dependent creatures who act only upon 
the external direction of others. Such a position would be inherently paradoxical: who 
of these non-autonomous and instruction-dependent people could possibly step up and 
create the first set of orders such a species would need to follow if they were to do 
anything at all? The instruction-maker themselves would either need to follow some
60 Dennett, D, 2003. Freedom Evolves, pp., 249-253. (Allen Lane, London)
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sort of external order to be capable of performing the initial act of creating directions 
for the others to follow, or else be able to autonomously decide upon them 
themselves; but if we can allow for one person to hold this capacity for autonomy, 
then there seems no reason to assume that such a capacity would not be held by 
others.
In terms of constructing knowledge then from ‘available beginnings, using available 
and follow able methods to reach attainable and sustainable conclusions’, 611 would 
say that the claim of rational autonomy is easily supported. From the available 
beginnings we have, we can see that a complete denial of human autonomy is 
paradoxical and untenable, leading to a concession of at least some autonomy in an 
accurate account of humanity. When we combine this concession with what we know 
about humanity’s empirically verifiable continued and successful existence in an 
unavoidably complex world of choices and decisions, then it seems reasonable to 
agree (either with evolutionary explanations or any other supportable basis for the 
same claim) that some criteria for choosing one thing over another seem to have 
developed within the human creature, and thus concede the existence within each 
person of a cognitive process of rationality. As this universal rationality implies the 
autonomous decision-making capacity of the rational individual who possesses it, 
then there seems no justifiable reason that we cannot then extend our arrived upon 
concession of there necessarily being some autonomous individuals in the world, to 
the larger claim that, all things being equal, such autonomy is inherently possessed by 
all such rational human beings, and is thus universal to the human species.
It is precisely the presence of this natural autonomy that requires autonomy- 
threatening synthetic structures of political power to be justified if they are created.
61 O’Neill, O, 1996. Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f Practical Reasoning, p.
63. (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge)
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Autonomous and unfettered, the pre-political person is in possession of a 
fundamental, and thus arguably intrinsically legitimate, power of authority over their 
own lives. The artificial creation of external structures of political power erected over 
and above those previously unfettered lives, therefore, is an unnatural intentional act 
that can only ever come about as a result of a rational choice to live one way rather 
than another -  be it the coercive choice of the few, or the consenting choice of the 
many. As it is a choice with significant, life-altering, and far-reaching consequences, 
demanding the practical forfeit of an essential part of the rational autonomous beings 
affected by it -  their autonomy -  to a constructed external authority, it is a choice 
which therefore requires a great amount of compelling and persuasive justification if 
it is to be rationally validated and autonomously agreed to by all intended to live 
under its auspices.
Now that all of our preliminary groundwork has been laid, a critical assessment of 
the necessary content and consequences of a viable justification of this type will form 
the ongoing focus of this thesis.
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2. Unearthing the Ethical Contract
‘The real problem is to infer the core common to the whole human race from the 
innumerable manifestations o f human nature... to recognize the laws inherent in 
human nature and the inherent goals for its development and unfolding. ’
62- Erich Fromm, The Sane Society
2.1: Why Political Power Must Be Ethically Justified: The Need for an Enduring 
Contract
It is my contention, then, that legitimate politics is a necessarily ethical business, 
justifiably established only through an ethical contract which binds political power to 
the task of achieving certain necessary goals of a legitimating political teleology.
We must never lose sight of the fact that systems and structures of political power 
are not natural phenomena, but are in fact artificially created human constructs that 
affect the lives o f  all those living within them; and as such must be submitted to the 
same ethical evaluation and demand for accountability as the results of any other 
consciously chosen human action. As O’Neill writes,
Three rather abstract and deeply interconnected aspects o f  the countless specific 
assumptions which structure all activity are particularly relevant for fixing the 
appropriate scope o f  ethical consideration. These are the assumptions that there are 
others (seen as separate from  the agent); that those others are nevertheless connected
62 Fromm, E, 2002. The Sane Society, p. 13. (Routledge; London)
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to the agent (either or both can act on the other); and that those others have limited but 
determinable pow ers .63
She reduces this idea pithily as ‘plurality’, ‘connection’, and ‘finitude’, and ultimately 
it amounts to this: the reasonable and vindicated assumption in all of our actions that 
there are other people in the world who must be taken into account when we choose 
what to do or not do, because, as we do not operate in a vacuum, our connected 
actions will affect each other’s lives. Each person’s decisions will in some way 
impinge on the life of somebody else and thus all affected persons should be given 
ethical consideration when determining the viability of a particular decision.
The sentiment is unsurprisingly similar to Kant’s categorical imperative that one 
should ‘act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal /aw’,64 although perhaps less esoteric, relying not so much 
on intangible projections of imagined universality, but on concrete and observable 
truisms: there are other people and our connection to them means that often our 
actions will affect them and their actions will affect us; thus it is an easily supportable 
minimum request for practical reason that we give those affected others due 
consideration when acting in such a way as it will affect them.
Such assumptions do not yet attempt to determine the nature of that consideration or 
the content of our constructed ethics, but they do fix a reasonable framework for 
working out the relevant scope of ethical consideration, and it is this scope which 
makes the creation of artificial structures of political power a necessarily ethical 
business: it is an inherently person-affecting act for which there must be a coherent
63 O’Neill, O, 1996. Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f Practical Reasoning, pp., 
100-101. (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge)
64 Kant, I (translated by Patton, H. J), 1956. Groundwork o f the Metaphysic o f Morals, p. 88. (Harper 
and Row; New York)
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and compelling justification and convincing reason why rationally autonomous 
individuals might consent in accepting its imposed authority over the natural authority 
of their own autonomous self-sovereignty.
As soon as we ask the question of how society ought to be organized, and 
deliberately attempt to manufacture a specific set of intentionally designed political 
circumstances to achieve that end, we are unavoidably asking ethical questions about 
what we would consider to be the best way to arrange our lives, what forms of social 
organization would be the right ones to create, and which institutional structures it 
would be good to erect to achieve those ends; all of which are questions ultimately 
resting on teleological notions of both particular endorsed goals of human life, and the 
notion of politics as a purpose-driven enterprise specifically designed to help its 
society achieve those goals, however construed. It is only through such an 
understanding that rationally autonomous individuals could be led to agree to their 
consent: the external authority of artificial political power is legitimated in otherwise 
autonomous people’s minds, on the basis that it will allow them to better achieve their 
goals and fulfill their interests than would otherwise be possible. Political power is 
legitimated upon an understanding, either explicit or implicit, that it makes life 
‘better’ for ‘people’ than it would be without it.
At its most basic, the claim that some form of justification is necessary for legitimate 
politics is grounded in the notion of individuals as rationally autonomous selves with 
an original claim to their own internal authority over how they will choose to live 
their own lives. The creation of any artificial system of political power that 
necessarily reduces that innate sovereignty by demanding social recognition and 
obedience towards a new external authority (the synthetic state) needs a convincing 
rationale if obedience is to be given freely.
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Of course, this is only true of those structures of political power genuinely seeking 
the mantle of legitimacy and, recognizing this need to validate their artificial 
character, seeking to provide people a coherent justification for acquiescing to their 
claim to authority. Those endeavours for power which explicitly and unashamedly 
make no claims to legitimacy and seek no justification for their imposed authority 
other than through the coercive powers of violent brute force, or tyrannical 
enslavement, have no interest in the consent or impinged autonomy of those over 
whom they assert the political power that they have forcefully grasped. As such, they 
cannot possibly base their legitimacy on an underlying ethical argument, for there are 
no claims of legitimacy being made in the first place. This though, comes at no cost 
to my overall argument. Indeed, it serves only to support it further: we can determine 
illegitimate politics precisely because they are self-serving set-ups which fail to fulfill 
any legitimating ethical purpose which would distinguish them as justified.
Returning briefly to the inherently problematic concept of authority, as well as 
noting the difference between internal and external sources of proclaimed authority, it 
is worth mentioning also that the idea of a naturally autonomous humanity, construed 
as rationally choosing individuals, originally holding sole legitimate authority over 
their own lives, brings with it an important distinction to be made between the 
concepts of objectively legitimate authority, and merely socially-legitimated authority.
Traditional assumptions about the nature of authority, especially those influenced by 
Weber, tend to misleadingly equate the latter to the former, assuming that which has 
been socially recognized as being a legitimate authority, as therefore being, de facto, 
an objectively legitimate authority. But as our earlier discussions on both the 
necessary reliance on the best o f  our knowledge when making our choices, and the 
sometimes insidious nature of political power discussed by Lukes reminds us,
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sometimes those with power can utilize their monopoly on communications to 
manipulate public opinion into an ignorance of certain facts and thus into an 
acceptance of some beliefs which they, under ‘conditions of full rationality’, might 
otherwise not accept. What this means therefore, is that sometimes that which has 
been socially recognized as being X, is not always necessarily what it is recognized to 
be in any objective sense, but might instead simply be bom out of mistaken ignorance, 
or as the product of a concerted propaganda effort.
Weber gives ‘three grounds legitimating any rule.’65 Those grounds are either the 
authority of custom: the idea that something that has always been traditionally 
accepted as right by the ‘eternal past’, is to maintain its authority in the present; the 
authority of the exceptional: the idea of charismatic leadership, to whom willing 
individuals simply submit; and finally, the authority of legality: the belief in the 
validity of legal statute and appropriate juridical competence ‘founded on rationally 
devised rules’, and acceptance of their virtue.66
Whilst all of Weber’s examples show clearly the ways in which it is possible that 
socially-legitimated authority can occur, at no point do his ‘three grounds legitimating 
any rule’ step outside of the context of social recognition and give any objective 
evaluation as to whether any of the socially-legitimated authorities developed in this 
way, can be considered objectively legitimate.
As far as the authority of custom goes, it seems hard to grant on any objective level 
the validity of practices simply because they are what have always been done. Such a 
view would prohibit any kind of social change or ability to independently criticize 
social practices and, if a source of genuine legitimating power, would have left us still 
with slavery, subjugation of women, racism, and a wide variety of other questionable
65 Lassman, P and Speirs, R (eds), 1994. Weber: Political Writings, p. 311. (Cambridge University 
Press; Cambridge)
66 Ibid., pp., 311-312
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historical practices, simply because they were what had always been done in the past. 
As Brian Barry asks, ‘How could anybody seriously imagine that citing the mere fact
67of a tradition or custom could ever function as a self-contained justificatory move?’ 
His answer is that they cannot. ‘Culture is no excuse...If there are sound reasons 
against doing something, these cannot be trumped by saying -  even if it is true -  that
/TO
doing it is a part of your culture.’
The same is true for the authority of charismatic leadership; one need only look at 
the abuse of cult leaders and demagogues to draw into question its validity as a 
legitimate source of political power outside of the deluded minds of those swayed by 
a particular leader’s personal magnetism.
Whilst the authority of legality has more going for it than the other two grounds for 
legitimacy that Weber highlights; there is still the question of on what basis that 
system of law is itself to be evaluated as legitimate; to paraphrase the old Euthyphro 
dilemma: do laws hold legitimate authority because they are recognized by the legal 
statutes, or do the legal statutes recognize the legitimate authority of the laws because 
their true authority comes from elsewhere? If it is the former, then the laws become 
the arbitrary whims of each particular society, and their objective legitimacy is 
questionable; if the latter, then the authority does not lie within the legal structure 
itself, but somewhere prior to that legal structure, in a realm of validated ethical 
claims which necessitate the creation of such laws in the first place.
Conceding that there must be more to an objectively legitimate authority than simply 
its social recognition as such, the distinctions between both internal and external 
authority, and objectively legitimate and socially-legitimated authority, allow us to 
look beyond the rather limited traditional notions of authority and legitimacy as
67 Barry, B, 2001. Culture and Equality, p. 253. (Polity Press; Cambridge)
68 Ibid., p. 258
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simply being bestowed by default on the groups or institutions within a society to 
which the majority of people consent to submit; and to a more critical view of 
authority, unbound by context, traditions or protocols, that is able to help lead to a 
compelling account of what would be necessary to provide an external structure of 
political power with objectively legitimate authority over the already objective 
internal authority of a naturally autonomous humanity.
Although Weber gives us three examples in which social-recognition of an authority 
might occur, he does not ever manage to explain why that recognition might occur 
with his limited approach, or answer what exactly it is that society is recognizing, 
when it recognizes the legitimacy of an external authority.
The answer to that question will lie in an account of political teleology. Although 
public consent, as we shall see, is vital to any account of legitimacy, it will soon 
become clear that recognition by the public of the legitimacy of any external authority 
over them, should be granted only on the implicit understanding that some 
teleological criteria of assumed political purpose, laid out in an underlying ethical 
contract, is being fulfilled by that authority. If it turns out that these structures of 
political power are in fact not fulfilling those understood criteria, then their claim to 
objective legitimacy is arguably revocable, regardless of a (potentially manipulated) 
enduring social perception of that legitimacy within some quarters.
The idea that legitimate political power can only be established via a justificatory 
contract is not a new one; social contract theory has long been a theoretical tool used 
in philosophy to determine the underlying understanding and obligations between the 
people in a society and their government. The traditional idea (which implies, 
without always explicitly stating it, a similar conception of a rationally autonomous 
humanity to my own) is that before formal societies and specifically designated
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structures of political power were formed, pre-political life would have consisted in 
uncollected groups of autonomous human individuals living life separately and 
unsystematically in an original state of nature. Then, for a variety of proposed 
reasons, at some point in history those individuals decided to join together and form 
an agreed compact of mutual advantage and protection, establishing the rudimentary 
beginnings of the sorts of political societies we know today.
For some thinkers, this moment of contract was conceived as an actual historical 
event; a genuine and explicit agreement made between peoples in which clear terms 
were laid out on which to begin their first attempts at society. For others, myself 
included, the social contract is more of a metaphorical event -  a hypothetical thought 
experiment which we can utilize to plausibly determine not just historically, but now, 
as situated beings ourselves living within a formal society, why such a society might 
have justifiably first come about, and under what terms and conditions such a society 
would have to have been created in order to ensure the existence of the kinds of 
obligations we believe political power has towards its citizens, and they to it, within 
these societies today. Indeed, it is a hypothetical thought experiment by which we can 
rationally ascertain, through a reasoned assessment of justificatory arguments, what 
the underlying principles must be that would legitimate erecting an externally 
authoritative artificial structure of political power over a hitherto autonomous people 
in the first place, in order for that decision to be willingly agreed upon, and entered 
into consensually by all.
Agreeing, prima facie, that due to the inherent autonomy of people, legitimate 
politics must be consensual, social contract theory attempts to decipher what, then, the 
valid grounds would be for achieving such consent and convincing individuals, 
without threat of coercive violence, to freely forsake the internal self-sovereignty of
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their original autonomy for the external rule of constructed political authority. In the 
words of Hume,
A man’s natural force consists only in the vigour o f  his limbs, and the firmness o f  his 
courage; which could never subject multitudes to the command o f  one. Nothing but 
their own consent, and their sense o f  advantages resulting from peace and order, could 
have had that influence.69
Hume, however, was no supporter of the idea of a social contract, claiming that ‘no 
compact or agreement, it is evident, was expressly formed for general submission’, 
because ‘each exertion of authority...must have been particular, and called forth by 
the present exigencies of the case’ until ‘their frequency gradually produced an 
habitual, and, if you please to call it so, a voluntary, and therefore precarious,
70acquiescence in the people.’ But I think, as a historian as well as a philosopher, 
Hume was far too worried about the idea of this contract being an actual historical 
event. He quite rightly claims that most people simply accept traditional structures of 
obedience and socially-legitimated authority without even considering the objective 
basis of its legitimacy, and he also, quite rightly, notes that there is no obvious reason 
why any original social contract, created by the first societies, should bind any future 
generations to its terms once all of its original signatories are long gone; ‘being so 
ancient, and being obliterated by a thousand changes of government and princes, it 
cannot now be supposed to retain any authority.’71 Most importantly, Hume 
devastatingly rejects the idea that an original contract can be said to retain its prior
69 Hume, D. Of The Original Contract, in, 1987. Essays Moral, Political and Literary, p. 468. (Liberty 
Fund; Indianapolis)
70 Ibid., pp., 468-469
71 Ibid., p. 471
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authority through the concept of tacit consent; the idea that, although citizens in 
society today were not a part of any original contract which might have taken their 
ancestors out of the state of nature and into society, their continued living in the 
society originally founded upon that contract shows continuing tacit consent to its 
authority. Hume counters this idea by asking if we can
seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when 
he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small 
wages which he acquires? We may as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, 
freely consents to the dominion o f  the master; though he was carried on board while 
asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her.72
However, these criticisms do not entirely destroy the idea of a social contract, just, 
again, the idea of that contract being an actual historical event. Furthermore, they 
serve to weaken the stance of any attempt at basing the legitimacy of a structure of 
political power simply on its history of arbitrarily agreed consensus, and show the 
urgent need for a social contract to be drawn up which is timeless, continually re­
affirmed, evaluative of institutions past, present and future, and based not simply on 
the agreed consensus of social recognition, but on objective and universal principles 
that will remain regardless of specific historical context. In other words, the sort of 
social contract which I am arguing exists already behind every instance of political 
power: the underlying ethical justification of legitimate politics as a teleological 
venture; designed with the specific purpose of helping people achieve certain goals 
they could otherwise not achieve without it.
72 Ibid., p. 475
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Another reason that such a contract needs to possess a timeless rationale and be 
capable of its hypothetical application to all emerging circumstances is because I do 
not believe it is persuasively possible to claim that anyone can ever fully sublimate, 
ignore or in any other way lose their natural autonomy, even when they seemingly do 
agree to give it up to an agreed external authority.
When agreeing to obey external laws, regardless of the system of social 
repercussions and punishments in place to back them up, it is never the case that law 
itself has any intrinsic authority over the individual which makes them obey it, despite 
their autonomous feelings; ultimately, it can still only be an individual’s repeated 
autonomous choosing or choosing not to follow a law, or any other kind of external 
edict, that gives them their power.
Whilst I shall grant that an agreed system of social repercussions and punishments to 
enforce a particular law is a strong persuader, and indubitably influences one’s 
autonomous decisions; ultimately, a formally recognised law or external edict is 
nothing more than a demand for certain behavioural expectations that, at any given 
time, the rationally autonomous agent ultimately holds internal power within 
themselves to choose not to follow.
The very fact that as long as we have had laws, the crimes they ostensibly prohibit 
continue to occur, is a clear example of the interminable nature of our individual 
autonomy, even within the apparent confines of externally authoritative decrees. 
External laws that are put over and above human autonomy are only ever as strong as 
they are chosen to be, or in the case of the mentally disordered able, to be followed, 
and can always be broken with relative ease.
73Thoreau, H. D., 1993. Civil Disobedience and Other Essays, (Dover; New York)
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For the criminal, these imposed laws have the same objective p o w e r  as they have for 
every other individual, and the law-breaker is fully aware of the system of social 
repercussions and punishments in place to ensure that the rules are obeyed; the only 
difference is that the criminal will (to their autonomous rational mind) have some 
stron ger  reason n ot to obey the law, if only on an unconscious level.
Further still, even when laws are  being followed by autonomous individuals, this is 
not because of some special power the law itself holds, or any magical compulsion it 
intrinsically invokes over people by its very existence; it is followed only because 
people agree with it and, therefore, autonomously choose to follow it; or, having no 
compelling reason to break it (living potentially even unaw are  of it), they 
unthinkingly happen to live in accordance with it.
It is not because we have a law against murder that the majority of people do not kill, 
it is because the majority of people do  n o t w a n t to, a n d  have no reason  to  com m it 
m urder; and so they don’t. Further still, those who feel that they do  have a reason to 
do so and thus do  have a desire to murder, often commit the act regardless of the laws 
against it, which is why the crime of murder still exists.
No matter how much external authority is imposed upon them, human beings remain 
ineluctably autonomous agents who must make a choice (either conscious or 
unconscious) in ternally  as to whether or not they will agree to obey that external 
authority each and every time it imposes itself on them. A valid social contract 
cannot be a one-off historical event of enduring impact, therefore, but must instead be 
a continuing hypothetical reality; a consistent and well-supported theoretical construct 
capable of analyzing and assessing the objective legitimacy of all possible claims to 
external political power at all times, and stating clearly the agreed terms of political 
obligation for their constant application.
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That said; the historical development of traditional social contract argument remains 
instructive as a way of looking at some of the underlying justificatory arguments that 
have already been offered to legitimate the existence of structures of external political 
power in human societies and, through their analysis, will help illustrate successfully 
the kind of underlying ethical contract which I believe that we ultimately must hold.
2.2: Traditional Social Contract Approaches to Ethical Justification
Whilst rejecting the idea of a singular historical contract, by stating that only 
humanity’s ‘own consent, and their sense of advantages resulting from peace and 
order’ could have subjected ‘multitudes to the command of one’;74 Hume still alludes 
to one of the most fundamental social contract arguments used to justify the existence 
of political power structures; one with clear roots in the work of Thomas Hobbes, who 
most famously put forward the argument for an original contract.
Hobbes argued ‘that during the time men live without a common power to keep them 
all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war...such a war, as is of every 
man, against every man’, leaving life under such conditions ‘nasty, brutish, and 
short.’75
In an attempt to work out why it was that human social groups needed governments, 
Hobbes attempted to envision how humanity would have been before external 
political power had been imposed upon them, within an original state of nature. 
Bleakly, Hobbes’ conclusion about pre-political life was the inevitability of this brutal 
war of all against all. Such war occurs without government, Hobbes claimed, because 
in the state of nature unfettered humanity possesses a dangerous fundamental 
equality; not in an egalitarian sense, but rather that,
74 Hume, D. O f The Original Contract, in, 1987. Essays Moral, Political and Literary, p. 468. (Liberty 
Fund; Indianapolis)
75 Hobbes, T, 1998. Leviathan, p. 84. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
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Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties o f the body, and mind; as that... when 
all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, 
as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not 
pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength o f body, the weakest has strength enough 
to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that 
are in the same danger with himself.76
In other words, humanity is equal in as much as everybody has an equal physical or 
intellectual ability to kill anybody else. Coupled with an innate drive Hobbes also 
believed all people held, to endlessly seek an unobtainable state of felicity and 
complete fulfillment of all our desires; ‘from this equality of ability, ariseth equality 
of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same
77thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies’.
Hobbes saw in the state of nature, an autonomous and self-interested humanity 
unbound by external laws, driven only by an internal obsession with achieving felicity 
at any cost -  even at the expense of someone else’s life -  and as he conceived of this 
state as a completely unlegislated domain where ‘every man has the right to every
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thing; even to one another’s body’, he quite understandably believed that such a 
state would soon be one without security. With anybody able and willing to kill you 
at any moment, for any thing, there would be the constant threat of death hanging 
over your head. Moreover, living under such constant threat may well lead you, 
yourself, to kill potential threats to your own life pre-emptively, or even to killing for 
no other reason than to gain a fearful reputation that puts others off the very idea of
76 Ibid., p. 82
77 Ibid., p. 83
78 Ibid., p. 87
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attacking you. These were, to Hobbes, the ‘three principal causes of quarrel’ found in 
the nature of mankind; ‘first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory’,79 and 
with no authority figure to keep such volatile instincts in line, in the state of nature all 
three components are exacerbated without end.
Importantly, Hobbes’s vision of a purely self-serving and egoistic humanity was not 
intended to pass moral judgement on the individuals living within the warring state of 
nature. Controversially he believed that in this state, there could be no such thing as 
ethics because
The desires, and other passions o f  man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the 
actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them: which 
till laws be made they cannot know: nor can any law be made, till they have agreed 
upon the person that shall make it...Nothing can be unjust.80
To Hobbes, humanity in the state of nature was, by definition, necessarily amoral. It 
was just brute fact that this war of all against all would be the result of pre-political 
conditions until a suitable power was established, dominant and awe-inspiring enough 
to keep our innate drives under control through law and order. This awesome power 
would be something that all people stuck in the warring state of nature would 
eventually recognise as a necessity for peace and survival and so, to Hobbes’ mind, 
they would agree to make a compact between themselves to create this ‘Leviathan’, 
bestowing it with complete authority over them and their lives.
Hobbes would argue that this social contract remains hypothetically binding to this 
day, legitimating all contemporary structures of political power, because to take such
79 Ibid., p. 83
80 Ibid., p. 85
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authority away from society would be to descend it back into the undesirable chaos 
and war of the state of nature.
Hobbes’ argument seems to be an intuitively convincing account of the possible 
justification of political power as a means to security. All of us could well imagine 
the violence and chaos that would ensue if all laws were suspended and people were 
immediately and unexpectedly freed from the constraints of formal legal 
repercussions. By that token, it seems reasonable to agree with both Hobbes and 
Hume that our structures of political power afford us a luxury of peace, order and 
security that is unavailable without formal legal restraints to repress our egoistic 
drives for felicity and punish those who threaten others. A closer look, however, 
reveals that these compelling intuitions about our current situation are, in fact, 
arguably disanalogous to the scenario Hobbes is trying to portray, and that Hobbes’ 
vision of the state of nature, the social contract, and his egoistic view of human 
nature, are fundamentally flawed in several important ways.
Firstly, we have an immediate problem with any position that denies the existence of 
ethics until it has been formalised into a set of socially recognised laws: our old friend 
the Euthyphro dilemma. Do we create laws against things because they are already 
wrong, or are things wrong only because we have created laws against them? This 
dilemma is highlighted further when we remember what I have been arguing so far: 
that the construction of those laws and the creation of the artificial political state out 
of the original state of nature necessarily presuppose certain ethical assumptions. As 
soon as we attempt to justify political power, as Hobbes does on grounds of security, 
we are giving that power a political teleology (the goal of creating peace) that is 
necessarily bound to some sort of teleological ethical assumptions about humanity
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itself (perhaps the goal of not being needlessly killed or living a long and fulfilling 
life).
If there is, as Hobbes suggests, no such thing as right or wrong in the initial state of 
nature, then how could we ever recognise within that state that the circumstances of 
all-against-all war are those from which we need to save ourselves through the 
establishment of suitably protecting power structures? Without some sense that a 
situation is ‘bad’ or that there could be a ‘better’ way (which are ethical claims), there 
seems no reason why anyone would ever have decided to stop their war of all against 
all in the first place and create the social contract that forms the necessary political 
power to end it. Even as a purely egoistic claim -  that the social contract is formed 
from nothing more than mutual se/^interest in survival -  such self-interest can only 
exist in the shadow of an ethical claim that self survival is ‘better ’ than one’s death.
If the circumstances in the state of nature really took place in a pre-moral universe, 
then the war of all against all, lack of security, and assorted other threats, could never 
be identified as something that ought to be ended. Indeed, it would make much more 
sense that in such a state, with no sense of right and wrong and driven only by their 
base desire to gratify themselves, egoistic humanity would simply wage the war of all 
against all in perpetuity, until the majority of people were dead and the surviving few 
were able to get what they wanted without interference or interaction with anyone else 
-  with even that shaky peace subject to continued fighting if ever the survivors’ paths 
crossed.
Any position that holds there to be no such thing as morality until formal, socially 
recognised laws are laid down is immediately met with an impossible chicken-and- 
egg problem unless it accedes to the idea that the moral argument behind the creation 
of laws necessarily exists prior to the law itself. Without accepting this idea, we must
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ask what exactly it is that society recognise as right or wrong when they decided to 
create and follow their laws, if they are unable to recognise right and wrong before 
those laws are made. Surely murder doesn’t become wrong only when there is a 
formal, socially recognised law that says it is wrong -  the pre-law wrongness of the 
act must be the catalyst for the decision to make that law in the first place, or else the 
legislation is meaningless.81 It instead seems much more reasonable, then, to posit 
that the kill-or-be-killed war-zone Hobbes depicts as the state of nature does allow for 
a sense of ethics, and that it is largely on moral grounds that the construction of the 
social contract is justified (because the present circumstances of war are ‘bad’ and a 
life without a war-of-all-against-all would be ‘better’).
The necessity of such an ethics is made clear by the fact that, despite saying that the 
notions of right and wrong have no place in the state of nature, Hobbes himself allows 
for what he calls laws of nature. Described as ‘a precept, or general rule, found out by 
reason, by which man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or 
taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh 
it may be best preserved’, these laws claim that ‘every man, ought to endeavour
o o
peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it’. But it seems hard to see how this claim 
can be made without a concurrent notion of such peace being in some way right and 
the destruction of life in some way wrong or else why peace over war? Even the most 
non-moral pragmatic approach, seeing peace as merely a prudential means to survival, 
and protection as an instrumental good which keeps one alive, can only make sense if
81 Thinkers such as Habermas might argue laws are a conversation, not simply arbitrary constructs or 
the formalization of our ethical beliefs. Whilst an interesting description of how current legislation 
works in a deliberative democracy, this view does not tell us whether or not legislation should work in 
this way, which is the focus of my enquiry.
82 Hobbes, T, 1998. Leviathan, p. 86. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
83 Ibid., p. 87
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survival can be said to be a more desirable state of affairs than demise and therefore 
better. And these notions are entirely moral ones.
In this context, Hobbes’ argument just seems like linguistic smoke and mirrors; the 
proclamation that X doesn’t exist simply because you have renamed it Y. Even his 
most enthusiastic supporters seem stuck having to explain this apparent contradiction 
with similarly problematic tactics. Oakeshott for instance, whilst describing the pre­
political Hobbesian agent as someone in whose ‘thoughts and actions he is answerable 
to none but himself, must also concede that ‘in the pursuit of felicity certain habits of 
mind and action will be found to be specially serviceable, and these are called Virtues.
84 . •Other habits will hinder the pursuit, and these are called Defects’. Yet Oakeshott, m 
his exegesis of Hobbes’ position, not only denies that these Virtues and Defects are 
moral terms, but also denies that the war of all against all can be thought of as either 
‘good’ or ‘bad’; it is just a practical obstacle to guaranteeing felicity and thus ending 
it is simply the most prudent means to ensure that individual felicity can be achieved. 
Seeking felicity, of course, is denied the status of being a teleological goal for people 
and simply dismissed as a brute, amoral fact of the human condition: we breathe, we 
eat, we seek felicity, etc. Indeed, to ascribe some sort of morality or ethics to any pre­
political thoughts, according to Oakeshott, is ‘fruitless until they are transformed from 
mere theorems into maxims of human conduct and from maxims into laws’.85 The 
reason for this is because
ad hoc formal relationships o f  mutual agreement between assignable persons are 
evanescent; remotely they may reflect generally accepted theorems about rational 
conduct, but as rules they are the products o f  specific and temporary agreements
84 Oakeshott, M, 1975. Hobbes on Civil Association, pp., 34-35. (Liberty Fund; Indianapolis)
85 Ibid., p. 39
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between the persons concerned. And further, they are always liable to be undermined 
by the substantial relationship o f competitive hostility.86
As with Hobbes’ own egoistic view of human nature, there are many inbuilt biases 
and assumptions about human nature within such a statement. Without vindicating 
these assumptions, the sum of both Hobbes and Oakeshott’s argument is ultimately 
this: for a variety of gut feelings, proven or unproven, we just do not trust that people 
are capable of maintaining a moral agreement unless it is enforced by formal law.
Other objections to the Hobbesian view of human nature have been offered by 
Rousseau.
Writing in 1755, Rousseau states that ‘the philosophers who have examined the 
foundations of society have all felt it necessary to go back to the state of nature, but 
none of them have succeeded in getting there’,87 before specifically targeting Hobbes 
with the charge that ‘all these philosophers talking ceaselessly of need, greed, 
oppression, desire and pride have transported into the state of nature concepts formed
o o
in society. They speak of savage man and they depict civilized man.’
What Rousseau points out, is that thinking of modern humanity without the laws that 
currently inform our lives is an entirely different matter from thinking about a pre­
political humanity who had never had law. Living as we do in a world where the 
specifics of social organization and structures of power mean that even the most basic 
necessities for life come at great financial cost and competition, it seems fairly 
uncontroversial to suggest that a sudden abandonment of laws today might indeed 
lead to exactly the sort of egoistic and self-serving war Hobbes talks about, as people
86 Ibid., p. 41
87 Rousseau, J. J (Cranston, M, trans), 1984. A Discourse On Inequality, p. 78. (Penguin Books;
London)
88 Ibid
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suddenly see an opportunity to get whatever they want without having to pay or 
struggle for it. However, whether or not such a reaction would be the ineluctable 
result of an innate human nature or simply a result of historical, cultural, and 
ideological conditioning is the important question that Rousseau raised. Hobbes’ war- 
zone essentialism did not ring true of what a genuine state of nature would look like, 
but rather what it would look like if contemporary humanity were to suddenly find 
ourselves in a state of sudden lawlessness today, after such a long-term dependency 
on law.
To Rousseau, the state of nature is not the contemporary state of scarcity Hobbes 
depicts, but rather a place of pre-industrial abundance. Far from having to murder one 
another for a piece of food or patch of land, if an individual in the state of nature saw 
another person eating something that they wanted themselves, or living in a place 
where they would like to live, etc, they would simply go and get their own piece of 
whatever it is that they desired from the abundance on offer, be it land, food or 
anything else. It is only once formal society exists and artificially constructed 
concepts of property and ownership come into play, making things such as food and 
shelter commodities to be hoarded and traded for profit instead of freely available 
essentials; that the sort of competitive greed Hobbes fears becomes a real problem.
As Rousseau describes it, ‘the earth, left to its natural fertility and covered with 
immense forests that no axe had ever mutilated, would afford on all sides storehouses 
and places of shelter to every species of animal.’89
Contrary to the kill-or-be-killed warring individual of Hobbes’ state of nature, for 
Rousseau, natural humanity is made up of a kind of ‘noble savage’. With nature’s 
plentiful bounty to sustain them and no pressing need for social interaction outside of
89 Ibid., p81
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the base need for sexual pleasure or procreation,90 these solitary individuals 
essentially kept to themselves until ‘the first man who, having enclosed a piece of 
land, thought of saying “this is mine” and found people simple enough to believe 
him’.91 Such an individual was ‘the true founder of civil society’92 and is responsible 
for all ‘the innumerable sorrows and anxieties that people in all classes suffer, and by 
which the human soul is constantly tormented’.93 Ultimately, Rousseau believes that 
‘most of our ills are of our own making, and that we might have avoided nearly all of 
them if only we had adhered to the simple, unchanging and solitary way of life that 
nature ordained for us.’94 
That the actions of this ‘true founder’ and the decision of people to accept and give 
legitimacy to them was the catalyst for this transformation from solitary life to a new, 
corrupt, social life, is made clear with a rhetorical flourish when Rousseau asks,
How many crimes, wars, murders; how much misery and horror the human race would 
have been spared if  someone had pulled up the stakes and filled in the ditch and cried 
out to his fellow men: “Beware o f  listening to this impostor. You are lost if  you forget 
that the fruits o f  the earth belong to everyone and that the earth itself belongs to no 
one!”95
But of course nobody did pull up the stakes and cry out a warning to the rest of 
humanity, and instead, the presumed peace of the state of nature descended into the
90 The problem of rape is not one discussed by Rousseau and is conceivably a source of conflict in any 
state of nature scenario, but as the entire spectrum of human relations would be much different in a pre­
political situation; we shall simply assume the problem of rape is just one of the many ‘inconveniences’ 
we shall see Locke refer to shortly.
91 Rousseau, J. J (Cranston, M, trans), 1984. A Discourse on Inequality, p. 109. (Penguin Books; 
London)
92 Ibid
93 Ibid., p. 84
94 Ibid., pp., 84-85
95 Ibid., p. 109
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damaging inequality of what Rousseau recognized as contemporary society. In his 
opinion, this corruption transformed the human race forever, and, now soiled by it, we 
can never go back to peaceful origins; an interpretation of contemporary structures of 
political power very much at odds with the conventional view. Instead of affording us 
security, peace and order, as is commonly thought, it is actually, Rousseau argues, our 
ill-thought out and ethically unjustified political structures which have caused the 
insecurity and war that has corrupted us into a manufactured dependence on it; an idea 
eloquently expressed by the anarchist Malatesta when he asks us to consider how 
‘someone whose legs had been bound from birth but had managed nevertheless to 
walk as best he could, might attribute his ability to move to those very bonds which in 
fact serve only to weaken and paralyse the muscular energy of his legs’.96
Whilst I think Rousseau is right to criticize Hobbes’ depiction of the state of nature 
as a necessary war of all against all; to question the perceived successes of external 
structures of political power; and to argue for a radically different conception of 
humanity than the one of Hobbes’ imagining; I do not agree completely with the 
specifics of his alternative vision of natural humankind.
Although I think Rousseau is correct in his assumption that a pre-political individual 
living in abundance would have no need to kill another for that which is plentiful, his 
belief that this kind of person would be entirely non-social seems at odds with the 
actual evidence of anthropology and the history of human societies both past and 
present. Human beings have a consistent history of intermingling, working together, 
living together, and forming long-lasting bonds of friendship and partnership, that, it 
seems reasonable to say, suggests this social aspect to humanity is not merely due to 
the random happenstance of geography, scarcity of shared resources, and population
96 Malatesta, E (Richards, V, trans), 1974. Anarchy, pp., 15-16. (Freedom Press, London)
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growth, but is in fact an inherent part of human nature, core to our very constitution as 
individuals, and central to our everyday lives. This odd refusal to concede a social 
element to natural humanity is peculiar in such a seemingly social thinker as 
Rousseau and, in my opinion, is indicative of a confusing dissonance within much of 
his writing between the natural logic of his ideas and an apparent anti-social bias in 
his personality which makes that logic escape him.97 For example, on the one hand, 
he claims ‘savage man, wandering in the forests, without work, without speech, 
without a home, without war, and without relationships, was equally without any need 
of his fellow men and without any desire to hurt them, perhaps not even recognizing 
any one of them individually’98; but at the same time he posits that within all noble 
savages is the innate virtue of compassion. If pre-political humans in the state of 
nature are inherently non-social beings, then it seems hard to understand why they 
would then possess this innate capacity of feeling for others within them, when such a 
capacity is entirely social, and without a social aspect to one’s life, entirely redundant. 
Such discords in Rousseau’s hypothesis become especially noticeable when he asks 
us to remember ‘how many ideas we owe to the use of language’ and ‘how much 
grammar exercises and facilitates the operations of the mind’,99 before realizing that 
within his depiction of the non-social state of nature, where humans rarely interact or 
need to communicate ‘one cannot conceive the necessity of language or its 
possibility’. As the phenomenon of language does exist, and is in fact necessary for 
Rousseau’s own argument, he is left having to explain how this could be so; but his 
attempts to find a way in which our universal tool for communication could be created 
without there being any natural desire to communicate are unsatisfactory to say the
97 Illustrations of Rousseau’s peculiar social attitudes can be found in many places. The best source is 
his autobiography: Rousseau, J, J (Cohen, J. M., trans), 1978. The Confessions. (Penguin; Middlesex)
98 Rousseau, J. J (Cranston, M, trans), 1984. A Discourse On Inequality, p. 104. (Penguin Books; 
London)
99 Ibid., p. 91
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least. They have also been much better accounted for in alternative conceptions of 
humanity’s social and linguistic evolution, such as the work of Chomsky, for 
example, who argues that linguistic rules are essentially hardwired into human brains 
and the capacity for language a natural phenomenon indicative of our inherent social 
nature;100 or the work of Habermas, who argues that all ‘forms of social action...are 
derivatives of action oriented to reaching understanding’ with ‘the goal of coming to 
an understanding’ being ‘to bring about an agreement...that terminates in the 
intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, 
and accord with one another...based on recognition of the corresponding validity 
claims of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness.’101 Indeed, Habermas 
goes as far as to argue that the existence of communication presupposes the existence 
of ethics, because there are certain normative assumptions inherent to the concept of 
discourse which must be universally accepted for communicative action to be possible 
in the first place; just as I am arguing that there are certain normative assumptions 
inherent to the concept of political discourse which must be universally accepted for 
legitimate politics to be comprehensible.
So perhaps Rousseau got it wrong when he could not ‘conceive the necessity of 
language or its possibility’ and claimed natural humanity to be non-social; but luckily 
such an admission affects nothing in his broader argument that the Hobbesian 
incorporation of contemporary corruption into the state of nature is unfounded -  in 
fact, once a social aspect is added to Rousseau’s position, it only helps strengthen it 
because we now lose the strange jump we find from uncommunicative and isolated 
individuals to our ‘true founder of civil society’ suddenly verbally communicating
100 Lyons, J, 1970. Chomsky. (Fontana; London); Chomsky, N, 1957. Syntactic Structures. (Mouton;
The Hague)
101 Habermas, J (McCarthy, T, trans), 1995. Communication and the Evolution of Society, pp., 1-3. 
(Polity Press; Cambridge)
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with others and forming some sort of basic, non-familial, social unit. Instead we can 
say that Rousseau’s noble savage in the state of nature not only had plenty and was 
without any real need to kill or go to war for personal felicity, but also that having an 
innate sense of compassion regarding the people with whom they shared this 
abundance, had some sort of rudimentary moral sense that such violence would not 
only be unnecessary but would be in some way wrong and thus possessing a 
correlating ethical inclination to seek other ‘better’ means to satisfy their immediate 
desires.
Both Hobbes and Rousseau’s theories of how humanity in the state of nature might 
have been lose coherency in places because of the blatant omission of this, hard to 
deny, social aspect to our lives. But whereas the inclusion of this, for Hobbes, makes 
his entire thesis fall down, for Rousseau it simply bolsters an argument in the places 
where it was previously lacking.
Ultimately though, both theorists’ positions turn on different conceptions of how 
they imagine a humanity unfettered by the authoritative trappings of external 
authority structures would behave when left to the devices of their own, individual, 
internal sense of rational autonomy; and it seems that both views, albeit radically 
opposed, do more to expose the unique personal fears and neurosis of the respective 
authors than to truly clear up the question they seek to answer. Hobbes, writing at a 
time of civil war, saw law and order break down violently all around him, and so 
posited the seemingly intuitive idea that without law and order, human beings would 
kill each other. Rousseau, meanwhile, was a socially awkward individual, for whom 
the dependency on other people was a necessary evil that he wished to minimize as 
much as possible. As a result, he posits natural humanity as unsocial beings, and even 
makes clear to stress that, once out of the state of nature and under a social contract,
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(although such a contract logically implies the ostensible forfeit of some natural 
internal autonomy for the gain of what he calls a new ‘civil freedom’ of being able to 
‘obey a law we have imposed on ourselves’ externally), ultimately, ‘each in giving 
himself to all gives himself to none, and since there are no associates over whom he 
does not acquire the same rights that he cedes, he gains the equivalent of all that he 
loses, and greater strength for the conservation of what he possesses.’102 In other 
words: even when humanity has created its social contract and agreed to work 
together towards a common social goal, for Rousseau, dependency on others is to be 
kept to a minimum.
It is conceivable then, to say that neither individual quite managed to paint a 
believable picture of humanity in the state of nature. I think it is fair to say, however, 
that whilst Rousseau’s version of events is simply lacking a necessary social 
component whereby it seems plausible to posit that natural humanity not only 
wandered around in a peaceful world of natural abundance, but also encountered and 
interacted with each other, slowly evolving the languages, cultures and communities, 
which eventually led to the sorts of conflict and obstacles that would have required 
the formation of a social contract to settle the balance; the Hobbesian picture seems 
unjustifiably bleak; not only missing out on a necessary social component, but also 
asserting, without evidence, a natural animosity, violence, and conflict between 
people that seems far too strong a thesis than can be supported.
Now, one could easily counter my claim that the history of humanity shows 
significant evidence of an innate sociability with the equally clear history that human 
social groups so often have of fighting each other. Whilst history undeniably shows 
us many examples of social formation throughout, it often also shows us these
102 Rousseau, J. J (Betts, C, trans), 1994. The Social Contract, p. 55. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
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societies at war with oth er  societies, or between competing factions of groups within 
those societies. Surely if this social aspect to human nature really exists within all 
human beings, it should be something universal and inherent to the entire human 
species, not simply something limited to others only in our immediate living 
environment?
Claims such as this however, miss the subtlety of the argument. To say human 
nature has an innate social aspect to it is not to say that humans are n ever unsocial -  
such a position would be patently untrue, and one of the reasons why Rousseau’s 
almost too  p e r fe c t  view of his conflict-free state of nature seems unsustainable. Even 
without any of the ex tern a l catalysts for inter-personal conflict, absent in Rousseau’s 
natural state (such as scarcity of resources or economic inequalities) there are many 
other reasons throughout the course of life for people not getting along, and even 
going so far as to commit violence on one another, but this does not discount the idea 
that our p referen ce  might ultimately be for communal harmony and social interaction. 
There may well be a reason that myself and a colleague can’t stand each other; be it 
personality clash, difference of political opinions, or perhaps because of something 
they have done which has personally aggrieved me, but that doesn’t mean that such 
dislike is our d e s ired  state of being. And on a less interpersonal and more global 
scale, whilst clearly conflict between different groups of people d o es  exist in the form 
of wars both civil and national, usually such conflicts don’t come about organically 
and because of some in stin ctual hostility, but only as a result of there being external 
policy obstacles distorting the guiding so c ia l  instinct within.103 Just as Hobbes 
explains that the state of nature will lead to war because of competition, diffidence 
and glory; social groups become hostile to one another only when they fear others as
103 More on this in Chapter 4
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competition for resources or territory, or are required to show strong defence or gain a 
fearful reputation in order to protect themselves from potential attacks against their 
own land or resources. Such behaviour, far from being evidence of a non-social 
element to human nature, could actually be argued to stem from precisely the social 
element in question, as it is ultimately protection of one’s society and maintenance of 
the safety and security of its citizens or agreed goals which motivates the conflict (or 
at least a manipulation of motivations so as to make people believe that this is the 
case).
Whilst this is not to say that such wars are necessarily justified, it does explain how 
we can acknowledge the conflictive side of human nature whilst still maintaining the 
argument for an innate sociability too. Further still, it is quite clear from hearing the 
accounts of soldiers in battle that once the layers of propaganda and jingoistic 
mythology have been stripped from their proclaimed group enemy and their common 
humanity exposed, it is much harder to maintain these conflicts. As Michael Walzer 
articulates, ‘armed, he is my enemy; but he isn’t my enemy in any specific sense; the 
war itself isn’t a relation between persons but between political entities and their 
human instruments.’104
Whether it is in stories such as the famous Christmas Day incident of 1914 when 
German and French troops dropped their weapons for a few hours and celebrated 
together instead of fighting, or in the observations and memoirs of soldiers which 
detail the moments where the cracks between universal reality and nationalist fictions 
begin to show;105 it is clear that often the innate social instinct overrides the 
propagated socialized one and the recognition of an official ‘enemy’ as a fellow 
human being can cause an end to manipulated violence.
104 Walzer, M, 2000. Just and Unjust Wars, P. 36. (Basic Books; New York)
105 Ibid., p. 140
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Similarly, on a more interpersonal level, when two individuals within a group do not 
like each other, it is only in very rare and obsessive cases where this dislike is 
nurtured and maintained into an active and violent end, and often such an outcome is 
the result of copious external factors. Usually, either conflicting individuals will just 
stop bothering each other and spend time instead with those they do get along with, or 
they will confront each other about their problems and attempt to iron out their 
differences; the conflict having arisen due to a misunderstanding or identifiable 
difference of opinion.
The capacity to form social bonds is something we can say is inherent to the entire 
human species, but this does not mean that the entire human species bond together 
equally or that sometimes other, equally inherent elements to our nature don’t take 
precedence. We form closer bonds with some people than we do with others and even 
the most peaceful person may kill a stranger in order to protect their immediate 
family. This doesn’t negate the existence of social bonds, it simply shows how strong 
those bonds can become with those we spend the most time with or those with whom 
we share DNA, and acknowledges that sometimes -  as with any holistic system -  the 
social element of our nature will clash with other competing elements, and during 
such clashes the social aspect sometimes gets overridden.106
We do not usually fight with each other in the same way as we befriend or help one 
another. Our default setting at meeting new people, unless one is a sociopath, is 
usually to put out positive and friendly signals in an attempt to get to know them, not 
to treat them with immediate dislike, distrust, or suspicion. Whilst we often seem 
inclined to try and make friends with those we share our lives with as a matter of 
course, we generally fight each other only when, at some point within a social
106 See, for example: Lorenz, K (Latzke, M, trans), 1966. On Aggression. (Methuen; London)
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formation, either (on a small scale) personal social attitudes have clashed into 
animosity, or (on a larger scale) somebody in a position of power fears others may 
threaten that power and proclaims these others as ‘enemies’. Because humans 
ultimately want their society to be safe and secure, by creating a climate of fear and 
paranoia, those in power who make such proclamations often find people ‘simple 
enough to believe them’ and willing to fight these ‘enemies’ in what they perceive as 
being ‘self defence’.
As both Hobbes and Rousseau have shown us, there are alternative ways of living 
which would have been our preference if our nature were solely individualistic -  
either kill everybody else, or ignore them. In the majority of cases, we do not do this. 
We interact, we befriend, and we join our individual lives up together with others to 
create long-lasting relationships and social networks which shape our own existences 
to such a significant degree, that it would seem fair to say that it is in our very nature 
to do so. Although much debated by sociologists, philosophers, psychologists and 
anthropologists alike, to me there is no either/or on the question of whether or not 
humanity is an individualistic or communal species. The answer is very clear: we are 
both, and we are more. We are mutually supportive communities of innately social 
autonomous individuals who rationally choose to co-exist co-operatively so long as 
there are no individual conflicts of personality/interest/temperament that make people 
go their separate ways. We are social, but that is not all that we are and sometimes 
there are clashes of other innate qualities which mean that individuals or groups of 
individuals will not mesh socially. When there is such conflict, violence is one 
option, but only as a last resort; usually we attempt to work it out, or decide to just 
form different social groups.
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It is only in the most extreme circumstances (real or imagined) that inter-personal or 
inter-social conflict leads to the violence or death Hobbes imagines, or that an 
individual will, as Rousseau suggests, freely choose to isolate themselves from all 
others and live a self-imposed life of solitude.
But now that we have argued for, and, I believe, must accept, an inherent social 
component to individual human nature and life clearly missing from Hobbes and 
Rousseau, the question we must ask is this: if humanity in the state of nature had these 
capacities for peace and sociability, and thus life there was not an unavoidable, nasty, 
brutish and short war of all against all, but had the potential to be an unfettered oasis 
of self-rule and autonomy -  why did we ever come out of it at all? Why did our ‘true 
founder’ ever selfishly claim their patch of land and so dangerously decide that the 
time for peaceful and cooperative sharing had come to an end? And where did these 
alleged ‘corruptions’ of modem living come from that make us so easily choose 
egoistic gain over cooperative mutuality, thus requiring the restraint of a watchful, 
powerful state?
The key to answering these questions arguably lies in Rousseau’s own phrasing 
when he proclaims those who believed the ‘true founder’ to be ‘simple’. Innate 
tendencies and capacities are not infallible permanent consistencies; they are only 
ever potentialities, and can often be overcome by competing instincts, or go 
unrealized by circumstance. As I have said, an innate instinct to be social can easily 
be overridden if a person becomes a threat to either yourself or those you love. Why 
might they become a threat? Perhaps because their equally innate instinct for survival 
might override their social instinct and concern for you if you stand in the way of 
something they need to survive such as food, shelter, money, etc.
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Even the survival instinct, core to Hobbes’ ‘laws of nature’, can be overridden at 
times. Whilst it would seem hard for anyone to doubt that for most people it is in 
their interests not to die, and that human nature has within it some sort of inherent 
instinct for its continuing survival, it is still true that sometimes people cross the road 
without looking and their decision to do so gets them killed; sometimes they get into 
fights and willingly put themselves in danger; and on other occasions, some 
individuals go as far as to purposefully and readily take their own lives through 
suicide. As we are all, at bottom, autonomous individuals, all of our innate instincts 
can be overridden if other instincts, drives, or desires compete with them, or are 
manipulated into such competition, and we choose to follow one motivation over the 
other. Whilst we may well have certain instincts, they are always ultimately going to 
be filtered through our capacity for reason and our autonomous decisions on whether 
to act on those instincts or not.
Just as we use reason to deduce from the car-related deaths of our un-cautious 
friends that our chances of survival when out and about are increased tremendously 
when we check the roads for oncoming traffic before crossing; our levels of reasoning 
and ability to act in a way which truly recognises and satisfies our instincts and 
interests, evolve with time and experience.
Whilst there are no definitive records of exactly who it was who first created formal 
law and order out of the originally anarchic state of nature, or why they decided to do 
so, it seems reasonable to posit that although there could have been any number of 
causes which led to such a creation, none of these potential causes mean that the 
decision to form the first governments and structures of political power was either 
necessarily in conflict with the idea that there is an innate social aspect to human 
nature, or that innately autonomous humans prima facie need external structures of
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political power to live communally with each other. Nor, importantly, does it mean 
that the decision was the right one or that the evolution into contemporary society 
from the original state of nature was an evolution most in tune with the objectively 
legitimate goals and purposes of human life. All it means, is that it happened -  
perhaps for the better, or perhaps for the worse -  and if it was for the worse, then it is 
up to us now, as continually re-evaluating autonomous agents who have evolved even 
further, to recognise that mistake and fix it.
Just as once it was commonly believed to be acceptable to ignore the rights of 
women, to enslave people of a different race or colour, or rape your spouse and not 
call it rape -  with the passage of time and a more reasoned and educated reassessment 
of received conventional wisdom, opinions evolve and we can see old, illegitimate 
ideas for the mistaken and flawed pieces of thinking that they are; or confirm existing 
conventions as the truths that they profess to be. This is what Richard Dawkins 
describes as the ‘manifest phenomenon’ of evolutionary moral Zeitgeist107, and is the 
crux of Habermas’ notion of discourse ethics and the evolutionary nature of normative 
discussion. The more that new ways of thinking about previously accepted moral 
platitudes are put forward and discussed, dissected and analysed in public discourse, 
the more our conceptions of what is and is not ethically acceptable, will evolve. In 
the words of Mill, ‘complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is 
the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and 
on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of 
being right.’108
From this more evolutionary perspective of our ethical development then, we can 
agree with Rousseau that those who accepted the harmful ideas of the ‘true founder’
107 Dawkins, R, 2006. The God Delusion, pp., 262-272. (Bantam Press; London)
108 Mill, J. S, 1998. On Liberty and Other Essays, p.24. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
might well have been evolutionarily ‘simple’ in that: they just hadn’t gotten around to 
thinking about such matters thoroughly yet. Perhaps the ‘true founder’, whilst still 
possessing an innate social instinct, was gripped with more force by an equally innate 
instinct for rest, and freedom from unnecessary toil? Realising that they could 
manipulate others into doing things for  them instead of having to do it for themselves; 
a purely pragmatic decision to fulfill one goal over-rode another. Perhaps the 
individual’s level of moral reasoning was much less evolved than their level of 
pragmatic thought and so the ethics of their idea, and the question of whether or not 
such goals, and their repercussions on society were justified, never even came into 
their evolutionarily ‘simple’ cognitions. Nor did it come up in the equally 
evolutionarily ‘simple’ minds of their fellow state-of-nature-sharers, who, at the same 
level of moral evolution equally hadn’t stopped to consider whether this shift in the 
social order and creation of institutions of political power was either good or bad in 
far-reaching terms. Like all of evolution, it was simply an accident of circumstance 
that served some sort of survival purpose for someone or something at the time. All 
we can say for sure is that, at some point along the way, the original state of nature 
wasn’t working very well for someone (or a group of someones) and so they decided 
to form laws to improve their circumstances and established structures of power to 
ensure that those laws were obeyed.
That said, as we have rejected Hobbes’ depiction of the state of nature for its flawed 
cynicism, and find Rousseau’s vision to be almost too perfect to have ever had reason 
to change; we are left with no convincing reason thus far, as to why the original state 
of nature would ever have stopped working successfully and why it would ever have 
been abandoned for this potential accident in our moral evolution to occur.
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John Locke provides an alternative theory as to why the state of nature might have 
been rejected in favour of civil society that is subtly different from all of the ideas we 
have heard so far. Instead of perceiving an initial state of lawlessness as a place of 
violent warfare or misguided evolution, Locke reminds us that although the state of 
nature is ‘a state of liberty’ where autonomous humanity were free to choose how 
they would live their lives, ‘it is not a state of licence.’109 For Locke, although there is 
no formal political law in the state of nature he, like Hobbes, believed there was 
always an underlying ‘law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone’110. 
Contrary to Hobbes though, for Locke this law was explicitly moral and something 
that all autonomous people willingly acknowledged that they must follow.
The trouble with Locke’s law of nature however, and its further distinction from 
Hobbes’ view, is that Locke believed this natural law existed because it was created 
by god. Arguing theologically from the premise that human beings are god’s 
creations, Locke concludes that, as god would wish to preserve this creation, ‘He’ has 
imbued in it certain laws of nature to be found through ‘reason, which is that law’111. 
This capacity for reason, given to us by our creator,
Teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no 
one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all 
the workmanship o f  one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants o f  one 
sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his 
property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s 
pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community o f  
nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may order us
109 Locke, J, (Macpherson, C. B, ed) 1980. Second Treatise o f Government, p. 9. (Hackett Publishing 
Company; Indiana)
110 Ibid
111 TU1A
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to destroy one another... Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit 
his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in 
competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, 
unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to 
the preservation of the life, liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.112
Our constructivist position immediately leaves Locke’s argument untenable -  the 
reliance on an unvindicated deity to prove his claim is metaphysically problematic -  
however, I believe that Locke’s position can still be maintained even when we take 
the omnipotent creator out of the equation. Without our being god’s creation and it 
being god’s gift, our capacity for reason (upon which Locke’s position ultimately 
rests) clearly does exist, and by using this capacity for reason to analyse our 
circumstances we can see, with little controversy, that we do have, on a purely 
individual level, a desire to preserve our own lives. As all human beings are of the 
same species and, therefore, arguably share similar desires and interests, it then seems 
reasonable to extrapolate from this individualistic desire for preservation, the 
possibility of a similar desire for preservation of life, liberty, health, etc from 
all human beings -  not because they are the indebted play-things of a supernatural 
deity, but because they are similarly interest-holding individuals like ourselves who 
cannot seek fulfillment of such interests if they are dead; and being innately social 
individuals, through compassion and empathy, they can recognise that their own
situation is the same as the other members of their species and thus apply the same
• 11^  desire for preservation to all.
| 12 Ibid
113 Such thinking could be conceived as ‘speciesist’ unless it is extended to all interest sharing 
creatures. Although beyond the scope of this essay, if the ethical arguments contained within this 
thesis are taken to their logical conclusions vis-a-vis non-human animals, then they should be applied
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By using our capacity for reason in conjunction with what we know of ourselves and 
our species, we can discover such ‘laws of nature’ (if that is what you wish to call 
them) about what we should and should not do if we want to live the most fulfilling 
and rewarding life that we can, for both ourselves and the people we share our 
existence with. Remembering our earlier equation, once we have reasonably 
ascertained a sufficient account of what a fulfilling and rewarding life would be, we 
could then coherently determine what ought and ought not be done in order to achieve 
the goal of that fulfilling and rewarding life.
Locke’s theistic appeal to an authoritative god in which to ground the 
prescriptiveness of rationally derived laws is not uncommon in natural law theory. 
Although traditionally such approaches to ethics from Aristotle to Cicero to Aquinas 
could all ultimately be boiled down to the same underlying claim -  that we can work 
out how we ought to live our lives through our reason -  just as I discussed in the 
previous chapter, this idea never quite seemed enough to satisfy the absolutist 
conception of ethics most people are looking for. As a result, an extra, unsupported, 
level of reasoning was often brought into the equation: reason was not simply 
deducing a rational ought from what we knew (as best we could) to be true of the 
world; it was uncovering moral truths that were fixed in nature itself, laid down by the 
creator of that nature -  god.
But I have already rejected this impulse for absolutism, and see constructivist ethics 
as a more plausible position than natural law theory. Constructivism denies the 
necessity of anything more than reason alone in our moral deliberations and uses it 
not to discover a firm set of unchanging natural laws, already in existence, but to 
determine a well-supported and defendable account of what all the relevant
(where relevant) to all living creatures, not just human ones. See: Singer, P, 1995. Animal Liberation, 
(Pimlico; London)
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information suggests it is reasonable to do, or not do, in any given situation. Whether 
god gave us our reason or not is irrelevant; regardless of its origins it is clear that by 
using reason it is possible to construct a plausible account of how we should act; and 
so we do not need god to understand what Locke meant by calling a state without law 
one of liberty, but not licence: a rationally autonomous human being in a state of 
nature is free of external control and at absolute liberty to choose how they will live 
their lives, but their choices must still always be guided by the conclusions of reason. 
Within their liberty, therefore, they do not have justifiable license to act in such a way 
that they transgress their rationally-derived rules of ethics; such an act would still be 
‘wrong’ even without an external authority to enforce its ‘wrongness’.
What Locke recognized, crucially, was that any formal laws made within a political 
society can only come into being if they are grounded first in these ethical ‘laws of 
nature’ that exist as independently justifiable truths found through reason; objectively 
determined as right or wrong regardless o f how society recognizes them to be at any 
one time.
Still, without a war of all against all or corrupted lawlessness to save ourselves from, 
how then did this alternative version of the state of nature lead to the formation of 
external structures of political power? In Locke more than in anyone else it seems an 
incredibly odd step that humanity takes; from being a people who possess these easily 
revealed and self-governing laws of nature that demand their peaceful preservation, to 
a people who suddenly need to be told what to do by someone else to secure peace 
and security. If the laws of nature are so self-evident and easily revealed, why doesn’t 
the world remain in its initial peaceful and self-governing state forever?
Locke’s reasoning for the change from anarchy to statehood is simple and pragmatic. 
To Locke, an ungovemed state will not lead to a Hobbesian war of all against all or a
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Rousseauian manipulation of people’s interests, it will simply become a hugely 
inconvenient way of following the very laws of nature it promotes. Whilst 
‘freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a 
man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it’114, part of the law of nature designed 
to preserve such life also includes the ‘strange doctrine’115 of punishment, and this can 
lead to difficulties in the administration of justice.
In transgressing the law o f  nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule 
than that o f  reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the 
actions o f  men, for their mutual security...Every man upon this score, by the right he 
hath to preserve mankind in general...hath a right to punish the offender, and be 
executioner o f  the law o f  nature.116
This rationally grounded right to punishment causes problems for Locke because it 
logically means that not only will each person have to judge the transgressions of 
others, but they will have to be the judge in any cases against themselves too, leading 
to fears that ‘self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on 
the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing
117 •  ♦others’ . Instead of an objective and purposeful system of law and order that 
maintains the security of the whole community, you would instead have a hugely 
biased and futile system of nepotism and personality-politics, making a fair and 
impartial judicial process impossible; therefore, establishing an external authority by 
the formation of civil government ‘is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the
114 Locke, J, (Macpherson, C. B, ed) 1980. Second Treatise of Government, p. 17. (Hackett Publishing 
Company; Indiana)
115 Ibid., p. 10
116 Ibid
117 Ibid., p. 12
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state of nature’,118 and the only way to ensure the kind of safety and equality 
demanded by the laws of nature.
Whereas for both Hobbes and Rousseau, the creation of formal structures of political 
power led to markedly different societies than those which were to be found in the 
original states of nature, for Locke, the externally governed state is merely a 
continuation of the original state -  just one with all the kinks ironed out. Instead of 
leading to radical change, the social contract Locke envisages is one whereby
whoever has the legislative or supreme power o f any common-wealth, is bound to 
govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by 
extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies 
by those laws; and to employ the force o f  the community at home, only in the execution 
o f  such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community 
from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, 
safety, and public good  o f  the people.119
In other words, it is a contract that gives power and authority to an external 
government, but a power and authority that is recognised from the start only as a 
means to a specific ethical end -  the preservation of people as demanded by the laws 
of nature, which Locke argues is impossible to guarantee amidst the inconveniences 
of the original state; thus a politics bound by the ethical obligations of a clearly 
defined political teleology.
Whilst the established government will become the supreme political authority in a 
society, they are still ultimately bound to follow and enforce the universal laws of 
nature, just as they did before they had political power. As Locke puts it, i t  is a
118 Ibid
119 Ibid., p. 68
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power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to
destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects...Thus the law of nature
120stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others.’
Like any good contract, the Lockeian model has terms and conditions for both 
parties to observe and which they must stick to or face the repercussions. Unlike 
Hobbes, whose contract bestowed absolute power into the hands of a Leviathan ruler 
who can never be questioned or held accountable, for Locke,
Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule o f  
society... by this breach o f  trust they forfeit the pow er  the people had put into their 
hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume 
their original liberty, and, by the establishment o f  a new legislative, (such as they shall
think fit) provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are
121in society.
Locke recognises that the authenticity of political power comes only from its being 
freely given by a rationally autonomous people in possession of natural sovereignty 
over their own lives. They can never really lose that internal sovereign power they 
innately possess, but can autonomously agree to concede political power to an 
external, socially-legitimated, authority in order to serve a specific purpose (a 
political teleology) -  in Locke’s case, the adherence to the laws of nature.
The social contract, therefore, is made only to fulfill pre-existing goals which state 
of nature circumstances prevent, getting rid of inconveniences and helping to 
improve conditions of life for citizens living under it, not take those conditions away.
120 Ibid., p. 71
121 Ibid.,p. I l l
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Rousseau recognised this too, as we recall from his statement that ‘each in giving 
himself to all gives himself to none, and since there are no associates over whom he
does not acquire the same rights as he cedes, he gains the equivalent of all that he
122loses, and greater strength for the conservation of what he possesses.’
The problem for Hobbes is that the contract he draws up is actually illegitimate by 
the standards of compact we normally observe. The Leviathan, whom all participants 
in the social contract agree to obey and submit their own freedom to, becomes an 
entity outside the contract, with no reciprocal obligations in return to its citizens other 
than the vague notion of stopping the war of all against all. Whilst the people give up 
everything to the Leviathan in order to escape the brutal state of nature, the Leviathan 
itself is simply given absolute, unquestionable power, which they are then free to 
wield however they like under the flimsy justification that at least i t’s better than 
constant war.
Further ramifications of the Leviathan’s unbound rule have been pointed out by 
Hart, who believed that laws grounded solely in the de facto legal claims of an 
unquestionable authority figure cannot account for two major features of law as we 
traditionally understand it: persistence and continuity. In short: if law can only come 
from the authoritative claims of the Leviathan, then how can those laws persist after 
the Leviathan’s death, under the regime of a new Leviathan?
Even the best effort made at defending Hobbes from this problem, by Robert 
Ladenson, finds its defence pretty flimsy; recognizing that no sustainable claim to 
authoritative transfer between Leviathan legislators can plausibly be made, Ladenson 
appeals simply to custom and tradition as the basis for legal continuity in Hobbes,
122 Rousseau, J. J (Cranston, M, trans), 1984. A Discourse On Inequality, p. 55. (Penguin Books; 
London)
123 In Ladenson, R, In Defence o f a Hobbesian Conception of Law, in Raz, J (ed), 1990. Authority, pp., 
32-55. (Basil Blackwell; Oxford)
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whilst admitting that ‘a Hobbesian analysis of law per se cannot account for why the 
above kinds of traditions should exist in certain circumstances.’124 Indeed, Ladenson, 
who has already brushed over the question of appropriate limits to authority as ‘an
125important task for moral philosophers that has not yet been fully addressed’, 
likewise shrugs off this important question as falling ‘more appropriately within the 
province of the sociology of law than analytical jurisprudence’, rather than seeing it as
176a serious failing in the position he is attempting to defend.
However, the question of the appropriate limits of the Leviathan’s power (also a 
concern of Hart’s) is not only directly connected to the question of why a community 
might continue a tradition of deferring their autonomy to an agreed external authority, 
but also to the basis of legal continuity and persistence: without a clear ethical basis 
for why the Leviathan ought to be established in the first case and detailed reciprocal 
agreement about its obligations to the people it governs (its political teleology), we 
have no way of independently judging its legitimacy, measuring its appropriate limits, 
and thus no way of objectively vindicating the continued existence of either itself or 
the laws it creates after it is gone.
That these questions remain unanswerable on a Hobbesian account of political 
power is down to Hobbes’ original claim that the state of nature was an amoral 
environment. If, instead, we were to concede that we needed to escape the war of all 
against all not for abstract strategic reasons but because such circumstances were 
considered, on some level, ethically bad, then the arguments we were using for its 
abolition would, within them, guarantee some sort of agreed ethical protections and 
obligations which any contracted solution -  the Leviathan -  would be compelled to 
maintain or else lose its status of legitimacy. This would explain why the laws made
124 Ibid., p. 41
125 Ibid., p. 37
126 Ibid., p. 41
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under such an arrangement would persist through time (the justification on which they 
rested being independent of the legislator themselves), why the citizens would 
willingly continue to give acquiescence to a new Leviathan (so long as it maintained 
its part of the agreement) and what the appropriate limits would be to the Leviathan’s 
power.
As illustration, imagine if (as in Locke), in Hobbes’ state of nature, what was 
ultimately important was the preservation of human life. On this view, it is clear that 
the war of all against all would endanger life rather than preserve it and so must be 
abolished. In any resulting contract made to achieve that end, the Leviathan would 
not only have to stop the specific circumstances of the particular war of all against all, 
but ensure also that the desired ends of preservation of human life were met in all 
other circumstances too (thus immediately setting limits to its power and certain 
obligations to its people). Without such ethics there is no specific obligation for the 
Leviathan to uphold. Yes they must stop the war and achieve continuing peace 
(which I maintain is an ethical goal in its own right) but without an underlying ethical 
justification for that goal there are no limits on how they are to achieve it. Perhaps the 
war could conceivably be stopped by the repressive imprisonment of 80% of the 
citizens, leaving the remaining 20% living in a carefree abundance of easy to find 
felicity? There is nothing within Hobbes’ social contract that could intelligibly call 
such a strategy ‘wrong’ because there is no morality prior to the establishment of 
political power and, once established, the edicts of the Leviathan become self­
validating and can be held up to no objective standards of moral understanding. To 
my mind this makes the agreement of the Hobbesian contract as volatile as the 
original war it is supposed to end; less of a contract and more of a mugging.
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2.3: Backing Into the Ethical Contract: The Unavoidability of Political Teleology
An alternative approach to tackling the state of nature problem without resort to a 
social contract was attempted by Robert Nozick: ‘if the state did not exist would it be
197necessary to invent it?’
Regardless of whether or not one believed in the existence of an original social 
contract, Nozick argued, the question could be refrained from the hypothetical and 
speculative query as to how the state might have originally come about, to the 
potentially more important question of whether or not, in the here and now, the state’s 
existence was really justified. By asking the question that way round, the historical 
arguments about the original social contract’s existence or lack thereof, or of how 
contemporary citizens can be thought to be bound to a contract drawn up by their 
distant ancestors, lose all force and import. They become irrelevant to the more 
pressing question: now that the state is here, should it be?
As well as turning the traditional assumptions of social contract theory on their head, 
Nozick’s refraining of the question asked something even more radical. The phrase, 
‘would it be necessary to invent it’ does not simply require us to ask whether or not a 
formal state-structure of political power is necessary for society, but more 
significantly, it asks whether or not such a state is ever avoidable. Would it be 
necessary to invent it, or would the state simply materialize organically, as the natural 
inescapable outcome of rational human choice?
To determine his answer, Nozick decided to re-analyse Locke’s depiction of the state 
of nature. As we have already seen, it is Locke’s state of nature which seems both the 
most plausible image of pre-societal humanity, and the most difficult to imagine us 
ever forsaking for the external authority of a political state, and so Nozick attempted
127 Nozick, R, 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 3. (Basic Books; New York)
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to see if there was any way of sustaining this original perfect anarchy without resort to 
the creation of a formal state; as well as the question of whether or not a formal social 
contract is required to make that transition and ‘invent’ the state instead of the state 
just simply happening. His conclusions, he would claim, would abandon the
necessity of a formal social contract argument and instead posit what he calls, after
128the economist Adam Smith, an ‘invisible-hand explanation of the state’.
Nozick claimed that the sort of inconveniences Locke talks about, instead of leading 
to the formal creation of a codified social contract, would more likely bring about an 
accident of circumstance which would inevitably lead to the organic formation of an 
‘ultraminimal’ state within the original state of nature itself. Such a state would not 
be a specifically devised contractual arrangement, but simply the natural evolution of 
human self-interest and happenstance.
Nozick imagined that to prevent ‘inconveniences’, groups of citizens would 
autonomously come together at first and, via mutual self-interested agreement, form 
protection agencies which ensure the laws of nature (and the rights that they gain as 
individuals from those laws) are upheld in society. Eventually, with many of these 
voluntarily created protection groups popping up and competition forming between 
them all, ‘the self-interested and rational actions of persons in a Lockeian state of 
nature will lead to single protective agencies dominant over geographic territories’,129 
be they one single agency, or a sole federation of many. Eventually, the unintended 
but ineluctable conclusion of such behaviour will be a de facto monopoly of 
protection which is, in essence, the basic beginnings of a formal ‘state’. Indeed, it is
128 Ibid., p. 118
129 Ibid
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the very personification of Weber’s definition of the state as the ‘monopoly of 
legitimized violence’.130
Nozick’s state exists, he claims, with no real social contract, and not by a conscious 
decision to form it; it just transpires naturally as a result of people’s rational, 
autonomous, and specifically self-interested actions within the original state and 
political power is therefore only ever justified at its most manageably minimal: 
providing only the basics of security as a dominant monopoly of protection and 
nothing else.
As radical as Nozick seemed on paper, in reality we have with Nozick the very same 
underlying idea that informed the social contracts of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau: 
that the existence of external political power was necessarily created, and therefore 
justified, as the only means by which to protect the individual. Whilst Nozick 
attempts to deny the necessity of a formal social contract by arguing that the minimal 
state is justified because its monopoly of socially-legitimized violence protects 
people; he is still relying on an essentially contractarian argument to support his 
conclusions: that the minimal state is legitimate only because it protects its citizens 
from harm, thus forming a deal of reciprocity between the governed and their 
government that minimum obedience shall be granted in return for security.
As well as ultimately trading on the very kind of social contract argument it claims 
to circumvent, Nozick’s invisible-hand explanation of ‘backing into’ the state via the 
circumstantial creation of increasingly monopolized protection agencies has other 
problems. Significantly, there is no compelling reason to imagine the behaviour 
predicted by Nozick as being obvious, unless one presumes (as did Nozick) several 
underlying, and unsupported, ideological assumptions about human beings that carry
130 Lassman, P and Speirs, R (eds), 1994. Weber: Political Writings, p. 310. (Cambridge University 
Press; Cambridge)
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a rather pessimistic view of human nature; views seemingly influenced by discredited 
game theory,131 arguably simplistic mathematical models of complex human 
behaviours such as the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’,132 and the egoistic neoliberal economic 
theories of people like Hayek and Friedman which were growing in popularity at the 
time of Nozick’s writing.133 This dated and Cold War-influenced outlook assumes a 
humanity whose prime preoccupation is with fighting each other, rationally scheming 
towards one’s advantage and buying into Mafioso protection rackets for safety and 
mutually assured destruction, whereas it is just as plausible to assume a human nature 
that is capable of developing alternative strategies to counteract both Nozick and 
Hobbes’ paranoid fear of constant attack and Locke’s unworkable inconveniences; 
strategies of mutual co-operation; autonomously created independent structures of 
objective adjudication, and stateless forms of secure community building. In other 
words, strategies with a rich history in the anarchist tradition134 and which, although 
far different from the state-dependent societies we have historically known, contrary 
to Nozick’s cynically fatalistic invisible hand conjectures, Hobbes and Rousseau’s 
manifold projected insecurities, and Locke’s mistrust of self-legislation; are as 
arguably plausible and theoretically possible as their more widely-known alternatives.
Still, in all of the social contract approaches we have looked at thus far, despite the 
difference of specific accounts, one thing has been implicitly agreed upon throughout
131 One of Game Theory’s major architects, the mathematician John Nash, has since dismissed the 
principles on which the theory was based as being possibly symptomatic of the then-undiagnosed 
paranoid schizophrenia he was suffering; asserting groundless suspicion on the behaviour of all 
players. See: Curtis, A, 2007. The Trap: What Happened To Our Dream of Freedom (documentary), 
BBC, London
132 Nozick, R, 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp., 120-133. (Basic Books; New York)
133 Ibid., pp., 21,27, 158-159, 173, 218. For more, see also: Hayek, F, 1944. The Road to Serfdom. 
(Routledge; London); Hayek, F, 2006. The Constitution of Liberty. (Routledge Classics; London); 
Friedman, M, 2002. Capitalism and Freedom. (The University of Chicago Press; Chicago). Further 
criticism of neoliberalism is to be found in Chapter 3.
134 For a broad view of the anarchist tradition see, for example: Guerin, D, 2006. No Gods No Masters. 
(AK Press; Edinburgh); Kinna, R, 2005. Anarchism: A Beginner’s Guide. (Oneworld Publications; 
Oxford); Carter, A, 1971. The Political Theory of Anarchism. (Routledge; London); Horowitz, I. L, 
2005. The Anarchists. (Transaction; New Jersey).
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from Hobbes to Nozick: the continuing presence of external political power structures 
in human societies are not, by themselves, prima facie evidence of their legitimacy; 
instead some other, independent, justification for their existence is needed.
When Hobbes tells us that the social contract exists because it is the only way to stop 
the war of all against all, and Rousseau tells us that it is the only tool we have to 
restore some semblance of the natural freedoms we have lost through the corruption 
and inequality of the non-contractual state, and Locke tells us that we need the 
contract to cure the many ‘inconveniences’ of the state of nature, or Nozick tells us 
that we must ensure our mutual protection through contractarian agreements of 
mutual advantage; despite all holding a wide array of reasons and arguments for what 
the exact specifics of this independent justification might actually be, there remains 
within all of these theories a singular underlying contractarian tiber-argument that 
links them all: that human beings are, by nature, free and autonomous, intemally- 
authoritative, interest-holding creatures who have the potential, natural disposition 
and prospective choice in life to live an unfettered existence of stateless self-rule; 
therefore for them to have chosen to create an artificial structure of external authority 
and give it political power over their lives is a decision which can only be justified on 
the understanding that doing so is the only possible way by which certain key interests 
that they hold can be achieved which, without the creation and maintenance of such 
politics, would otherwise be thwarted. In other words, that establishing political 
power X makes life ‘better’ for ‘people’ than they would be without it.
At its most base, ‘better’ for ‘people’ means as a starting point within all of these 
arguments, that the ‘people’ in question are able to stay alive longer with the creation 
of political power than they would do without it. This desire is rudimentary, and is 
found clearly stated in both Hobbes and Locke’s fundamental laws of nature, as well
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as implicitly within Nozick’s acceptance of protection from harm as a valid 
justification for a minimal state, and is the crux of Rousseau’s entire project: ‘the 
purpose of the social treaty’, Rousseau tells us, ‘is the preservation of the contracting 
parties.’135
Whilst there is certainly much more to the story (the preservation of life, as we shall 
see, is by no means the sole justificatory purpose for the legitimate creation of 
external political power), the notion is a necessary prologue to any complete account 
of political teleology as ultimately, whatever other interests we might wish to fulfill 
and incorporate into our definitions of what exactly making things ‘better’ for 
‘people’ might mean, we simply cannot fulfill any desires, goals and needs, or, 
indeed, hold any interests at all when we are dead; and so keeping ourselves alive will 
always be a key priority, upon which the pursuit of all other interests is made 
possible. Indeed, it is perhaps this constant awareness of our own fragility which 
helps motivate many of our other interests in the first place; as finite, self-conscious, 
and psychologically complex creatures with a conceptual framework of ourselves, 
others, the past, the present and the future, who live our lives under the constant and 
impending shadow of an inescapable death, it is possibly this knowledge of life’s 
fleetingness which causes us to place significant value on the time in which we 
actually are alive. With the clock ticking, we strive to fulfill as many of our interests 
and as much of our potential as we possibly can before succumbing to the ineluctable 
-  but utterly unpredictable and therefore, almost paradoxically, unexpected -  day that 
we eventually decease.
Whilst we can prepare for, and accept the fatal dangers of unavoidable killers such 
as disease, age, decrepitude, etc, we cannot easily accept the avoidable hastening of
135 Rousseau, J. J (Betts, C, trans), 1999. The Social Contract, p. 71. (Oxford University Press;
Oxford)
105
this grim but natural occurrence through circumstances or actions which we have the 
power to change or prevent. This attitude applies not only towards the conscious and 
intentional individual act of avoidable murder of one person by another -  the most 
immediate and obvious catalyst for seeking inter-social protection we might imagine 
-  but also towards any recognized unnecessary systemic killing: deaths caused by 
changeable conditions of life which, if altered, could have easily prevented certain 
fatalities.
In our present situation, perhaps that could be the recognition that certain life- 
threatening conditions of extreme poverty could be alleviated by a differently devised 
distribution of wealth; but for Hobbes it was changing the circumstances of war 
between all, for Rousseau it was recognizing ‘men as they are, and laws as they can 
be’,136 for Locke it was getting rid of the ‘inconveniences’ of the state of nature, and 
for Nozick it was formalizing random acts of vigilantism into an organized system of 
security.
Of course, it must be made clear that preserving life, although clearly ‘better’ for 
‘people’ than hastening their death, cannot be the only goal of a complete political 
teleology. If that were the case then there would be nothing wrong in calling 
legitimate a form of political power which ensured that each and every citizen under 
its auspices was drugged into a state of enduring unconsciousness and hooked up to a 
piece of medical equipment that kept them alive in this vegetative state for as long as
• 1T7 • •possible. Quite rightly there seems something wrong with equating the value 
people place on life with the simple biological fact of being alive. Yes we value life, 
but we value equally many other things as well which that life enables us to do; 
without the existence of other interests within our lives, our interest in staying alive
136 Ibid., p. 45
137 An example intentionally similar to Nozick’s ‘experience-machine’ counter-argument against 
utilitarianism: Nozick, R, 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp., 42-45. (Basic Books; New York)
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loses all rationale, becoming nothing more than the rather odd desire to witlessly 
experience continued breathing and synaptic activity for as long as possible.
This is why Nozick follows up his establishment of the dominant protection agency 
with a detailed remit of clauses and criteria to limit the scope of their interference in 
the lives they protect, and how the Rousseauian and Lockeian peaceful visions of the 
state of nature still lead to the creation of certain contracted protections despite not 
having the immediate chaotic violence of Hobbes’ warring state. All four thinkers 
believed, to greater or lesser extent, that the preservation of life was only one in a 
wide array of things which a society required to ensure its citizens the quality of life 
that they desired and fulfill their essential interests both as individuals and as 
members of a community; making the social contract much more than just an 
instrumental assurance of one’s continued existence, but rather a comprehensive inter­
social commitment to certain ethical obligations ostensibly held by all.
2.4: Rawls and Constructing the Hypothetical Contract: Ethics and the Original 
Position
Dworkin famously stated that ‘a hypothetical contract...is no contract at all’,138 and as 
I have claimed that the kind of social contract I am looking for is one which must be 
hypothetically applicable at all times and in all circumstances, the claim at first seems 
quite damaging. However, whilst I think that is arguably true in the legislative sense 
in which Dworkin, a legal scholar, was conceiving of contractual agreements, I think 
it is important to understand that the hypothetical ethical contract needed for 
justifying legitimate politics, although possessing a familiar contractual structure to 
the formal legal model, is not intended to equate exactly with a conventionally
138 Dworkin, R. ‘The Original Position’, in Daniels, N (ed), 1976. Reading Rawls, pp., 17-18. (Basic 
Books; New York)
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understood legal contract. That sort of legal document, we might normally imagine, 
is one willingly drawn up between several cooperating parties, for mutually beneficial 
reasons, in order to agree to certain behaviours or actions which the participants 
would otherwise, were it not for the contract, have no interest in adopting or 
undertaking, in order for a particular agreed outcome to be achieved. However, the 
hypothetical contract we are looking for here is not a contract to impose a particular 
controversial arrangement between peoples, as in the traditional legal case (although it 
is necessarily framed as such when applied historically, for obvious reasons), but 
rather one to assess an already existing state of affairs that, it has been independently 
ascertained, requires a consent it does not yet explicitly have.
Once we recognize that the unshakeable natural autonomy of humanity necessitates 
the existence of a justificatory argument to explain the legitimate deference of 
individual self-sovereignty to an external social authority, then we are left with two 
choices: either attempt to work out what a suitable justification would be and see if it 
applies, or concede that any such justification is impossible and thus that any external 
authority structure is irresolvably illegitimate. As soon as we attempt to undertake the 
former task, then the very nature of such an enquiry, centring as it does around the 
question of consent and what it would take for rational and autonomous individuals to 
freely sanction an external authority over their own self-rule, leaves us with an 
inescapably contractarian project: the search for justifiable terms of agreement 
between individuals and the state regarding the limits and obligations of external 
political power over individual autonomous life. As there is no historical record of 
such a contract genuinely existing, and no compelling reason that, even if it had, a 
previously agreed pact from one generation should bind future generations to its 
claims, we are left seeking not proof of an actually existing contract, but rather an
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empirically vindicated and rationally sustainable set of timeless clauses and criteria 
that we can apply hypothetically, and in perpetuity, to already existing sets of 
circumstances in order to see if they satisfy these newly-discovered conditions of 
legitimacy.
Recognizing both this, and the scope within the social contract tradition for 
agreements that go ethically further than mere preservation of life, John Rawls 
attempted, in A Theory o f Justice, to save social contract theory from those critics who 
had denounced its plausibility or purpose, and reconstruct the idea into precisely this 
sort of timeless and hypothetical thought experiment, accessible to all, by which he 
could discover the conditions of justice which any political constitution, past, present 
or future, must operate within if they are to be considered objectively just.
Rawls argued that ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions’ and that ‘laws and 
institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished
• * 1 7 Qif they are unjust.’ To discover what exactly the criteria of ‘justice’ were though, 
by which institutions and laws would be assessed, Rawls came up with an ingenious 
methodology: a rationally constructed social contract argument, which would attempt 
to discard unsubstantiated speculations about pre-political life and historical states of 
nature that may, or may not, have happened; and rely only upon what Rawls believed 
to be rationally constructed principles, extrapolated from already existing verified 
facts and confirmed intuitions: in other words, by creating hypothetical conditions in 
which ethical constructivism could flourish.
For Rawls, arguments about the historical accuracy of differing conceptions of the 
state of nature had missed the point; it wasn’t necessary to determine how an actual 
pre-political state of nature might have been in order to work out viable doctrines of
139 Rawls, J, 1999. A Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, p. 3. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
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justice and legitimacy, but only to imagine a hypothetical place, situated before any 
particular laws or institutions had been devised, which recreated a pre-legal state in 
which people could reasonably construct, without prejudice, the principles on which 
legitimate government could be justified, based only on what they could plausibly 
assume to be true about human interests and unfettered by the biases and influence of 
distorting social trappings. Rawls called this place ‘the original position’; a 
‘conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher abstraction the 
familiar theory of the social contract’.140 Essentially, ‘the principles of justice for the 
basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the 
principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would 
accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their 
association’ and would ‘regulate all further agreements’.141 The original position 
attempted to imagine members of a society stripped down to their basic core, as self- 
interested, rational, and autonomous individuals, and then in this hypothetical ‘state of 
affairs in which the parties are equally represented as moral persons and the outcome 
is not conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social 
forces’,142 envision what it would be likely such people would agree upon as fair 
principles of justice.
Among the essential features o f  this situation is that no one knows his place in society, 
his class position or social status, nor does he know his fortune in the distribution o f  
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like....the parties do not 
know their conceptions o f  the good or their special psychological propensities...This 
ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice o f  principles by the
140 Ibid., p. 10
141 Ibid
142 Ibid., p. 104
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outcome o f  natural chance or the contingency o f  social circumstances. Since all are 
similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favour his particular 
condition, the principles o f  justice are the result o f  a fair agreement or bargain.143
Rawls uses this ‘veil of ignorance’ because he feels that ‘the arbitrariness of the 
world must be corrected for’.144 He recognized that despite our common humanity 
suggesting the logical possibility of the existence of a core set of shared human 
interests it might be reasonable to assume are universal to all, specific social situations 
and cultural inheritances have shaped people’s individual interests in existing 
societies towards a biased and distorted relativism, unduly influenced by the particular 
arbitrary circumstances of their current life situations. The device of the veil is an 
attempt to combat this, and successfully tackles Rousseau’s criticism of Hobbes, or 
my criticisms of Nozick’s unjustifiably cynical conception of humanity, by trying to 
eliminate from the participants in the contract any contemporary corruptions or 
ideological distortions that might negatively influence objective deliberation.
Instead of, for example, business leaders deciding only upon business friendly 
principles in the original position, manual workers deciding only upon labour-friendly 
principles, men deciding on patriarchal principles, women deciding on matriarchal 
principles and all manner of slanted, self-interested, rationalisations being unwittingly 
put forward under the guise of universal ‘human’ interests; by not knowing anything 
more than the mere generalities of their condition -  that they are human beings living 
in a society and bound to follow whatever principles of justice their agreements shall 
yield -  Rawls posits that participants in such circumstances would be more likely to 
choose fairly, on universally defensible principles of shared human interest, rather
143 Ibid., p. 11
144 Ibid., p. 122
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than on subjective and unvindicated empirical assumptions or foundations of esoteric 
and unsubstantiated partisan metaphysics. Further still, once sound conclusions about 
justice have been derived under these impartial conditions, those principles would be 
capable of exposing some of the injustices of contemporary institutions, creating a 
comprehensive critical tool against which the legitimacy of existing structures of 
political power, trading on claims of justice, can be assessed.
Justice, therefore, is ‘fairness’, according to Rawls, because in such an ‘original 
position’ only the most irrational gambler would agree to principles of justice that 
were hugely biased in favour of a specific social group at the expense of all others, 
because they would not know on which side of the divide they would be living upon 
their return to society. In fact, under the veil of ignorance, they wouldn’t even know 
enough about their own individual psychology to know if they were such a gambler, 
and capable of making such an irrational decision in the first place. Each participant, 
even by voting completely in their own self-interest, could only ever justifiably 
choose principles that were fair to all, based only on uncontroversial, person- 
unspecific, universal knowledge of the shared human condition.
For Rawls, therefore, making things ‘better’ for ‘people’ means ensuring that the 
conditions of justice, yielded from the original position, are upheld. If the basic 
structures of political institutions are organized properly along these universally 
applicable principles of justice as fairness, then a society could be considered as just, 
Rawls contended, regardless of how the free individual choices and decisions made 
by people within such a just society, outside of the parameters of justice, made 
individual lives ultimately turn out. Rawls took these principles of justice as the 
foundations for procedural justice within a society, from which all else would follow.
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This idea of ‘pure procedural justice’ was fleshed out and taken further in Rawls’ 
later books, where he devised a unique model of liberal pluralism. As the original 
position, due to its timeless and universal hypothetical nature, is understandable and 
obtainable by anybody of any creed, religion, or other comprehensive doctrine 
(because it brackets such individual cultural and ideological differences as being 
‘arbitrary from a moral point of view’,145 and reduces all people to only their 
universal and common elements as rational and reasonable individuals); Rawls argued 
that ‘justice as fairness’ expresses ‘shared and public political reason’ and that ‘to 
attain such a shared reason, the conception of justice should be, as far as possible, 
independent of the opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that 
citizens affirm’.146 Recognizing societies as ‘a fair system of cooperation over time, 
from one generation to the next’147 and individual citizens as free, autonomous 
individuals with the moral power to ‘form, revise, and rationally pursue a conception 
of the good’;148 he claims that in a ‘well-ordered’ society it is essential to make the 
distinction between comprehensive individual religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines that people may choose to hold in their private lives, and a public 
philosophy of mutually agreed ‘overlapping consensus on a political conception of 
justice’.149
Rawls steps away from the more abstract thought of A Theory o f Justice in his later 
work and places his analysis in the specific context of the Western liberal tradition, 
assuming three ‘general facts’ which he believes necessitate this ‘fact of reasonable 
pluralism’150 and justifies an ‘overlapping consensus’ of public philosophy in Western
145 Ibid., p. 63
146 Rawls, J, 1996. Political Liberalism, p. 9. (Columbia University Press; New York)
147 Ibid., p. 15
148 Ibid., p. 30
149 Ibid., p. 65
150 Ibid., p. 36
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democratic societies. Firstly, that the diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
is a permanent feature of the public culture of such a democracy, and no one 
comprehensive view can realistically ever be satisfactorily ‘proven’ as being the 
comprehensive religious, philosophical or moral truth. Indeed, as a second general 
fact, Rawls believed that ‘a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive 
use of state power.’151 As a result of this, the only way to avoid sectarian divisions 
and factions within a society, or ideological tyranny, is to ensure that the ‘public basis 
of justification for a constitutional regime...must be one that can be endorsed by
152widely different and opposing though reasonable comprehensive doctrines.’ Put 
succinctly:
To say that a society is well-ordered conveys three things: first...it is a society in which 
everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the veiy same principles o f  
justice; and second...its basic structure -  that is, its main political and social 
institutions and how they fit together as one system o f  cooperation -  is publicly known, 
or with good reason believed, to satisfy these principles. And third, its citizens have a 
normally effective sense o f  justice and so they generally comply with society’s basic 
institutions, which they regard as just.153
What matters here is this continuing idea found in Rawls, that a social contract does 
not need to be some long-forgotten document, or actual state of historical agreement, 
but can simply be defined as the only reasonable conceptual framework by which an 
institution’s legitimacy can be rationally assessed; and that this conceptual
151 Ibid., p. 37
152 Ibid., p. 38
153 Ibid., p. 35
114
framework, and the procedural justice of the basic structure of society that such a 
conceptual framework permits, whilst still allowing for a free pluralist diversity of 
defensible individually held comprehensive doctrines, must, in the public sphere, take 
into account only those facts that are universal and applicable to all autonomous 
individuals when determining externally authoritative rules which are intended to be 
observed by all.
For Rawls, no matter how socially, or individually, recognized they may be, 
objectively speaking, reasonably held yet unproven comprehensive social, religious, 
and philosophical viewpoints and particular cultural contingencies are ultimately 
‘arbitrary from a moral point of view’.
This idea must be momentarily dwelt on, as it does seem that Rawls is advocating 
the rather paradoxical notion that morality itself be arbitrary from a moral point of 
view if one is not allowed to bring their moral convictions into public questions of 
procedural justice. Indeed, this seeming problem has been highlighted by Sandel as 
an inherent flaw in liberal political theory as opposed to traditional communitarian 
republicanism.
Liberal political theory does not see political life as concerned with the highest human 
ends or with the moral excellence o f  its citizens. Rather than promote a particular 
conception o f  the good life, liberal political theory insists on toleration, fair procedures, 
and respect for individual rights -  values that respect people’s freedom to choose their 
own values. But this raises a difficult question. If liberal ideals cannot be defended in 
the name o f the highest human good, then in what does their moral basis consist?154
154 Sandel, M, 1998. Democracy’s Discontent, p. 8. (Belknap Press; Harvard)
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As we have already seen, Sandel, and communitarians like him, see a fundamental 
problem in the liberal’s conception of the self as an abstract and ‘unencumbered’ 
entity, not situated in any particular social circumstances or within any of the 
comprehensive doctrines Rawls rejects. ‘Encumbered identities such as these are at 
odds with the liberal conception of the person as free and independent selves, 
unbound by prior moral ties, capable of choosing our ends for ourselves’,155 Sandel 
claims. Further still, Sandel shows that in some hard-case examples, the idea of an 
unencumbered self obeying public procedural justice, independent of more 
comprehensive individual moral doctrines, simply cannot work as mere independent 
arbiter of public policy, because the allegedly ‘independent’ outcome of such 
decisions are actually unwittingly taking a particular moral side. For example, when 
the procedural republic deals with the question of controversial medical procedures 
such as abortion; by disallowing comprehensive religious viewpoints from the public 
discourse which see abortion as a form of murder, Sandel argues that the procedural 
republic is forced to discount such claims, and thereby judge on the case of abortion 
in a way which would not be acceptable to all, but would instead be completely 
morally unacceptable to holders of those comprehensive doctrines and, in their view, 
permit horrific acts of murder within their society.156
I believe that this critique is a weak one which misses the underlying point of Rawls’ 
argument; a misunderstanding which comes from not recognizing the vital distinction 
between objective legitimacy and merely socially-recognized legitimacy -  a major 
flaw with the communitarian position as a whole.
Whilst perhaps there are some aspects of the Rawlsian conception of the self which 
are questionable, and it is arguable that certain pieces of information deemed
155 Ibid., p. 12
156 Ibid., pp., 100-103
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expendable by the ‘veil of ignorance’ could be disputed; luckily, the means to 
evaluate and reassess the Rawlsian conception exist within the very construction of 
his theory. If one can vindicate the claim that certain key elements of the self are 
missing from an abstract liberal account and place a substantiated objection to that 
account, then it can be rectified and adjusted to the objectively supported standard 
which has been reasonably argued for. The communitarian alternative, meanwhile, 
seems much more problematic, positing, as it does, that the self is entirely constituted 
by the social circumstances of its particular situatedness, with normative values and 
ethical answers to be found not in rationally constructed abstract universals, but in the 
concrete conditions, conventions and traditions of already existing societies. Such a 
view leaves little room for questioning the various relativisms of a particular society’s 
socially-recognized claims, and assessing its norms and values with any objectivity; 
instead it relies on the extremely troubling idea that, although open to the possibility 
of slow, gradualist discussion and progressive change, whatever a particular society or 
social group hold to be right or wrong at any given time, simply is right or wrong.
This default assumption that a social group has the indisputable right to define its 
own moral universe by whatever agreed ethical standards it collectively decides upon, 
is what leads to Sandel’s confusion regarding the non-neutrality of the neutral state. 
He is confusing Rawls’ reasonable demand that conflicting ethical positions be 
debated publicly in non-controversial terms comprehensible to all, for the demand that 
holders of certain controversial comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral 
claims cannot express their views at all. This is not what Rawls is doing, however, 
and why Rawls is not calling morality itself ‘arbitrary from a moral point of view’.
Whilst it is true that those who hold, say, comprehensive religious moral doctrines in 
Rawls’ procedural republic cannot bring their religious orthodoxies into public
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debates; it is not true that they cannot still argue for their ethical position in non­
religious, publicly understandable terms of defendable rationale. On the issue of 
abortion, for example; although the overtly religious argument ‘abortion is wrong 
because god forbids it’, is unacceptable in public discourse because it relies upon both 
an unproven god, and particular unvindicated claims to have accurately interpreted 
that alleged god’s words; what it does not forbid, is the holder of an individual 
comprehensive religious doctrine bringing an anti-abortion argument to the table on 
universally recognizable, publicly comprehensible terms, such as potential scientific 
proof of a foetus’ status as a person, its capacity to suffer, the strength of its position 
as a potential person, etc. Indeed, the principle which disallows comprehensive 
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines from public debate is the same principle 
which ensures public policy is not capriciously decided on equally unsubstantiated, 
less socially-recognized, beliefs. It seems self-evident that the argument ‘abortion is 
right because the man in the moon said that it is so’, or ‘abortion is wrong because my 
imaginary friend Bob says that it is’ would not satisfy most people’s criteria for 
reasonable justification, and all Rawls is doing is taking that self-evidence to its 
logical conclusions, regardless of a particular unvindicated view’s social popularity.
The same is true of any other comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrines -  
whilst one would not be permitted to argue for a particular position because ‘it 
conforms to my hypothetical meta-narrative of dialectical necessity’, or ‘is the pre­
destined function of our historical thrust towards the inner child’; one would be 
permitted to put forward any universally recognizable and publicly comprehensible 
arguments which would support the same positions on objectively defendable 
grounds.
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All the idea of ethical constructivism and the procedural republic actually does, is 
force the encumbered self to look beyond the unquestioned platitudes of their 
encumberment; beyond socialization, indoctrination, and other forms of cultural 
custom and belief, and put forward rational and factual arguments (to the best of their 
knowledge) using mutually agreed, objectively verifiable, public language and terms 
of discourse, to support their positions on a basis more convincing than mere faith or 
habit. Indeed, it demands analysis of one’s presuppositions and moral assumptions in 
a way which, to borrow and extrapolate on a concept put forward by Dawkins, raises 
the social consciousness to a level which no longer accepts with prima facie respect, 
the random assertions of organized superstition.157
If any moral position held as a result of a comprehensive religious, philosophical or 
moral doctrine can be argued for convincingly in secular, publicly comprehensible 
terms, then it can happily be considered as part of the public discourse; but positions 
with no intellectual recourse but ‘so it is written in the scriptures’, or ‘I know in my 
gut that it is true’, quite reasonably, are exposed as the untenable positions that they 
are, based not on supportable truth-claims, but only in questionable customs or 
insubstantial faith; ‘beliefs’ which when ‘formed exclusively in this way have dubious 
rational credentials.’158
What Rawls then is really doing when he calls something ‘arbitrary from a moral 
point of view’ is implicitly acknowledging that an underlying ethical contract of 
political teleology must be understood before we can even begin to analyse the justice 
of specific political institutions. He is saying that if we were to strip ourselves out of 
the socially-contextual and circumstantially random collection of comprehensive 
doctrines, and social, cultural or even genetic differences which arbitrarily separate us
157 Dawkins, R, 2006. The God Delusion, p. 27. (Bantam Press; London)
158 Smith, M, 2000. The Moral Problem, p. 189. (Blackwell Publishers; Oxford)
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from our common humanity (in other words, enter into a moral state of nature), we 
can come to understand our universal core as human beings: rational autonomous 
individuals who hold certain shared innate and universal interests as a species which 
we need fulfilled, and which it ought to be the legitimate purpose of politics to 
uphold.
No matter how important they may be socially recognized as being, all of those 
things left behind the veil of ignorance, the trappings of culture, socialization, 
indoctrination, etc, are arbitrary from a moral point of view if we are attempting to 
obtain an objectively legitimate and unbiased understanding of what particular 
interests human beings might hold in common, as equal members of a shared species, 
and on which to base a plausible conception of justice.
Whilst perhaps the validity of Rawls’ particular concluded principles of justice could 
potentially be brought into question, and the specific terms of his original position, 
veil of ignorance, conception of the unencumbered self, assumptions about the 
procedural republic, overlapping consensus, and even the question of the primacy of 
justice and the right as the cornerstone of ethical justification, could all be up for 
debate; I think the basic methodological idea contained with A Theory o f  Justice is 
right. The only way in which we can determine the underlying principles of social 
contract necessary to legitimate external structures of political power (of discovering 
an objectively defensible account of what making things ‘better’ for ‘people’ might 
sensibly mean) is through the hypothetical establishment of a reasonable and 
vindicated doctrine about plausibly extrapolated key human interests and social goals, 
the fulfillment and protection of which must be understood as the sole justifying 
purpose of politics. Indeed, I think that this is a social contract which must come 
prior to analyzing the abstract nature of justice and the specific principles of a
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procedural republic as Rawls did, a contract that answers first the unasked question of 
why we must assure that our political institutions are committed to justice, before we 
can attempt to work out what shape that justice might take.
2.5: Political Teleology Outside of the Social Contract Tradition: The 
Universality of the Necessary Contract
What we know then is this: all justifications for the existence of external structures of 
political power over autonomous human life that we have hitherto seen, have been 
based on some interpretation of the same underlying idea: that political power X is 
justified because its existence makes life ‘better’ for ‘people’ than it would be without 
it. My claim is that this same basic argument of political teleology is universal and 
necessary in justifying any and all artificially created structures of external political 
power over an otherwise autonomous populace. However, the existence of this 
underlying contractarian argument has only been shown, so far, to be manifest within 
the justificatory arguments of the social contract tradition. Before we start the 
important task of deciphering what this claim might reasonably be said to mean, and 
constructing a comprehensive objective account of what this political teleology 
implies (who ought to count as ‘people’ and what, therefore, can we plausibly say 
would make life ‘better’ for them) we must look briefly beyond the social contract 
tradition and to alternative attempts at justifying external political power.
On the one hand, I have already said, the necessity for a vindicated account of 
political teleology is absent in those coercive political regimes which make no attempt 
at justifying their existence to their populace; but on the other, it is quite unsurprising 
that an underlying contractarian argument has been found at the bottom of the social 
contract tradition. If this political teleology is to truly be considered to apply
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universally to any form of external power it must be shown to have capital within not 
only democratic and overtly consensual political systems, but in the justificatory 
arguments for any other type of artificial politics that attempts to claim legitimacy for 
its rule.
For example; the fascist ideology of a regime such as the Nazis in Germany, on the 
surface, couldn’t seem further away from shared assumptions of traditional social 
contract theory. But a more nuanced look reveals that even a political system as 
authoritarian as Nazi fascism, when it attempts to justify its authority, cannot avoid 
relying on this same implicit ethical contract argument, albeit an incredibly flawed 
interpretation of it. For Nazis, their contract was simply one which only recognized 
only a limited group, Aryan Germans, as the ‘people’ to be given this moral 
consideration, and therefore ensured a ‘better’ life only for them, even if that 
supposedly ‘better’ life had to be taken through brutality and force from those who 
were considered not worthy of moral consideration (Jews, Blacks, Homosexuals, etc).
We shall soon see exactly why such thinking was rationally untenable, but what 
must be made clear is that, mistaken as the Nazi interpretation of the argument was, it 
still bore beneath it the same underlying principle of necessary political teleology 
whenever articulating its defence. Even an ideology as heinous as that of Nazism 
needs followers if it is to obtain power and achieve its particular goals, and the reason 
it managed to get those followers is because it found people ‘simple enough to 
believe’ in its uniquely twisted interpretation and cashing out of an underlying ethical 
argument that all of us recognize, in one form or another, as being true: that political
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power X is justified if it makes life ‘better’ for ‘people’ than they would be without 
it.159
As Erich Fromm observed, after reading Mein Kampf:
Usually Hitler tries to rationalize and justify his wish for power. The main 
justifications are the following: his domination of other peoples is for their own good 
and for the good of the culture of the world; the wish for power is rooted in the eternal 
laws of nature and he recognizes and follows only these laws; he himself acts under the 
command of a higher power -  God, Fate, History, Nature; his attempts for domination 
are only a defence against attempts of others to dominate him and the German people.
He wants only peace and freedom}60
The extermination of Jews was not sold to the German people as an intentionally evil 
and morally repugnant policy which could and should have been avoided; it was 
framed to those citizens who Nazi ideologues considered ‘people’ as being a 
necessary task on the ostensibly honourable and just road to making life ‘better’ for 
them and their families. The same can be said for the atrocities committed under 
Stalin in the 1930s and ‘40s. Brutal purges, torturous gulags, and the continuing 
oppressive infringement on people’s freedom of thought, were not explained to the 
Russian people as the gross human rights violations or unvindicated crimes that they 
were; they were instead put forward as being regrettable but necessary evils, curbing 
‘counter-revolutionary’ activities in order to ensure the success of the revolutionary
159 Hannah Arendt attempted to explain the exact socio-historical circumstances which can lead to a 
population becoming ‘simple enough to believe’ such an ideology. See: Arendt, H, 1973. The Origins 
of Totalitarianism: 5th Edition. (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; New York), whilst Adomo and Milgram 
investigated the psychological conditions that might cause such thinking. See: Adomo, T (et al), 1950. 
The Authoritarian Personality. (Harper; New York); Milgram, S, 1974. Obedience to Authority: an 
Experimental View. (Tavistock Publications; London)
160Fromm, E, 2003. The Fear of Freedom, p. 195. (Routledge Classics; London) (emphasis added)
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project and achieve the industrialization that would, so it was claimed, make life 
‘better’ for those non-bourgeois proletarians his regime considered as the ‘people’.
Indeed, all totalitarian regimes justify their practices explicitly by using the exact 
same underlying ethical argument that we have seen is used within liberal, social 
contract democracies, albeit a strictly defined (and as we shall soon see, untenable) 
interpretation of it. The very nature of totalitarianism requires at its core an 
overriding official ideology which justifies the coercive centralized control of all 
other aspects of political life. In the 1960s, Friedrich and Brzezinski identified six 
phenomenological characteristics of totalitarianism that, until recent years, became a 
standard textbook classification of the subject.161 Whilst their purely descriptive 
approach has rightly been criticized as not being a viable tool for sufficiently detailing 
the full complexities of the issue for social research, and for failing to offer much 
more in its ‘analysis’ than a fairly flimsy, politically motivated, check-list of 
potentially arbitrary circumstances seemingly common to societies already designated 
as ‘totalitarian’, within even this flawed and basic model lies an important, though 
understated, point: whatever the specific totalitarian characteristics might be of a 
particular system of government, what is unmistakable within them all is the 
necessary presence first of ‘an official ideology incorporating a vision of the ideal
• • •  • 1 AOstate, belief in which is compulsory’, and the trend for severe punishment of any 
unorthodoxy that strays from that ideological dogma. In other words, a professed and 
explicit belief from those claiming political power that they know precisely what 
making things ‘better’ for ‘people’ must entail; an absolutist political teleology based 
in an absolutist conception of human purpose, from which everything else is, 
theoretically, justified.
161 Friedrich, C and Brzezinski, Z, 1969. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy: 2nd Edition.
(Praeger; New York).
162 Goodwin, B, 1997. Using Political Ideas: 4th Edition, p. 170. (Wiley; Chichester)
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The same thing can be said about theocratic political systems which demand strict 
adherence to fundamentalist interpretations of certain religious texts and punish, or 
even execute, those members of their society who disobey them. Instead of a political 
ideology guiding their actions, they gain their absolutist vision of what they believe, 
unquestioningly, is ‘better’ for ‘people’ from similarly devotedly held religious 
beliefs, but the underlying argument remains the same: they do not justify their 
actions to citizens by saying that they are impinging on their freedom of thought or 
attempting to repress their choices; they believe their actions are legitimate because 
they believe that what they are doing will ultimately lead to salvation, and that the real 
harm to the citizenry is being caused by those individuals who ignore what they, their 
religious leaders, understand as being ‘god’s will’. It is on this basis that they attempt 
to claim their legitimacy: they make life ‘better’ for ‘people’ because they ensure that 
the people they rule over do what god wants them to do, which, they believe, is the 
sole purpose of life and thus the only valid basis for a justified political teleology.
What these examples have hopefully shown is that whilst the underlying argument is 
universal and necessary, the cashed out conclusions of that argument are not. For an 
artificial construct of political power to be erected by people over and above their 
previously unfettered existence legitimately, an argument must always be made, 
unavoidably utilizing both a teleological theory of the valuable goals of human life, 
and a teleological idea that it is politics’ purpose to help its citizens achieve those 
goals -  that political power X is justified because it makes life ‘better’ for ‘people’ 
than they would be without it. However, such a vague and unformed argument can 
allow for a variety of controversial interpretations about who counts as ‘people’ and 
what, therefore, would be ‘better’ for them, and there seems something terribly wrong 
about an allegedly ethical argument, which at the same time as it can be used to
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legitimate, say, a consensual democratic structure, can also seem to work as a 
justificatory argument for Nazi fascism or oppressive ideological fundamentalism. 
Without a more objective account of political teleology and a clearer and compelling 
argument about who ought to count as the ‘people’ for whom politics is to make 
things ‘better’, there is nothing by which to assess each particular authority’s unique 
interpretation on which their particular claims to legitimacy are grounded. Unable to 
do this, the underlying ethical argument on its own seems not only toothless, but 
capable of allowing potentially cruel and dangerous regimes to establish themselves, 
under misleading mantles of perceived legitimacy.
In other words, unearthing the universal structure of the underlying ethical contract 
gives us only half of the picture regarding the ethical justification for external political 
power: we still need to analyse and assess the terms of the contract we have 
discovered. Until we can plausibly construct an objectively valid interpretation of 
what exactly making life ‘better’ for ‘people’ can reasonably be said to mean, 
awareness alone of this underlying argument is not enough. Indeed, one doesn’t even 
have to look to the extremes of totalitarian dictatorships to see the potential for 
interpretative abuse of the contract’s undefined clauses. Famously, the U.S. 
Constitution begins ‘we the people’, but as historian Charles Beard points out; four 
groups are not included within this definition o f ‘people’: ‘slaves, indentured servants, 
women, men without property. And so the Constitution did not reflect the interests of
163those groups.’ Let us never forget also, how earlier in America’s history, native 
Indians too, were discounted as ‘people’, as those who were not massacred were 
herded into reservations and ousted from their homes to make room for the invading 
settlers searching for a ‘better’ life for their ‘people’ on newly discovered shores.
163 Beard, C in Zinn, H, 1995. A People’s History of The United States, pp., 89-90. (Harper Collins; 
New York)
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Meanwhile, one need not look far into Britain’s colonial past to see similarly brutal 
denials of the moral standing of certain groups of people living in invaded countries 
renounced as ignorant savages, or as Mark Curtis has termed them, ‘unpeople’164.
Once we have reached a defensibly constructed account of objective political 
teleology, however, and ascertained who we can justifiably say ought to count as 
‘people’ and what we can reasonably claim to know would make life ‘better’ for 
them, then the underlying ethical contract can finally become a comprehensively 
critical tool with which to meaningfully evaluate the validity of each competing 
interpretation, and offer a complete account of the justificatory minimum number of 
ethical obligations a legitimate structure of political power must have to its citizens.
164 Curtis, M, 2004. Unpeople. (Vintage; London)
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3. Who Are ‘The People’, And What Is ‘Better’ For Them?
‘The point ofjudgements o f right and wrong is not to make claims about what 
the spatiotemporal world is like. The point o f such judgements is, rather, a 
practical one: they make claims about what we have reason to do...In order to 
show that questions o f right and wrong have correct answers, it is enough to 
show that we have good grounds for taking certain conclusions that actions are 
right or are wrong to be correct, understood as conclusions about morality, and 
that we therefore have good grounds for giving these conclusions the particular 
importance that we normally attach to moral judgements. ’
- Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other165
3.1: An Inclusive Definition of ‘People’
Political power X is justified on the basis that its existence makes life ‘better’ for 
‘people’ than it would be without it. That is the essence of political teleology; an 
intractable basis of contract which lays out the essential justificatory goal underlying 
all artificially constructed structures of external political power, without which such 
institutions cannot be called legitimate. Without this basic teleological underpinning 
to the endeavor of formal politics, there is no reason why rationally autonomous 
individuals would opt to sacrifice their self-sovereignty for external governance; as 
soon as there is good reason for such a move to be made, then that reason ineluctably 
becomes the purpose of their politics, making all such politics necessarily 
teleological.
165 Scanlon, T. M, 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, pp., 2-3. (Harvard University Press; 
Cambridge)
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Whilst the contractualist structure of this political teleology is the same in every 
case, the individual interpretations made by the citizens and government of each 
particular society regarding the meaning of this necessary contract, however, can 
differ radically . The contract, therefore, whilst universal in its necessity, is not so in 
its application, which means that there is now an urgent necessity to construct an 
objectively defensible account of what the terms of this ethical obligation ought to 
mean universally:; an objective account of political teleology beyond its basic 
contractualist structure which tells us more than vagaries; not simply that political 
power X is justified on the basis that its existence makes life ‘better’ for ‘people’ than 
it would be without it, but who we can plausibly claim ought to count as ‘people’ 
within such an agreement, and what, then, we can therefore reasonably say would 
entail making life ‘better’ for them.
The answers to both of these questions will be logically interlinked. Returning 
briefly to our dictatorships and fundamentalist theocracies; it seems clear that an 
account of what might plausibly be said to make life ‘better’ for ‘people’ becomes a 
radically different thing depending on whether or not the ‘people’ in question means 
all people within a given community, or simply refers only to members of a specific 
ethnic, economic, or religious group. Likewise, once our definition of ‘people’ has 
been determined, the sort of things we then attempt to define as being ‘better’ for 
them cannot help but reflect back upon our original definition of who counts, and 
either confirm its assumptions, or expose its faults.
If an exclusionary social contract recognizes as ‘better’ for its narrowly-defined 
group of ‘people’, protection from X, but does not offer that same protection to 
similarly affected members of the society not recognized as ‘people’, but equally in 
danger from X; then the argumentative basis for offering such protections must be re­
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assessed and, if the given argument applies equally to those individuals who are not 
currently considered as counting within the accepted definition of ‘people’, then either 
the scope of the original definition will have to be extended, or the argument for 
protection in the first place must be rejected.
In short: in a process similar to Rawls’ ‘reflective equilibrium’, each section of the 
argument informs the other until a final, balanced, account is eventually achieved.
We must begin this account, then, with what we know to be the case so far: that this 
is an ethical social contract which is used universally, in all instances of human 
governance, to attempt to justify any artificially created external structure of political 
power erected over a naturally autonomous, and thus self-sovereign, humanity. This 
fact, combined with the subsequent fact that what we are looking for here is an 
objective and universally applicable account of that contract’s terms, immediately 
suggests that the definition of ‘people’ which we are looking for might well be one 
inclusive of all. Further evidence of this comes from the fact that the ethical contract 
itself is predicated on a claim about a universal feature possessed by all human 
beings: their natural autonomy and ability for self-rule. It is the apparent universal 
tension between this natural individual sovereignty and the ability for such sovereign- 
selves to successfully fulfill all of their competing needs and interests by themselves 
(both individually and as a community) that is the core justificatory basis for 
establishing an institutional framework of externally authoritative political power over 
natural society in the first place. It follows, therefore, that objective political 
teleology must be equally universal in scope, based on a similarly derived 
understanding about the plausible goals and purpose of human teleology that are 
apparently frustrated in the pre-political state and which lead to the creation of a 
purpose-built politics to enable their fulfillment.
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One cannot sensibly imply that a government must be established to facilitate X, Y, 
and Z for its citizens if it has not first been shown that X, Y, and Z are the endorsed 
goals and interests of the citizens in question.166 Likewise, if X, Y, and Z are the 
endorsed goals and interests of all citizens, but the government established to 
supposedly facilitate those goals and interests only promotes and supports the special 
interests P, Q, and R, of a particular group of citizens, with P, Q, and R benefiting that 
one group greatly whilst serving only to damage the possibility of anyone else 
achieving the X, Y, and Z that they require; then it would be impossible to call such a 
government legitimate under the justificatory terms of the underlying ethical contract.
That said, we must briefly ask whether or not there might be a justifiable reason to 
discriminate between certain groups of people. Although its justificatory basis is not 
immediately obvious, could there be suitable grounds for a legitimate political power 
to aid only the goals and interests of a certain ‘elite’ group of people rather than only 
those endorsed goals and interests which are universal to all over whom they are 
demanding political authority?
I believe that this question can be answered by recognizing that the essential appeal 
to universality within the very foundations of the ethical contract has certain 
necessary ramifications regarding the legitimate cashing out of its terms. If we agree
• 1 f\lthat, all things being equal, human beings are the rationally autonomous 
individuals depicted in the framework of the ethical contract, then we must also agree 
then, that any legitimate interpretation of that contract must also be one which can be
166 Nor, in fact, if it hasn’t first been established also that X, Y, and Z are impossible to achieve without 
such help.
167 The mentally-handicapped or incapacitated, whilst theoretically capable of rational autonomy due to 
their biological and psychological heritage, might not have the same faculties for utilizing those 
capacities as the fully-abled, but this does negate the argument for universality; it simply adds an 
interesting question about the possible need for paternalism regarding those genuinely incapable of 
making their own rational autonomous choices, which does not -  in itself -  legitimate external political 
authority.
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understood and approved by all such autonomous individuals, or else they will have 
no basis on which to supply their necessary consent to the compact, without which, its 
arrangement becomes moot. Furthermore, due to the necessary role of political 
teleology within the ethical contract, there comes also the requisite consequence that 
anyone who does not recognize the facilitation of their own goals and interests within 
the proclaimed purpose and actions of synthetically erected political institutions 
allegedly there to do just that, will equally not recognize any compelling reasons to 
award such institutions with their willing acquiescence.
It is for this reason then, that it seems hard to deny the scope of the validating ethical 
contract as being one which must necessarily be inclusive of all people; both those 
within the immediate legal auspices of an established political power, and also those 
whose lives will in any way be affected by the actions of said power. Returning to 
O’Neill’s ‘plurality, connection, and finitude’; on the basis of political power’s 
inherent person-affecting nature, not just within its own agreed territorial boundaries 
but potentially anywhere across the world where the effects of its various acts and 
policies will be felt, there seems no plausible way to pick out any potentially affected 
individual, or group of individuals, as being justifiably excluded from our ethical 
consideration without such an exclusion being completely arbitrary.
Although there are many differences between individuals, the basis of the legitimate 
social contract lies not in a claim about making life ‘better’ only for a select few 
‘people’, but on a claim about all people and a feature of their shared humanity: their 
rational autonomy. Superficial differences make no difference to the initial claim that 
as a species all human beings are naturally rational and autonomous beings with the 
capability for their own self-rule, for whom the creation of external structures of 
authoritative political power must be compellingly justified if they are to be
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legitimate. As such, to exclude any members of that rationally autonomous species 
from our moral consideration would be to exclude them from the contract itself and 
return them to their original state of self-sovereignty, unbound to the edicts of the 
external power.
It seems fair to say then that, at this point, we can reasonably assume that the 
‘people’ for whom a legitimate structure of political power must make life ‘better’ if 
its existence is to be justified, must mean all people who will be affected by its 
actions. Perhaps we will find during the course of our investigation that this current 
definition is too broad and there actually are justifiable reasons for excluding certain 
groups or individuals from the ethical consideration of external politics; but until we 
do we have no good reason to assume the exclusion of anyone from our definition of 
‘people’ and so shall begin our enquiry into what making life ‘better’ for ‘people’ 
might plausibly mean, on this universalist understanding that the ‘people’ we are 
referring to is a definition inclusive of all.
3.2: From Species-Facts to Species-Interests: Making Life ‘Better’ for All
If the ‘people’ the ethical contract is concerned with includes everyone over whom 
the political power in question is seeking to claim authority, then our account of what 
would plausibly make life ‘better’ for them must be equally universal in its scope.
To work out the ethical obligations of an objectively constructed political teleology 
we cannot look at the problem in terms of individual goals and interests which are 
contextually different from person to person, but must look instead at what we can 
reasonably claim to be the universally held goals and interests of all.
The precise problem of the pre-political state is the assumption that each 
autonomous individual has their own rationally-derived goals and interests which they
133
wish to achieve and fulfill in their life, but that the unrestricted attempts made by each 
rationally autonomous individual to do that by themselves will lead to conflict, chaos, 
and, ultimately, the continued frustration of those needs and desires. The claim that 
life under the authority of an external political power will be ‘better’ than a life of 
self-rule is, therefore, at its core, the claim that achievement and fulfillment of these 
goals and interests will be better facilitated. But it is important to note that ‘better’ 
facilitated is not necessarily a guarantee that any and all goal or interest will be 
facilitated unquestioningly; the task for legitimate politics is not to perform the 
impossible, but to find a way of ensuring that all people manage to achieve and fulfill 
their goals and interests as much as is possible compatible with a system o f equal 
achievement andfulfillment for all.
There are many types of goal and interest; some might be communal or group 
interests, such as a shared but context-specific interest held only by members of a 
particular community or group; others are individual-specific, the arbitrary whims and 
desires of each singular person based on the contingencies of their own particular life- 
situation.
Whilst the ability to achieve and fulfill all of these sorts of goals and interests would 
certainly make life ‘better’ for people than it would be without there being such an 
opportunity available to them, a universalist understanding of the underlying ethical 
obligations which bind legitimate political power cannot be grounded in the 
particularist details of the specific goals and interests of individual communities, 
groups or persons; it must instead seek its foundational framework only within a third 
category of interests: those which I shall be calling universal species-interests.
To objectively construct a defensible account of what would make life ‘better’ for all 
people, as demanded by the agreed terms of the ethical contract, a legitimate political
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teleology must be understood, at its bare minimum, as the obligation to protect and 
facilitate first and foremost those core goals and interests which are held universally 
by all: goals and interests innate to our very being. To do this, and ascertain exactly 
what these universal interests might be, we must construct our account of those goals 
from an almost ‘original position’ understanding of the human individual, stripped of 
their various contingencies and the prejudices of their own particular individual- 
specific and communal goals and interests, and ignoring the manifold differences 
between people which are ‘arbitrary from a moral point of view’. However, as my 
aim here is not to then discover an abstract theory of political justice as Rawls did, but 
to work out from this original position the very criteria of the ‘moral point of view’ 
itself and discover what universally held ethical principles, if any, we can extrapolate 
from any universally-shared interests we can reasonably claim to be common to the 
whole of humanity, I do not think that the best way to achieve this original position is 
by prematurely placing people under a theoretical ‘veil of ignorance’, because until 
we know the full criteria of what is and is not important ethically, an arbitrarily 
chosen veil would potentially be at risk of excluding from the original position 
important and necessary information; and also of incorporating into it illegitimate 
assumptions about human nature which have not been objectively justified.
Instead of concocting a convoluted thought experiment then, with certain artificially 
construed conditions and synthetic criteria, I shall simply be stripping down humanity 
hypothetically, to its most uncontroversial and empirically verifiable core: as a 
common species of intelligent and sentient self-conscious biological and 
psychological organisms; and concentrating solely on only those universal truisms we 
can justifiably claim to be common to all: self-evident and immediately demonstrable 
universal species-yhcta about the human condition from which we can plausibly
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construct and extrapolate a core set of uncontroversial, rationally defensible, 
universally shared species-mferosto, arguably held by all.
Despite the many things which separate and distinguish them as individuals within 
their complex societies, all human beings share, by mere virtue of their being 
members of the species Homo sapiens, several empirically verifiable species -facts; 
indisputable and universal biological, physiological, and psychological facts about 
what it is to be a human. These species-facts, of which there will only be a few that 
we can plausibly establish without controversy, can then be logically translated into a 
reasonably supported number of universal basic human needs, which, coupled with 
humanity’s distinct inner life of fully sentient consciousness, then become articulated 
into the universal interests of a shared human teleology of species-interests, which we 
can short-handedly call our human nature.
For example: a human being, purely as a biological organism, needs nourishment to 
survive; if they do not eat or drink, they will die. Likewise, a human being needs 
shelter from the elements as their body cannot endure extreme conditions. A human 
being needs a place to rest and recuperate as, like any other animal, they tire when 
their energies are depleted. In short, there are a series of easily provable empirical 
facts that strongly support the conclusion that a human being, as a biological 
organism, has certain prerequisites necessary to the preservation of its life. When that 
information is combined with the concurrent psychological species-fact we have 
previously discussed, that as a conscious and sentient organism, a human being can 
also be said to have various self-relating thoughts and desires that take the form of 
interests, the fulfillment of which relies on the continuation of their life; it seems quite 
permissible to conclude that, all things being equal, all such human beings not only 
plausibly share a universal species-interest in wanting to avoid their unnecessary and
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untimely death, but also in obtaining fair and unimpeded access to and procurement of 
the basic requisite material goods necessary for staying alive, such as food, water, 
shelter, etc. Any system of political power truly concerned with making life ‘better’ 
for such people therefore, would have to ensure that the biological needs essential to 
human survival are easily satisfied by all.
To concentrate on these basic universal ethical obligations is not to discount the 
possible need for a richer and more comprehensive account of morality within each 
individual community that will create special ethical obligations of their own; it is 
simply to acknowledge these ethically fundamental species-interests which all people 
share, the fulfillment of which is the necessary task of any legitimate political 
teleology before any more comprehensive goals can be achieved.
The idea here which I am subscribing to is one of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ moralities, 
inspired more by Walzer’s pluralistic account of this distinction in his book of the 
same name than Williams’ original delineation of the two concepts in moral 
philosophy.168 Walzer argues for two types of morality: a ‘thin’ universalist morality, 
applicable to all, and a ‘thick’, particularist, morality, in which the ramifications of 
the ‘thin’ ethic have been cashed out in a variety of different ways into the individual 
cultural and moral conventions of a particular community.169 I think the basics of this 
approach are right, although not necessarily Walzer’s specific application of it or 
wider project of social criticism, and believe that our universal species-interests, once 
found, will form the rational basis for a thin, universally understood morality, from 
which individuals and communities then have the ability to determine more 
comprehensive ‘thick’ moral doctrines, so long as they remain in harmony with, and 
non-violation of, the thin universal principles they hold.
168 Williams, B, 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, (Fontana; London)
169 Walzer, M, 1994. Thick and Thin: Moral Argument At Home and Abroad, (University of Notre 
Dame Press; Indiana)
Our sense of ethical obligation to the thin morality though, will not originate in any 
claims of an absolutist duty to the thin moral principles, or any concurrent theory of 
their forming inalienable rights or other legally binding edicts; but simply from 
understanding the fact that as we all share these same species-interests, and are all 
autonomous individuals with the capacity for rational choice in all of our actions and 
thus with an arguable accountability for the actions we ultimately choose to take, we 
must be able to compellingly justify any choices that we make. To adapt Scanlon’s 
contractualist approach to ethics; I believe that as we each have a persuasive reason to 
assume that, as all other people desire as equal a consideration of those core interests 
that they share with us as we do from them (due to the mutually recognized source of 
their value), we are rationally bound to choose courses of action which respect those 
interests when evaluating our autonomous actions; both because we objectively 
recognize the value of the ethical requirement in question, and also because we 
subjectively want to promote its continued reciprocal existence between peoples for 
our own future benefit. I believe such species-interests, although the necessary 
foundation of any subsequent rights-theories or protective laws that they might 
inform, and a firm basis for thick concepts such as ‘human rights’, cannot in 
themselves be called ‘rights’ because I believe they go deeper than rights. They are 
the only logical foundation upon which the very idea of rights can make sense; with 
rights ultimately being only the socially-legitimated formal recognition of these 
universal interests and obligations we inherently hold as members of the human 
species, be they imagined as side-constraints (Nozick)170, trumps (Dworkin)171, or 
pre-emptive exclusionary reasons for action (Raz)172; be they claim-rights, liberty-
170 Nozick, R, 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. (Basic Books; New York)
171 Dworkin, R, Rights as Trumps in: Waldron, J (ed), 1984. Theories o f Rights. (Oxford University 
Press; Oxford)
172 Raz, J, 1988. The Morality o f Freedom. (Clarendon Press; Oxford)
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rights, power-rights, or immunities (Hohfeld);173 or be they considered simply a 
‘dialectically necessary method’ of articulating certain human needs (Gewirth):174 
ultimately interests and obligations formally recognized as rights must have a prior 
basis in these objectively legitimate s^eczes-interests and obligations, for us to have 
justifiable reason to accord them any such social-legitimation in the first place.
The number of species^/ac/s that we can call truly uncontroversial and from which 
we can extrapolate related species-interests will be few in number; as will the number 
of species-interests we can reasonably include in our account. Remembering what I 
have previously said about ethical enquiry in previous chapters, this should not be a 
concern. I am not attempting to discover a comprehensive list of moral dos and 
don’ts to which all political power must adhere, but rather a minimal set of shared 
human interests from which we can then make the ethical claim of ‘making life 
“better” for people’ a comprehensible obligation. Nor am I claiming that this set of 
revealed interests is necessarily the basis for all moral claims in all possible situations 
-  only those moral claims made in the context of a political teleology which already 
presupposes the existence of certain normative conclusions (i.e. that there can be 
‘better’ ways of organizing a society than others).
The first species-interests, then, that I think we already have reasonable evidence to 
posit following our discussion thus far, is a universal interest in avoiding unnecessary 
death and preventable suffering, and the related interest in obtaining fair and 
unimpeded access to, and procurement of, the basic requisite material goods 
necessary for staying alive, such as food, water, shelter, etc.
173 Hohfeld’s four distinctions of rights in: Jones, P, 1994. Rights, pp., 12-13. (Macmillan Press; 
London)
174 Gewirth, A, The Basis and Content of Human Rights in: Nomos: XXIII: Human Rights, pp., 119-147 
Chapman, J and Pennock, J (eds), 1981. (New York University Press; New York).
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The species-facts of humanity’s biological fragility and psychological desire for their 
continued survival (all things being equal), are irrefutable and uncontroversial truisms 
which we have already examined. I have included the avoidance of ‘preventable 
suffering’ alongside the already established interest in avoidance of unnecessary death 
because I believe that, by definition, suffering is something we inherently wish to 
avoid, however the definition of ‘suffering’ may be construed in practice. Allowing 
for the full spectrum of subjectively understood human sensations, differing levels of 
tolerance for pain, and an understanding of the strange phenomena of masochism, we 
can still claim as universally true that the psychological state of ‘suffering’, of 
experiencing intolerable pain and distress, if possible, is one that all people hope to
1 7 ^eschew; especially in regards to how this suffering, if the result of physical injury, 
violence, or disease, might sometimes lead to the death they are also seeking to avoid.
The avoidance of preventable suffering also comes from our understanding that the 
species-interest in avoiding unnecessary death, not being an absolute moral law but 
simply a logically extrapolated and rationally supported conception of the human 
condition, as such, is just one interest among many, no more or less important than 
any other. We cannot defensibly argue that human beings value their lives above all 
else at all times, and that the will to stay alive will override all other interests, or else 
we could not explain the very real, and in many cases perfectly understandable 
phenomena of suicide, of euthanasia, of sacrifice. We value our lives not arbitrarily 
or on pure instinct alone, but because our being alive is a necessary prerequisite for 
doing everything else that we value, of achieving and fulfilling all other goals and 
interests be they universal, communal, or individual-specific. But by the same token, 
to not be able to fulfill those other goals and interests, to simply be alive but nothing
175 The definition o f ‘pain’ here must also be understood to mean the distinct psychological state of 
‘pain’, however construed.
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else, incapable of movement, communication, or any other essential component of a 
meaningful existence, diminishes completely the value of life. Therefore, a life of 
prolonged and preventable suffering that denied you the ability to do anything of
176value would be no life at all, even if that suffering did not, of itself, kill you.
Indeed, the species-interest in avoiding unnecessary death and preventable suffering 
is only comprehensible when existing in tandem with another related species-interest, 
extrapolated from the already established spQcies-fact of our highly evolved sentience 
and rational ability to intelligibly engage with ourselves and the world we live in and 
shape and form complex articulated goals and desires; that being not only an interest 
in being able to hold and fulfill one’s core species-interests but: in holding general 
interests (both as an individual and in conjunction with others) and having the 
reasonable capacity fo r  carrying them out.
The idea of having a ‘reasonable capacity for carrying them out’ rather than a 
blanket guarantee to carry them all out, whatever they may be, comes from our earlier 
acknowledgement of the task for legitimate politics being not to perform the 
impossible, but to find a way of ensuring that all people manage to achieve and fulfill 
their goals and interests as much as is possible compatible with a system o f equal 
achievement andfulfillment for all.
It is simply impossible to demand that all people be able to achieve and fulfill all of 
their goals and interests on logical grounds alone (we cannot both satisfy our goal of 
eating the last apple). Further still though, we must remember that our species- 
interest in holding interests and carrying them out, just like our species-interest in 
avoiding unnecessary death and preventable suffering, does not exist in a vacuum, but
176 This is not to be mistaken for the claim that there is necessarily some objectively knowable level of 
when a life is no longer worth living; someone could quite happily live a continued existence in a 
physical and psychological state that another person might find intolerable. The point is that when it 
does become ‘suffering’, if that suffering is bad enough, if it is prolonged and impossible to relieve, 
then it may lead one to wish to end their own life.
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concurrently alongside all other equally shared interests, and, as such, our capacity to 
carry them out must both be compatible with ensuring a similar capacity for others, 
and in non-violation of anyone else’s species-interests.
All of this is, of course, connected to another species-fact, closely related to the clear 
interest we have in avoiding preventable suffering. Why do we wish to hold and 
fulfill our various interests: because ultimately, as human beings, we desire to be 
happy. It is a brute species-fact of the human individual that we all seek some overall 
sense of happiness and fulfillment in our lives, however it may be individually 
defined, and wish to avoid its opposite state -  misery, discontent and suffering -  as 
much as is possible. It is the overall sense of happiness and fulfillment that gives a 
life its ‘quality’ and makes it worth living.
I say ‘however it may be individually defined’ in much the same way as I qualified 
the idea of ‘suffering’, because I am not talking about an objectively decided instance 
of a particular form of happiness, or of one definitively endorsed route towards that 
goal (that is again for the ‘thick’ cashing out of individuals and societies), but about 
the universal human desire to achieve this commonly understood positive 
psychological state, which can be achieved in a variety of different ways for each 
individual person. What remains constant for all, though, is that, however it may be 
defined, what they are seeking is a state of happiness. Indeed, a fourth species- 
interest can be added to our list as a result of this species-fact: an interest in pursuing 
and achieving a ‘quality o f  life ’ which brings levels o f  individual happiness 
commensurate with ensuring equal opportunities for happiness and ‘quality o f life ’ 
for all.
As the long history of utilitarian philosophy and the numerous criticisms levelled at 
it by its opponents has shown us though, happiness can be a problematic idea to work
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with ethically and politically. By saying that our underlying ethical social contract 
must take into account the species-interest in seeking happiness, are we potentially 
promoting unfettered hedonism as a cornerstone of legitimate political power?
This is where the idea of being compatible with a system o f equal achievement and 
fulfillment fo r  all comes in, and the importance of remembering that these species- 
interests are interconnected, with no one interest being more important than another. 
The problem with utilitarianism is the primacy of ‘happiness’ as an abstract and 
singular goal of existence. Despite being a clear species-interest, ‘happiness’ is not 
the only species-interest, but just one of many goods necessary for a completely 
fulfilling existence. Whilst the pursuit and achievement of happiness is to be desired, 
so too are all the other species-interests; and recalling that these species-interests are 
to be protected for all ‘people’, it follows that the legitimate pursuit and achievement 
of one person’s happiness cannot interfere with another’s pursuit and achievement of 
their own happiness; and thus with another’s ability to hold and fulfill their own 
species, communal and individual-specific interests.
The happiness that a sadist might derive from killing an innocent child, therefore, is 
by no means on a par with the happiness someone else might derive from, say, a good 
game of chess. Happiness is important, and sought by all human beings; but it is also 
nuanced and contextual. Although people’s interest in achieving happiness is never 
doubted, the happiness they desire must be in line with all other species-interests, or 
else its attainment can reasonably be deemed illegitimate.
Of course, some pursuits of happiness require the possibility of their goal going 
unfulfilled in order to make the possibility of its achievement rewarding in the first 
place. Although two football teams can’t both achieve their conflicting goals of 
winning the match, it is only the possibility of not winning the match, which gives
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winning its value; without its threat the eventual victors would not feel the happiness 
of true accomplishment.
In all cases of competition, many vying for a specific happiness will go home 
unhappy; but such risk is part and parcel of that specific pursuit and thus perfectly 
acceptable: without that risk there would be no joy in the eventual victory or purpose 
in entering the competition itself. This remains true, however, only if entry into the 
competition is freely agreed upon by its participants, there is a reasonable opportunity 
for success, and failure to win the competition does not harm or in any other way 
impinge upon one’s ability to fulfill their other species-interests. This is why it is 
essential to stress the word ‘achieving’ found in the species-interest in pursuing and 
achieving ‘quality of life’ that brings a level of happiness to all, as opposed to, say, 
the U.S. Declaration of Independence’s proclaimed right of all citizens to merely ‘the 
pursuit of happiness’. The right to pursue happiness acknowledges the species- 
interest in having that happiness, but gives no guarantee for such a pursuit ever ending 
fruitfully, and without such a guarantee could lead just as easily to a life of constant,
I  n n
unfulfilled struggle, as much as it could one of happiness achieved.
What we have seen so far then, is an attempted negotiation between the ramifications 
of individual freedom and a world of ‘plurality, connection and finitude.’ The 
necessity of this negotiation, and indeed, the nexus from which species-interests in 
freely pursuing and achieving various kinds of happiness, and holding and fulfilling a 
wide array of individually-chosen interests stem, is the existence of another species- 
fact which we have already touched on: that of rational human autonomy.
It is our autonomy which has led us to the ethical contract in the first place and it is 
an autonomy which is so essential to our nature that I have argued it cannot ever be
177 An insight brought to my attention in the 2006 film: The Pursuit o f Happyness, written by Steve 
Conrad and distributed by Sony Pictures.
144
lost. Indeed, that as much of this autonomy is to be preserved as is possible under the 
social contract has been made clear from the outset: as autonomy can’t ever be lost, 
only coercively repressed, and as policies of overt repression will not gain the willing 
and autonomous consent of the repressed (that is needed for legitimate agreement), 
then it stands to reason that as much individual autonomy ought to be maintained as is 
possible alongside the wider project of making life ‘better’ for all.
Again, such freedom will have certain inbuilt limits due to the universality of its 
application, the necessary observance and protection of all other species-interests, and 
the ramifications of inescapable plurality, connection and finitude to all others with 
whom this freedom is shared. But it is important to note that these inbuilt limits are 
the only acceptable restrictions to autonomy and freedom we can plausibly permit 
without being arbitrary if we are to be truly committed to sustaining as much natural 
autonomy andfreedom as possible.
Freedom is also crucial in the fulfillment of another species-interest that we can 
unearth by looking at yet another uncontroversial species -fact: human sociability.
As we have already discussed at length, human beings are undeniably social 
creatures who live their lives in groups; in friendship and family units; in 
communities made up of friendship and family units; in countries made up of
• • 178communities, etc.
The certain fact of this innate sociability gives rise to a clear correlative interest, held
universally by all, in freely forming social bonds with others. Such an interest may
seem at first to be trivial, but in terms of its political application we can see that it
might form the basis of reasonable arguments against many currently or formerly
existing discriminatory practices such as caste systems, divisions of class, the
178There is even recent evidence o f human babies making social evaluations from as early as six to ten 
months old: Kiley, J et al: Social Evaluation by Preverbal Infants in: Nature #450, pp., 557-559. 
November 22nd 2007. (Nature Publishing Group; London)
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subjugation of one sex/race/religion by another, and any other institutional construct 
which arbitrarily draws restrictive social boundaries between peoples.
This species-fact of human sociability, combined with the species-fact of human 
rational autonomy results in one final interest-provoking species-fact that I can see: 
that of human creativity.
As autonomous individuals constantly having to make choices about their actions 
and how they will fulfill their interests and spend their days, human beings constantly 
create unique ways of doing things that make tasks both interesting and pleasurable 
for them. As sociable creatures, they also find creative ways of expressing 
themselves and their ideas to other people, as well as of distinguishing themselves 
from other people as individuals.
The admission of such universal creativity is not to say that all human beings are 
innately playwrights and poets; simply that there is a driving creative force within 
these rational and autonomous creatures that inspires and encourages them to act, 
rather than simply choose to sit still and do nothing. It is an ability to problem solve, 
to think innovatively, and with originality, away from the confines of only what is 
empirically known and into a realm of imagination. Faced with a multitude of days 
before them, and many interests to attempt to fulfill, it is this innate creativity that 
finds each person a variety of ways of spending those days as effectively and 
pleasurably as possible in order to achieve as many of their interests as they can.
Creativity means simply an ability to create; not just great works of art, but anything 
and there is no way we can look at the strong and solid historical evidence of human 
culture, invention and innovation and not say that an innate creativity is clearly 
evident as a universal species-fact. And as a result of this species-fact there exists an
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obvious and concurrent species-interest therefore in freely using the innovative 
powers o f  one ’s creativity.
Again highlighting how interlinked these species-interests are, these final three 
interests all stem from the same idea of ensuring a minimal level of frustration in 
these essential features of human psychology (autonomy, sociability, and creativity). 
These three elements of human life, being so core to an individual’s existence that 
they can only ever be curbed through repression and tyranny, mean that if we are to 
also observe the species-interests in avoiding preventable suffering and pursuing and 
achieving happiness (which we must), then we are left with no choice but to accept 
them as essential freedoms, held by all, which must be necessarily protected if we are 
to speak meaningfully of making life ‘better’ for them.
To recap then, what we have established is this: first of all there are eight self- 
evident and empirically verifiable uncontroversial species-facts universally true of all 
human beings qua human beings:
■ That we are finite, biologically fragile, creatures with a capacity to feel pain.
■ That we are sentient and possess great psychological complexity and
capacities.
■ That we have the cognitive ability to form self-relating desires and interests.
■ That we are inescapably choice-making autonomous beings; for the most part
behaving on the basis of rationally derived autonomous decisions to do X 
rather than Y.
■ That we hold a desire to continue living for as long as is possible, all things 
being equal.
■ That we seek happiness and avoid unnecessary suffering.
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■ That we are social creatures.
■ That we possess an innate creativity.
These eight species-facts then give rise to seven logically constructed species- 
interests, also universally held by all:
■ An interest in avoiding unnecessary death and preventable suffering.
■ An interest in obtaining fair and unimpeded access to, and procurement of, the 
basic requisite material goods necessary for staying alive.
■ An interest in pursuing and achieving a ‘quality of life’ which brings levels of 
individual happiness commensurate with ensuring equal opportunities for 
happiness and quality of life for all.
■ An interest in being able to hold and fulfill one’s species-interests, and in 
forming and holding other interests (both as an individual, and in conjunction 
with others) and having the reasonable capacity for carrying them out.
■ An interest in sustaining as much natural autonomy and freedom as possible in 
line with sustaining a similar level of natural autonomy and freedom for all.
■ An interest in freely forming social bonds with others.
■ An interest in freely using the innovative powers of one’s creativity.
The claim that an external structure of political power makes life ‘better’ for people 
than it would be without it then, if it is to be objectively legitimate, must therefore be 
a claim that the existence of such a structure of political power, at a bare minimum, 
must ensure the protection and fulfillment of these seven species-interests for all; with 
any structures trading upon the necessary contractual justification of making life
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‘better’ for people, but failing to uphold this minimum requirement of ethical 
obligation, deemed necessarily illegitimate.
Vis-a-vis the ‘reflective equilibrium’ of the ethical contract’s internal logic; we can 
see immediately that these seven species-interests further support our original 
definition of ‘people’ as having to mean all people; for they are not only interests 
universal to all human beings, but they are interests which demand an inclusivity of 
persons within their edicts; ensuring the interests of all are observed even in the 
interests of one, and that all means chosen towards accomplishing any endorsed end 
must be such as to ensure the non-violation of the species-interests of everybody else 
affected.
With this information, we now have as complete an account as we can achieve of 
what a complete political teleology must look like, and thus of the ethical obligations 
necessarily demanded through the terms of agreement that must be used to justify and 
legitimate the existence, of any artificial structure of external political power.
3.3: Rejecting Non-Valid Interpretations of the Universal Contract
As we have seen, this underlying ethical contract is used universally, but without any 
objective interpretation of its terms by which to judge its practical application beyond 
its mere rhetorical uses, it has long been utilized to ostensibly justify many different 
types of political power, from its obvious relevance within the democratic tradition, to 
its more dubious appearance in supporting more questionable regimes.
With our complete account of species-interests now drawn up, however, we can 
begin to assess the ethical contract’s real-world application, and determine which 
structures of external political power, if any, genuinely fulfill the necessary demands
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implied within their justificatory political teleology, rejecting as illegitimate, those 
which fail to do so.
Immediately, our inclusive definition of ‘people’ allows us to reject as untenable any 
political systems designed to explicitly exclude certain groups or individuals from its 
consideration or, worse, purposefully harm their species-interests. Ideologically 
totalitarian regimes, standard forms of fascism, and theocratic political systems built 
on tenets of discriminatory religious fundamentalism, by discounting ‘non-Aryans’, 
‘the bourgeoisie’, ‘infidels’, or opposing political groups from their respective 
definitions of ‘people’, all fail this test of legitimacy at the very first hurdle. The 
same thing can be said of less extreme but just as discriminatory examples of political 
exclusion; such as those democratic social contracts which excluded certain groups of 
people from political participation, such as women, people of a certain race, etc.
Definitions of who count as ‘people’ aside; as far as making things ‘better’ for those 
people, and ensuring protection and fulfillment of their universal species-interests, 
again, totalitarian and dictatorial regimes fail to meet the underlying social contract 
because they inherently violate the majority of those interests: they deny freedom and 
autonomy; deny the freedom to form social bonds with certain ‘others’; fail to allow 
people to hold and carry out individual-specific interests that conflict with the 
overriding ideology of the state, or the ability to pursue and achieve similarly non- 
conforming types of happiness; and in some extreme cases, they even violate the 
interest in avoiding unnecessary death and preventable suffering through execution 
and torture. Indeed, any political regime established through violence and maintained 
by threat of force must be considered illegitimate for much the same reasons.
Theocracies too, can coherently be said to violate the interests in freedom and free 
social bonding, as well as the interest in forming and pursuing individual interests and
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achieving happiness for those individuals who attempt to think outside the scriptures 
of the ruling religion. Similarly, even without Stalinism to corrupt it into full-blown 
totalitarianism, traditionally construed communist and Marxist ideologues are often so 
hung up on discriminatory proletariat/bourgeoisie narratives and the crude 
metaphysics of historical materialism that, as apolitical system, it all-too-often 
appears just as parochial, dogmatic, and in danger of violating one’s species-interests 
as any other form of religious fundamentalism; denying important individual 
freedoms and creativities in some areas for an unvindicated ideal of the community; 
not to mention the messy problem of how it intends to deal with those bourgeois 
members of the exploiting ruling classes in the post-revolution world, after being 
established through such an antagonistically ‘us’ and ‘them’ dialectic.
Of course, most of this should come as no surprise. That brutal dictatorships, 
totalitarian regimes and fundamentalist systems of control can be dismissed as 
illegitimate, has simply confirmed a major intuition of the prevailing political 
consensus of our times; that as we see ‘the appearance of democratic forces in parts of 
the world where they were never expected to exist, the instability of authoritarian 
forms of government, and the complete absence of coherent theoretical alternatives to 
liberal democracy’,179 we have somehow reached what Francis Fukuyama called ‘the 
end of history’; the concluding stage of social evolution finding its final cultural and 
political destination in the contemporary form of Western capitalist democracy that is 
spreading so eagerly throughout the world today. Indeed, democracy has become 
almost universally accepted as the most justified structure of political power that there 
is.
179 Fukuyama, F, 1992. The End o f History and the Last Man, pp., 69-70. (Penguin; London)
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Echoing Fukuyama, the opening gambit from the September 2002 National Security 
Strategy of the United States informs us that ‘the great struggles of the twentieth 
century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the 
forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, 
democracy, and free enterprise’.180 The sentiment continued in the 2006 restatement 
of those aims; aims claimed to be based on ‘promoting freedom, justice, and human 
dignity -  working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend 
prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies’; a strategy ‘built 
on a foundation of freedom’ in order to confront ‘the challenges of our time by 
leading a growing community of democracies.’181 As President Bush put it; at the 
start of the twenty-first century ‘the trend is clear: Freedom is on the march. Freedom 
is the birthright and deep desire of every human soul, and spreading freedom's
1 8 9blessings is the calling of our time’; and for British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, 
‘the victory of democracy’ marked the end of ‘the great struggles of the last century, 
against the dark night of fascism, Nazism and anti-Semitism’ and ‘against the shame 
of apartheid’.183
Democracy has the stamp of approval in contemporary political consensus; but is 
this prevailing political consensus justified? I have already made clear the presence 
of the social contract theory within the democratic tradition and upon first glance it 
seems obvious that a system of democracy would be the perfect means to fulfilling the 
goals of legitimate political teleology. Just as the basis for the social contract’s 
necessity lies in the idea of human autonomy and natural self-sovereignty; democracy
180 The National Security Strategy for the United States ofAmerica 2002, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html (accessed 11/12/07)
181 The National Security Strategy for the United States o f America 2006, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ (accessed 11/12/07)
182 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050329.html (accessed 11/12/07)
183 http://www.tuc.org.uk/congress/tuc-13692-f0.cfm (accessed 11/12/07)
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is a political system which sees government and political power not as something 
externally authoritative to the people over whom it governs; but as something to 
which a naturally autonomous and self-sovereign population must give their willing 
consent if it is to be legitimate. Democratic political power is intended to be as near 
to a system of self-rule as is practically possible; with democratic governments 
explicitly beholden to the will of their citizens and given the power only to do what 
the people themselves want them to do.
In other words, democracy, as a political idea, imposes nothing on its citizens that 
they do not wish to be imposed themselves, allowing them to freely form and hold 
whatever individual-specific and communal interests they may like, have the 
reasonable capacity to carry them out, pursue and achieve a ‘quality of life’ which 
brings levels of individual happiness commensurate with ensuring equal opportunities 
for happiness and quality of life for all, and sustain as much of their natural autonomy 
and freedom as possible, including freedom to form social bonds with others and use 
the innovative powers of their creativity. As violence and coercion by force are not 
viable options for a government predicated on consent and electoral accountability, 
democratic citizens are also protected from unnecessary death and preventable 
suffering at the hands of the state itself.
Protection from unnecessary death and suffering on a wider scale, as well as the 
related need for fair and unimpeded access to basic requisite goods, as inherent 
species-interests, will become articulated into a rationally derived ‘will of the people’ 
to which democratic government is shaped and beholden, ensuring such protections 
are preserved and a system of just distribution erected.
At least, that is the theory.
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Theoretically, democracy seems capable of ticking all the boxes regarding the 
protection and fulfillment of its citizen’s species-interests, and this is why democracy 
is currently perceived as the holy grail of political civilization, performing the miracle 
balancing act between ensuring as much freedom and autonomy as is possible for 
people within the binding legal framework of an external structure of a freely elected 
political power. But theoretically there is also another political alternative to 
democracy that can guarantee the protection and fulfillment of people’s species- 
interests even more comprehensively; ensuring not just as much freedom and 
autonomy as is possible within the binding legal framework of an external structure of 
a freely elected political power, but, just as the species-interest requires, as much 
freedom and autonomy as possible in line with sustaining a similar level of natural 
autonomy and freedom for all: anarchism.
But freedom alone does not a legitimate political system make. The entire argument 
of social contract theory rests upon the premise that the unfettered freedoms of a pre­
political humanity were unworkable and led only to chaos, violence, and 
inconvenience. We argue that external structures of political power are created on a 
universal teleological argument that they will make life ‘better’ for ‘people’ than it 
would be without them, precisely because it is believed that the fulfillment of our 
species-interests is impossible to achieve without the creation of such institutions; the 
assumption being that a system of pure self-rule would be incapable of guaranteeing 
the relevant protections necessary to achieve them. Anarchism, the idea of a society 
without a state, can certainly offer people freedom from external authorities; but can it 
offer anything else, such as the security offered by democratic structures of law and 
order against unnecessary death and preventable suffering, or the organized 
distribution of basic requisite material goods necessary for staying alive that the
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structured and complex economic systems of capitalist democracy claim to provide?
In other words, can it offer the protection for the full spectrum of species-interests that 
legitimate politics must fulfill; or is advocating anarchism to doom us only into the 
sort of dangerous unfettered freedoms found in Hobbes’ warring state of nature?
3.4: Anarchism and Political Teleology
Anarchism is potentially the most misunderstood political doctrine in the history of 
political thought; largely because it is counter-intuitive to most accepted theories of 
politics and governance which assume the unquestionable necessity of an external 
state over and above society to carry out the goals of legitimate politics; but also 
because, in terms of a specific and identifiable political doctrine, anarchism is, 
necessarily, somewhat lacking.
Whilst at their core, all anarchist theories have a family trait agreement on certain 
key factors, such as, the necessity of maximum possible political and individual 
freedom and the abolition of permanent external structures of political power within 
society; the exact specifics of how this is to be accomplished -  what such a society 
would look like; the reasonable limits of legitimate authority; acceptable forms of 
organization; extent of individual autonomy, etc -  differ from theorist to theorist, 
leaving it, historically, more a rich tapestry of varied interpretations on a similar 
theme than a singular and definitive manifesto.
Whilst anarchism has been accused by both nihilists intrigued by its potential for 
destructive violence, and conservatives, terrified of its same perceived potential, as a 
doctrine of social annihilation; the majority of anarchist thinkers see things quite 
differently. Anarchists, Cole tells us, ‘were anarchists because they did not believe in
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an anarchical world’.184 Indeed, most anarchists advocate a system of society without 
external government not as a means to violent chaos and disarray, but precisely 
because they believe that it is only under such a system that one could truly live the 
fulfilling life that is so often promised but never delivered under state systems of 
government.
Anarchists make a fundamental distinction between society and the state, claiming 
crucially that whilst the external state is, as we have discussed, an artificially created 
structure erected unnecessarily over an otherwise autonomous society; people, being 
inherently social creatures, form societies organically. Society, therefore, is an 
entirely natural phenomenon, perfectly capable of its own self-rule and self­
sustenance, were it not for what Proudhon called the existence of a ‘governmental
185prejudice’ amongst people: the unwarranted assumption that governments are a de 
facto necessity to organized life, simply because we have not yet known a society 
without one.
Anarchists argue that whereas we conventionally see external government as the 
solution to the problems we have within society, in reality the majority of these 
problems come as a result of the inherent conflict caused by the needs and interests of 
natural human society struggling against the artificial influence of illegitimate state 
structures.
Crime, for example, is the social phenomenon most often cited as an objection to the 
anarchist claim that a society could flourish successfully without formal laws. Whilst 
I used the idea earlier -  that as long as we have had law, the acts those laws prohibit 
still continue -  as an argument to prove the intractable nature of human autonomy in 
the face of external constraints; the same idea is often pointed to as evidence that
184 Cole in: Horowitz, I, L (ed), 1964. The Anarchists , p. 9. (Dell; New York)
185 Proudhon in Guerin, D (ed) (translated by Sharkey, P), 1998. No Gods No Masters: An Anthology 
of Anarchism -  Book One, p. 65. (AK Press; Edinburgh)
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humanity without the constraints of formal law could be much worse. If we cannot 
fully tackle crime within current democracies, where complex systems of law and 
punishment are in place; then what hope would we have in a society with no 
deterrence from committing crimes at all? It is for this reason, the critic of anarchism 
might respond, that we need external state structures to oversee natural societies.
The anarchists, however, whilst never denying the possibility of crime still existing 
within a stateless society, perceive the clam that the state protects people from crime 
as a spurious instance of counter-factual ‘governmental prejudice’. Anarchists do not 
deny the importance of such security within their political teleology, but they resist 
the conclusion that only an external authority can successfully provide such a 
function, arguing instead that society can not only secure itself capably, but that the 
state system itself is a major cause of much of the crime which plagues societies 
today.
Criminal acts, the anarchist reminds us, should always be understood in their proper 
context; as harmful acts committed not by intrinsically evil people, but through 
attitudes largely exacerbated by the damaging influence of overly authoritarian 
societal structures on pliable human behaviour. Robbery, for example, is often a 
result of either need or greed stemming from a competitive and unfairly distributed 
society. So too are murders or assault for financial gain or social prosperity, with 
others brought about by psychological problems that even some non-anarchist 
researchers have linked to the stresses and pressures of contemporary capitalist living, 
the feeling of struggling in a mindless ‘rat-race’ for economic survival leading to an 
urge to lash out in retaliation.186 Rape too, it has been argued, has been encouraged 
by the distinctively capitalistic commodification of sex, especially of the female body,
186 Wilson, C, 1995. A Plague o f Murder, p. 527. (Robinson; London)
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through advertising and other forms of commercial modelling that reduce women into
•  187nothing more than a dehumanized product, there solely to titillate men.
The anarchist argues that the criminal behaviour we see in contemporary humanity is 
unrelated to any ineluctable and inevitable human nature, nor is it, in and of itself, a 
legitimate reason for an authoritative society; the human behaviour that we see is 
rather a product of the particular authoritative society we live in. Human beings are 
not bom with an inner essence of greed, competition, betrayal, hatred, possessiveness 
and all the other terrible qualities so often attributed to our nature, but are bom instead
1 Rftwith a much more malleable nature that is merely moulded this way. It is living 
life in a greedy, competitive society that encourages only our most negative potentials 
to flourish. Thus a society with a different emphasis would be able to nurture us in 
some other way; a society structured to encourage co-operation and mutuality would 
see an entirely different type of behaviour emerge from the one we posit today, and 
leave us with no reason to assume autonomous individuals, without the threat of state- 
enforced-sanctions, would be incapable of making unselfish, socially-minded, 
choices; yet because a society ruled by an external government is all that we have 
ever known, we find it difficult to think outside the box of its ubiquity.
This seeming ubiquity, however, and the existence of the external state as dominant 
political power, is a relatively new trend in human history. As Michael Taylor 
reminds us, ‘anarchic communities did in fact survive for millennia. Homo sapiens
187 There is a massive amount of feminist, socialist, Marxist, and anarchist literature on this subject, but 
recognition of the effects of commercial images contributing to gender-based violence has begun to 
receive attention in more mainstream arenas. In May 2007, for example, the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe heard a report from the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and 
Men, which noted that women ‘are vulgarised in advertisements and commodified or presented as sex 
objects’, and that ‘too often, advertising shows women in situations which are humiliating and 
degrading, or even violent and offensive to human dignity...women are nearly always the ones who are 
presented in certain advertisements as mere consumer commodities or sex objects.’ (Bilgehan, G, May 
21 2007. Report to the Parliamentary Assembly o f the Council of Europe by the Committee on Equal 
Opportunities for Women and Men. The Image o f Women in Advertising. Doc. 11286)
188 The divergences of opinion in the evolutionary and social theories of Charles Darwin, Herbert 
Spencer and Peter Kropotkin are instructive here.
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•  189lived in such communities for nearly all of his forty or fifty thousand years.’ This 
is not to suggest anarchism as a ‘back to nature’ position or necessary advocate of 
primitive tribalism, but merely to illustrate that external political power is a relatively 
recent historical creation, an organizational construct manufactured with no intrinsic 
legitimacy or ontological necessity, justified only on the underlying teleological 
assumptions of the ethical contract.
Anarchy appears unnatural only because history has favoured the organization o f the 
state and because, even in a globalized world where the powers o f the state appear to be 
challenged, this historical trend is unlikely to be reversed. Yet even though the state 
has endured, the study o f  stateless societies suggest that it is both impermanent and 
alien.190
As Colin Ward points out, since its intellectual emergence as a distinctly articulated 
political theory in the late eighteenth century, anarchist undercurrents have not only 
appeared in the Western world as an all-too-often-ignored theoretical alternative to 
traditional statist politics; but have sprouted up as a theoretical alternative to state 
systems all over the globe. Whilst European and American anarchist thinkers often 
get exposure within academic discussion about anarchism (usually as an extremist 
footnote to the history of democratic thought); in Japan, Kotoku Shusui’s translations 
and engagement with anarchist philosophy helped spread the idea not only in his 
home country, but also to China and Korea. In India, Gandhi famously took 
inspiration and ideas from well-known anarchist thinkers like Tolstoy, Kropotkin, and 
Thoreau; as did the teachings of his spiritual successor Vinoba Bhave’s anarchist-
189 Taylor, M, 1982. Community, Anarchy and Liberty, p. 3. (Cambridge University Press;
Cambridge)
190 Kinna, R, 2005. Anarchism: A Beginner’s Guide, p. 93. (Oneworld Publications; Oxford)
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inspired Sarvodaya movement. Meanwhile, in Africa, Mbah and Igarewey drew 
attention to the perceived failures of state socialism in the region with their respective 
anarchist critiques.191
Despite the illusion of historical permanence and a tradition of its acceptance, the 
modem nation-state has no more special privilege of existence than any other 
proposed organizational system. Moreover, as Ian Shapiro remarks, ‘it is an open 
secret that political theorists have yet to come up with a compelling justification for 
it.’192
Rather than arrangements of vast and isolated nation-states, anarchists propose a 
radical restructuring, both domestically and internationally, of social organization 
towards a federal system of multiple small-scale and self-govemed autonomous 
communities as a democratically manageable alternative to the over-reaching state 
systems of today.
In the words of Proudhon,
Solicit men’s views in the mass, and they will return stupid, fickle and violent answers; 
solicit their views as members o f  definite group with real solidarity and a distinctive 
character, and their answers will be responsible and wise. Expose them to the political 
“language” o f  mass democracy, which represents “the people” as unitary and 
undivided, and minorities as traitors, and they will give birth to tyranny; expose them to 
the political language o f  federalism, in which the people figures as a diversified 
aggregate o f  real associations, and they will resist tyranny to the end.193
191 Ward, C, 2004. Anarchism: A Very Short Introduction,^ ., 10-12. (Oxford University Press; 
Oxford)
192 Shapiro, 1,2003. The Moral Foundations o f  Politics, p. 187. (Yale University Press; New Haven)
193 Proudhon, translated by Vernon, in Ward, C, 2004. Anarchism: A Very Short Introduction, pp., 81- 
82. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
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Of course, the idea of such federalism implies a much more structured level of 
organization than is commonly attributed to the anarchist position; but this traditional 
equation of anarchism to chaos lies in stark contrast to actual anarchistic thought. As 
Bakunin put it, ‘although I am a strong supporter of order, I am in the fullest sense of 
the term, an anarchist.’194 Anarchists do not reject the idea of authority outright, or 
necessarily the idea of rules, restraints, and even law; however they do reject all of 
those things as they are conventionally conceived -  as unquestionable, external 
impositions of coercive obligation. Instead, they support freely chosen and voluntary 
forms of mutually agreed, non-permanent, organization and authority. ‘Anarchy as 
affirmation, means the “internalisation” of rules to such a high degree as to do away 
with the need for external constraint all together.’195
Does it follow that I reject all authority? Far from me such a thought. In the matter of 
boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, or railroads,
I consult that of the architect or engineer. For such special knowledge I apply to such 
and such a savant. But I allow neither the bootmaker nor the architect nor the savant to 
impose authority upon me. I listen to them freely and with all the respect merited by 
their intelligence, their character, their knowledge, reserving always my incontestable 
right of criticism and censure.. .1 bow before the authority of special men because it is 
imposed upon me by my own reason. I am conscious of my inability to grasp, in all its 
details and positive developments, any very large portion of human knowledge. The 
greatest intelligence would not be equal to a comprehension of the whole... Each directs 
and is directed in his turn. Therefore there is no fixed and constant authority, but a
194 Bakunin in: Goodwin, B, 1997. Using Political Ideas: 4th Edition, p. 121. (Wiley; Chichester)
195 Horowitz, I, L, 1964. The Anarchists, p. 16. (Dell; New York)
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continual exchange o f  mutual, temporary, and, above all, voluntary authority and 
subordination.196
Similar to Bakunin’s position, Kropotkin described the idea of anarchy as
a principle or theory o f  life and conduct under which society is conceived without 
government -  harmony in such a society being obtained, not by submission to law, or 
by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded between various 
groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake o f production and 
consumption, as also for the satisfaction o f  the infinite variety o f  needs and aspirations 
o f a civilised being.197
Taking the idea of rational autonomy to its logical conclusions, the anarchists simply 
concede the intractable nature of human autonomy and embrace it, rather than fight it; 
arguing that laws ‘from above’ cannot hold any reasonably supported claim to 
authority without their first being autonomously agreed upon and freely entered into 
by individuals ‘from below’. As such, they seek to abolish formally established 
permanent external laws and complex authoritative state systems, not to produce the 
unlawful chaos and disorder feared by their critics, but because they see such artificial 
institutions as unnecessary for legitimate forms of rule-following and social 
organization. As Kinna puts it, ‘in whichever way anarchists choose to describe the 
idea, “authority from below” enables them to distinguish between types of
196 Bakunin, M, 1970. God and the State, pp., 32-33. (Dover Publications; New York)
197 Kropotkin in: Ward, C and Goodway, D, 2003. Talking Anarchy, p. 25. (Five Leaves Publications; 
Nottingham)
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commitment and to argue that anarchism is consistent with some forms of binding 
authority.’198
The central difference between anarchist forms of organization and authority, and 
more traditional forms, is the idea of free agreement. Anarchists argue that once an 
organization becomes an enduring institution, it can lose sight of its original purpose 
and become a self-interested and self-perpetuating entity, disconnected from the 
people it is meant to serve and the aims it is meant to fulfill. As such, organizational 
agreements need to be short-term, non-hierarchical, purposeful, and mutually agreed 
upon. Obviously, certain organizations may well need to be long-term -  such as, 
perhaps, a method of political organization for meeting and voting on issues, etc, but 
even here the problems of entrenched power can be resolved. There is no reason to 
assume the need, within such enduring organizations, of the presence of an equally 
enduring ‘leadership’ to control the proceedings. An alternative organic 
organizational principle can be produced, of freely putting forward suggestions and 
creating an improvised and non-directed discourse, which generates its own, ever- 
changing, series of circumstantially-specific individuals chosen in each instance to 
carry out and implement agreed decisions based on willingness, expertise, 
competence, etc; or, perhaps, a chairperson could be freely elected, for a short term, 
and those individuals responsible for carrying out certain democratically decided tasks 
chosen through mutual discussion and agreement, arbitrated by the freely chosen and 
mutually agreed upon chair.
Authority in such circumstances though, would be temporary, for use only in that 
public meeting, garnering neither the voting system nor elected individual any other 
special rights, privileges or respect in any other area of public life (the chair could
198 Kinna, R, 2005. Anarchism: A Beginner’s Guide, p. 71. (Oneworld Publications; Oxford)
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justifiably be changed each session, and a different electoral model might be agreed 
for different contexts). It is an authority given only on the rationale that the individual 
or system bestowed with such authority has been allowed this position of privilege 
only to serve the specific purpose of ensuring the order and structure of that particular 
town meeting is one conducive towards the direct democracy which is its intention. 
The authority is accountable to its purpose and is temporary; a purely functional 
arrangement as a means to communal ends, rather than enduring, unquestionable and 
arbitrary. Indeed, the anarchist acceptance of certain qualified instances of authority 
works on the very same assumptions as the underlying ethical contract which bestows 
legitimacy only upon those structures of political power which fulfill the specifically 
defined functions of political teleology: accepting the natural authority of individual 
autonomy, we can still freely choose and mutually agree to certain communally 
created curbs to that autonomy if it is necessary for ensuring the fulfillment and 
protection of our species-interests that we ultimately autonomously desire.
Still, freely appointing a chairperson at a town meeting, or even a local 
representative for a larger federal conference, is hardly the same as freely establishing 
international agreement between nations without some overarching authoritative 
structure. But as Ward points out, voluntary groups of international cooperation 
already do exist in non-political forms, and have done throughout history.
Kropotkin used to cite the lifeboat institution as an example o f  the kind o f  voluntary 
and non-coercive organization envisaged by anarchists that could provide a worldwide 
service without the principle o f  authority intervening. Two other examples o f  the way 
in which local groups and associations could combine to provide a complex network o f  
functions without any central authority are the post office and the railways. You can 
post a letter to Chile or China, confident that it will get there, as a result o f  freely-
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arrived-at agreements between different national post offices, without there being any 
central world postal authority at all. Or you can travel across Europe and Asia over the 
lines o f  a dozen different railway systems, public and private, without any kind o f  
central railway authority. Coordination requires neither uniformity nor bureaucracy.199
Furthermore, the anarchist system offers a much more substantial ability to not only 
coexist perfectly with the important ethical idea of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ moralities, 
allowing for as diverse a range of, what Rawls might call ‘reasonable pluralism’ 
between communities as possible; but also to create a promising middle-ground 
between the traditionally conflicting political theories of communitarianism and 
cosmopolitanism, allowing individuals and communities to autonomously form and 
hold as wide an array of thick ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ as they want 
whilst rooted in the ‘overlapping consensus’200 of necessary agreement about the thin 
principles of universal political teleology which legitimate them.
As a theoretical alternative to statist politics therefore, anarchism cannot be 
dismissed offhand. Indeed, once we allow for the anarchist capacity for mutually 
agreed voluntary forms of rule-following and binding authority, there is no justified 
reason to discount anarchism’s ability to ensure the protection and fulfillment of any 
of the core species-interests of its citizens. All the anarchist asks is that these species- 
interests be given no undue absolutist status as unquestionable and definitive 
categorical laws, which, considering what the constructivist account of ethics has 
maintained throughout -  that ethical prescriptions can only ever be reasonably put 
forward to the best o f  our knowledge, and are always open to compelling criticisms
199 Ward, C, 2004. Anarchism: A Very Short Introduction, p. 89. (Oxford University Press; Oxford) 
2004
200 Rawls, J, 1996. Political Liberalism, W-, 133-172. (Columbia University Press; New York)
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and debate -  seems quite compatible with all that we have thus far said about political 
teleology.
Whilst anarchy, so construed, might sound like an unreachably utopian project, as 
Rawls reminds us, ‘political philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what 
are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility’. The 
decentralized and autonomous self-governance of independent, yet inter-related 
anarchist communities certainly relies on a catalogue of distinct arguments about 
human nature and the full spectrum of possibilities of voluntary non-hierarchical 
politics, but these arguments, however removed they may be from our current 
political norms and practices, are not without substance. The anarchist critique of 
contemporary systems of power is based in a coherent theoretical argument about 
human autonomy and political legitimacy, and proposed alternatives to the state- 
system, whilst innovative and unique, are never posited without evidence to support 
the case for their application. Whilst such alternatives might well be radically 
different from what we imagine to be the limits of practical political possibility today, 
there seems nothing unrealistic or unjustifiable about suggesting that what have 
hitherto been considered the limits of practicable political possibility might well be 
mistaken, and that perhaps there could be a different way of doing things that we have 
not yet considered. ‘Facts’, Bakunin insists, even in the seemingly utopian theories 
of the anarchists, must always come ‘before ideas... the ideal, as Proudhon said, is but 
a flower, whose root lies in the material conditions of existence.’202
That said; anarchism does have much more to prove regarding its realistic viability 
as a political system than democracy; which currently exists as a functioning political 
reality in many countries throughout the world. As such, it would be of great
201 Rawls, J, 2000. The Law of Peoples, p. 11. (Harvard University Press; Cambridge) (emphasis 
added)
202 Bakunin, M, 1970. God and the State, p. 9. (Dover Publications; New York)
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practical benefit if we were simply able to endorse these existing democratic systems 
as legitimate structures of political power -  we could let the world continue on its 
current course rather than having to endorse the much more substantial social task of 
creating a whole new workable system of anarchism.
As democracy also seems a theoretically promising means to successfully fulfilling 
the ethical obligations required for legitimate politics, then it seems wise to enquire 
first into the possibility of democracy’s ability to ensure the protection and fulfillment 
of its citizen’s species-interests and truly make life ‘better’ for ‘people’, than to risk 
all our eggs breaking just yet in the anarchist’s unproven basket.
3.5: Capitalism, Representative Democracy, and Democracy’s Authentic Ideal
The concept of democracy has held many different interpretations since it first came 
into being, and has been put into practice in a variety of different ways. From the 
male-oriented direct-democratic Athenian city-state of its intellectual origins, to the 
first-past-the-post bicameral British parliament, to the systems of proportional 
representation currently found throughout most of continental Europe and Latin 
America, to the presidential system of the United States (to name but a few differently 
construed democratic structures to be found throughout the world today); it is clear 
that the criteria for what makes a political system democratic are not to be found 
simply in the claims to democracy made by each particular state, but rather by 
unpacking the common theoretical thread found within all such democratic systems 
and determining a unifying democratic ideal.
Beneath all claims to democracy then, we can find the same underlying idea: as 
ultimately people are understood to be self-sovereign and rationally autonomous 
individuals, and this self-sovereignty is seen as the only truly legitimate form of
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political power that there is; the authentic democratic ideal is to ensure, as much as is 
possible, that the people in any given society govern themselves.
Instead of erecting a structure of political power over and above the citizenry, 
external from them and in domination; the authentic democratic ideal maintains that 
political power comes only internally, from the citizenry themselves, with external 
political institutions legitimately created only if they are to serve as necessary external 
agents for enacting the internal will of the people into practical action; the conflict 
between internal human autonomy and external political authority dissolved through 
what R. P. Wolff calls the ‘solution’ of democracy.203
Democracy attempts a natural extension o f  the duty o f autonomy to the realm 
o f collective action. Just as the truly responsible man gives laws to himself, 
and thereby binds h im self to what he conceives to be right, so a society o f  
responsible men can collectively bind themselves to laws collectively made, 
and thereby bind themselves to what they have together judged to be right.204
Real-world democracies and the authentic democratic ideal, however, are two very 
different things. As Arblaster tells us, despite contemporary rhapsodizing about 
having reached an ‘end of history’ with the widespread achievement of democracy, 
‘the purposes for which ordinary people wanted political democracy, or the vote, have 
not yet been completely fulfilled by any means.. .political democracy itself has not 
been realised simply by giving every adult person a vote in general and local 
elections’.205
203 Wolff, R.P, 1998. In Defense o f Anarchism, pp., 21-67. (University of California Press; Berkeley)
204 Ibid., p. 22
205 Arblaster, A, 2001. Democracy, 2nd Edition, p. 98. (Open University Press; Buckingham)
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One of democracy’s most basic mechanisms utilized to enact its central principle of 
public participation and self-sovereignty is enfranchisement, but what Arblaster 
reminds us is that the vote alone remains just that: a mechanism, a means to an end.
The entitlement of a population to vote is, by itself, not enough to make a political 
system authentically democratic. Indeed, in recent times reporters have exposed 
substantial evidence to suggest one of the world’s largest current ‘democracies’, the 
United States, is lacking even this bare minimum, with both the 2000 and 2004 
elections intentionally manipulated and tampered with to secure two controversial 
victories for George W. Bush despite him losing the popular vote each time; thus 
leaving the decisions of the American electorate entirely disconnected from the 
outcome.206
Even without such blatant vote-fixing, in the UK a celebrated 1997 Labour Party 
‘landslide victory’ saw this ‘landslide’ support for Labour, in reality, come from only 
44% of the 71.4% of the population who actually voted. In other words -  the majority 
56% of voters didn’t vote for the supposed ‘landslide’ winning party and 28.6% of the
907country’s population didn’t vote at all. In 2001, that proclaimed ‘majority’ was 
even less, with support for Labour coming from only 40.7% of a voter turnout of only
9 0 859% of the population. Once again, a majority 59.3% of voters and 41% of the
population did not vote for their professed ‘democratic’ leaders.
Just because a system of government, and the population it governs, considers itself 
democratic, and its nation a democracy, does not necessarily mean that it is
206 Bugliosi, V, 2001. The Betrayal o f  America. (Nation Books; New York); Palast, G, 2003. The Best 
Democracy Money Can Buy. (Robinson Books; London); Palast, G, 2006. Armed Madhouse. (Allen 
Lane; London)
207 Jones, B (ed), 2001. Politics UK, pp., 169-175. (Pearson Education Limited; Essex)
208 Leader Column: A Youthful Lack o f Enthusiasm, The Guardian, Wednesday December 28th, 2005 
http://www.guardian.co.Uk/leaders/story/0,, 1674177,00.html (accessed 7/12/07); Statistical Table:
How The Parties Did, The Guardian:
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/election200 l/stateofparties/0,10167,495820,00.html (accessed 7/12/07)
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objectively so, and since democracy’s inception, there has been a consistent and 
predictable conflict between its authentic idea and the actualization of democracy as a 
working system of political power. As Arblaster explains, one of the major reasons 
for this is because of class antagonisms inherent to the democratic movement.
The notion that support for democracy might mean taking sides in a kind of 
class war will seem absurd to most people today. Yet democracy, both in 
ancient Greece and in the politics o f  the past two centuries has never been 
achieved without a struggle, and that struggle has always been, in good part, 
a type o f  class struggle, even if  it is very simply characterized, as it was by 
many Greeks, as a struggle o f  the many poor against the few who are rich and 
well-born.209
The idea of there being a class war between supporters of democracy and its 
opponents should not be as surprising as Arblaster makes it out to be. When looked at 
objectively, such conflict seems inevitably tied into the idea of democracy. To say 
that all people should be entitled to political power and have control in the running of 
their own societies, is at the same time to say that those who already hold non- 
democratic power within that society must give that privilege up and share power 
with those they currently rule over. As such, it is hardly unexpected that those 
already benefiting from arguably illegitimate power claims would seek to maintain 
their dominant social positions and try to crush any attempted usurpations from below 
that might jeopardize their enjoyed status.
Writing about the early rumblings of democracy in seventeenth century England, 
Chomsky provides a good example of this inherent conflict at play:
209 Arblaster, A, 2001. Democracy, 2nd Edition, p. 14. (Open University Press; Buckingham)
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The libertarian ideas o f  the radical democrats were considered outrageous by 
respectable people. They favoured universal education, guaranteed health 
care, and democratization o f the law .. .they developed a kind o f  “liberation 
theology” which, as one critic ominously observed, preached “seditious 
doctrine to the people” and aimed “to raise the rascal multitude.. .against the 
men o f  best quality in the kingdom, to draw them into associations and 
combinations with one another...against all lords, gentry, ministers, lawyers, 
rich and peaceable men” (historian Clement Walker). Particularly 
frightening were the itinerant workers and preachers calling for freedom and 
democracy, the agitators stirring up the rascal multitude, and the printers 
putting out pamphlets questioning authority and its mysteries.210
When people holding political power in a society truly believe themselves to be 
‘men of best quality’, and see everybody else as a mere ‘rascal multitude’ who 
couldn’t possibly know how to govern each other let alone be allowed a say in the 
governing of the men of best quality themselves, then class lines have already been 
drawn deeply, and any attempt to democratize such a society will ineluctably take the 
form of class warfare. The essential democratic idea that it is actually the rascal 
multitude themselves who are the people of best quality when it comes to governing 
their own affairs, not only threatens these existing class lines, but brings their 
previously perceived legitimacy into question, inevitably leading to class conflict.
As Arblaster reveals, even in Athens, despite its reputation for being the first 
functioning democracy in the world, ‘most of the famous Athenian philosophers and
210 Chomsky, N, 1992. Deterring Democracy, pp., 357-358. (Hill and Wang; New York)
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writers were critics and opponents of the democracy’.211 Looking at the available 
texts and documents of the time, Arblaster shows that ‘even those who do not 
condemn democracy out of hand have often contrived more subtle ways of 
disparaging it.’212
The hard struggles to realize democracy, against the entrenched interests o f  
birth and wealth; the deprecation o f democracy as the rule o f “the mob” or 
“the rabble”; the conviction that the poor, or working men, have no 
competence in politics; the uneasy coexistence o f political equality with 
social and economic inequality; the linking o f  the struggle for democracy 
with the struggle for freedom o f  speech and equality before the law; the 
dependence o f  democracy upon a communal sense o f  identity -  all these are 
found in the Greek experience, and all recur in the modem evolution o f  
democracy213
A major clash between the authentic democratic ideal and the attitudes of entrenched 
elite power stems from precisely the premise which puts it in possible harmony with 
the demands of legitimate political teleology: democracy’s commitment to the full 
political participation and universal enfranchisement of all. Whilst our discussion so 
far has shown the ineluctability of human autonomy, and paired that with several 
related species-interests in ensuring people as much freedom as possible in choosing 
what they will do with their lives, the following question has been asked by Walker’s 
‘men of best quality’ since the time of Plato: what qualifications do ordinary people 
have to know how best to run a society? Surely, they ask, despite having shared
211 Arblaster, A, 2001. Democracy, 2nd Edition, p. 16. (Open University Press; Buckingham)
212 Ibid
213 Ibid., p. 23
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interests and needs, not everyone is well-equipped for the demands and challenges of 
governance? Indeed, in this thesis alone it has taken us quite an abstract route to 
unearth what I am claiming to be core species-interests held by all people; if these 
interests are as universal as I say they are, then doesn’t our general lack of awareness 
about them in our everyday life stand as substantial evidence that, for the most part, 
the ‘people’ themselves are not necessarily always the best authority on what their 
own interests are?
Plato famously believed that the ability to govern well was such a rarefied skill that 
‘there will be no end to the troubles of states, or indeed....of humanity itself, till 
philosophers become kings’.214 Believing there to be a particular type of knowledge, 
the possession of which was an essential prerequisite for good governance, Plato 
believed that only a certain elite of philosophers would be capable of governing 
because only true philosophers could obtain this objective knowledge o f ‘the good’; 
that which ‘gives the objects of knowledge their truth and the knower’s mind the 
power of knowing’. Essentially, Plato was arguing that those who rule a state 
cannot simply be anybody, but as with any other skilled profession the job must be 
undertaken by someone properly able and suited for the role. Having knowledge of 
the form of the good meant that a ruler would be able to see more than the visible, 
material, transient appearance of things that the majority of people mistake for 
reality, and be able to see beyond the illusionary veneers of form-hiding particulars to 
absolute truth. With this true knowledge, a leader would therefore be unerring in their 
decisions and infallible in their ruling.
Once all the overly dramatic hyperbole and unvindicated metaphysics is done away 
with though, what we find in Plato is simply a re-articulation of the familiar argument
214 Plato (Lee, D, trans), 1987. The Republic, pp., 202-203. (Penguin Books; London)
215 Ibid., p. 248
that the only people fit to govern a state are those who truly know what is ‘better’ for 
‘people’; our universal ethical contractarian argument. His accompanying claim is 
that only a philosopher king can possibly possess this knowledge because it is an 
esoteric metaphysical form revealed only to the most adept of inquiring minds. 
Democratic thought claims instead, however, that we can all be philosopher kings; an 
idea that gains support from the ethical constructivism of the previous chapters.
As well as forcing us to reject the sort of unsubstantiated metaphysics Plato uses as a 
sound basis for argument; constructivism suggests that any plausible conception of 
knowledge of ‘the form of the good’ that could exist, especially in a political context, 
must be knowable by all once we accept ethics for what ethics really is: as well 
supported a conclusion about a particular moral truth as we can logically achieve after 
a rational analysis of all the vindicated relevant facts about a case that are true to the 
best o f our knowledge. When we do this, and acknowledge the thin set of universal 
species-interests and the concurrent moral obligations that they bring to legitimate 
politics, then we are accepting the most plausible account of any ‘knowledge of the 
form of the good’ there might be, and it is clearly one which is potentially available to 
all.
The claim that ordinary people do not have the sufficient qualifications to govern 
compared to more educated specialists can be easily rejected, then, when taken as an 
epistemological claim about the intellectual abilities of people to know their own 
interests; but the claim becomes debatably true when understood as a practical claim, 
especially in the complex modem societies we live in today.
Whilst it is arguable that everybody within a particular community knows, either 
consciously or unconsciously, their own universal needs and species-interests, as well 
as their own individual-specific and relevant communal interests, better than any
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external source, it remains highly unlikely that everybody within that community also 
grasps equally well the complete gamut of specialist knowledge required for engaging 
in practical politics: management of large-scale economies, budget-organization, 
creating and enforcing trade agreements, international law, diplomatic negotiating, 
criminal justice, military strategy, education, social policy and current affairs both 
domestic and international; to name but a few areas with which contemporary 
politicians need an intimate familiarity. An individual may well be able to know their 
universal needs and species-interests after brief analytic reflection about their 
common circumstance and nature, but without also having sufficient technical 
knowledge about the complex realities of the political world, they would almost 
certainly find themselves excluded from capably turning those needs and interests into 
any practical political action.
Such exclusion of the voting masses from the everyday workings of democracy is 
praised heartily by Edward Bemays, a former member of the U.S. Committee on 
Public Information: ‘in theory, every citizen makes up his mind on public questions 
and matters of private conduct.. .in practice, if all men had to study for themselves the 
abstruse economic, political, and ethical data involved in every question, they would 
find it impossible to come to a conclusion’. As a solution to this, Bemays argues, ‘we 
have voluntarily agreed to let an invisible government sift the data and high-spot the 
outstanding issue so that our field of choice shall be narrowed to practical 
proportions.’216
That such an agreement is voluntary is questionable; but in essence, Bemays is 
putting forward a similar argument to Plato’s: whilst claiming that the decision to 
leave such complicated matters up to external government is simply a voluntary one
216 Bemays, E, 2005. Propaganda, p. 38. (Ig Publishing; New York)
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motivated by the practical concerns of the majority, ultimately he is predicating his 
point on the assumption that the majority of citizens would find it ‘impossible to come 
to a conclusion’ on the esoteric complexities of real world politics manageable only 
by a selected elite of career politicians.
Recalling democracy’s turbulent history and the perpetual resistance to it by 
entrenched power though, one must ask if the specialized knowledge of the sort 
detailed above really is an essential component to genuinely democratic politics, or 
simply a changeable result of historical practice and working convention intended to 
keep the meddling ‘rascal multitude’ away from gaining too much political power. Is 
the claim that successful governing requires specialist skills and knowledge that is 
unavailable to all true, or merely the same sleight of hand tactic which illusionists use 
when trying to convince an audience that the various techniques of manipulation they 
have applied in their act are mystifying forces only a gifted magician can harness, 
instead of what they really are: entirely banal procedures that anybody can leam with 
a little time and motivation?
Let us not forget; it used to be an established convention that craftsmen and artisans 
would keep the methods and techniques of their trade a protected secret; not because 
of any objectively necessary requirement for concealment or reasonable belief that it 
would be beyond the average layperson to figure out, but simply out of fear that if the 
general public found out how to do for themselves, the things that they were currently 
paying the tradesmen good money to do for them, then they would all soon be out of a 
job.
Are the career politicians of today simply doing the same thing and protecting their 
own employment opportunities, career prospects and power, by alluding to abstruse 
but spurious tricks of the trade at the possible expense of genuine democracy?
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Indeed, is it their very presence which leaves the general populace feeling that they 
simply have no need to know the ins and outs of politics because it is precisely a 
politician’s job to know it for them -  not because the public are incapable of gaining 
such knowledge, but just in the same way that all of us could, if pushed, learn how to 
make tables, fix cars, grow crops, etc i f  we needed to, but as long as there are 
carpenters, mechanics and farmers in society, to whom such tasks have been 
delegated, we simply find there is no need?
With class antagonism so integral a part of both the democratic idea and its 
tumultuous history, the question of teleological integrity within actualized 
incarnations of practical democracy is no small matter. Indeed, the most pressing 
question we might ask of democracy’s current ascendancy in contemporary political 
consensus is why this previously controversial idea of democracy has become so 
acceptable today? Has such a change of perception towards democracy occurred 
because those previously in positions of power and privilege saw the compelling 
egalitarian logic of the democratic argument and willingly gave up their former claims 
to private dominance for the overall good of the people; or has democracy gained its 
political currency only because what remains of the democratic idea in contemporary 
times is a toothless shadow of its authentic ideal; a misused moniker now lacking in 
any of its intended substance?
Bemays’ idea that the will of the people must certainly guide democratic policy 
decisions, but that it is both impractical and unnecessary for all citizens to engage in 
the actual formation of those policies and define the political agenda themselves lends 
itself nicely to the representative system of elected government we equate with 
democracy today, but is, I believe, at odds with the authentic democratic ideal which 
demands a much more direct notion of democracy than the representative system
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allows, in which all citizens within a political community have an equal role in not 
only voting on, but in shaping and enacting political policy on all matters that affect 
them.
For obvious reasons though, such direct-democracy requires small-scale 
communities of citizens if it is to work effectively, and it is argued that in the modem 
nation-state the sheer size of our societies makes direct-democracy logistically 
impossible to achieve. Even in a country as relatively small as Britain, for example, if 
every single person in every single town were to be involved in every political 
decision that affected them, then the day-to-day running of the country would be a 
hugely impractical task. Not only would there be the question of where and how the 
entire citizenry might ever be expected to all meet up and meaningfully discuss 
matters of political importance in enough detail to knowledgeably engage with them, 
but there would also be the question of the amount of time needed in one’s life to be 
pro-actively involved in the complete minutiae of local and national politics, and 
whether or not such time would be available on top of all the other time-consuming 
factors of everyday life like work, family, friends, etc.
On the assumption that such direct-democracy is unworkable in the modem nation­
state; the system of representation has been invoked as a seemingly necessary 
compromise. In Britain, then, instead of the entire population of over sixty million 
people having to understand and vote on every single issue that faces them, just under 
650 Members of Parliament are elected from constituencies around the country to 
represent the views and interests of their respective constituents and oversee the day 
to day running of the nation manageably from Westminster. Put eloquently by Mill, 
although
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there is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form o f  government is 
that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, 
is vested in the entire aggregate o f the community; every citizen not only 
having a voice in the exercise o f  that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least 
occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government...since all 
cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally 
in any but some very minor portions o f the public business, it follows that the 
ideal type o f  a perfect government must be representative.217
Mill’s argument is the justificatory basis for the representative systems we call 
democratic today; but there is an alternative conclusion to be drawn from the notion 
that the directly-democratic ideal cannot function on a scale larger than a small town 
that is equally compelling, but not often drawn out: namely, the conclusion that a 
legitimate political society, bound as it is by its justificatory terms of political 
teleology to ensure the authentic democratic ideal, cannot, therefore, be established 
over so large a scale that it cannot guarantee the meaningful political participation to 
all, on which its legitimacy rests.
Now that we have seen how legitimate politics must be beholden to the ethical 
obligations of its justificatory teleology, the default position of compromising 
political ideals to fit the perceived limitations of reality becomes untenable; for it 
commits the major fallacy of forgetting that political reality is just a synthetically 
manufactured creation, artificially designed by societies to perform a specific social 
function. As such, political ‘reality’ in this case, is impermanent, and completely 
changeable if such change will help better fulfill that legitimating function. Once we 
remember this common oversight, we can suddenly see that it is just as realistic to
217 Mill, J. S, 1998. On Liberty and Other Essays, pp., 244-256. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
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change current political circumstances in order to accommodate the requirements of a 
justified ideal, as it is to compromise the ideal itself to the restrictive and arbitrary 
limits of a pre-existing reality. As O’Neill asks, ‘why should the boundaries of states 
be viewed as presuppositions of justice rather than as institutions whose justice is to 
be assessed?’218 Our political borders are created, not a natural and unchangeable 
phenomenon, and as such they should be up for as much scrutiny and ethical analysis 
as any other arrangement we are morally accountable for.
If authentic direct democracy turns out to be the only system of political power 
which can successfully ensure the protection and fulfillment of people’s species- 
interests, then regardless of the capricious contingencies of contemporary political 
reality, such as nation size and a population’s current levels of political understanding, 
it is entirely arguable that, rather than rejecting authentic democracy as impossible, 
we ought instead to change what we can in order to make it possible.
Representative democracy is certainly a compromised and pragmatic approach to the 
authentic democratic ideal, but can a single representative really articulate the full 
spectrum of nuanced and subtle differences in opinion of the large numbers of people 
they claim to represent? In the British example, for instance, if we divide the total 
number of the population who must necessarily be represented (60, 587, 300219) by 
the number of representatives available (646), we discover that, on average, each MP 
must theoretically articulate the interests of over 93, 788 people each if all of the 
‘people’s’ interests are to be represented in parliament.
Is it realistic to believe that on such a scale meaningful representation is possible, or 
are the myriad of complex individual interests and ideas simply diluted into easy 
generalizations that leave many people’s true positions without political voice?
218 O’Neill, O, 2000. Bounds o f Justice, p. 4. (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge)
219 Estimated for 2006 UK Population by the Office for National Statistics: 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=6 (accessed 12/12/07)
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Even if we reduced that number considerably and ensured a single representative for, 
say, every five  thousand people, it seems hard to imagine the situation making the 
chances for meaningful political representation any better.
The quality of representation gets even worse with the trend for political parties to 
form under such a system, further limiting the options of available representation for 
the majority of the public. Such representatives cease to represent individuals, or 
even communities, but instead represent parties, reversing the process of 
representation from one shaped and beholden to the public will, to one which gives its 
citizenry no other choice but to force their own nuanced and varied political beliefs 
into the acceptance of a representative-of-best-flt from a very narrow selection of 
available agents that have been chosen for them by party members.
With such limited choice, genuine representation of the gradated and myriad 
personal differences of popular political opinion within a society is severely 
constricted from the outset, making genuine representation in such systems a rarity. 
As Wolff suggests,
When matters have reached this degree o f  removal from direct democracy, 
we may seriously doubt whether the legitimacy o f  the original arrangement 
has been preserved. I have an obligation to obey the laws which I m yself 
enact. I have as well an obligation to obey the laws which are enacted by my 
agent in strict accord with my instructions. But on what grounds can it be 
claimed that I have an obligation to obey the laws which are made in my 
name by a man who has no obligation to vote as I would, who indeed has no 
effective way o f  discovering what my preferences are on the measure before 
him?220
220 Wolff, R.P, 1998. In Defense o f Anarchism, p. 29. (University of California Press; Berkeley)
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Whereas those like Bemays claim that ‘the conscious and intelligent manipulation of 
the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic 
society’, with a politician’s job being ‘by the instmment of propaganda, to mould and 
form the will of the people’, and alongside other important societal group leaders 
constitute ‘an invisible government’ who can ‘bring order out of chaos’ through the 
‘manipulation of public opinion’221; for Wolff, ‘men cannot meaningfully be called 
free if their representatives vote independently of their wishes, or when laws are 
passed concerning issues which they are not able to understand. Nor can men be 
called free who are subject to secret decisions, based on secret data, having 
unannounced consequences for their well-being and their very lives.’222 
The authentic democratic ideal is not about forsaking individual political 
perspectives and opinions for the representative-of-best-fit within a meagre pool of 
choice; nor is it about what Walter Lippmann called the ‘manufacture of consent’, 
giving only an illusion of autonomy and freedom to a general public considered ‘by 
and large incapable of lucid thought or clear perception, driven by herd instincts and 
mere prejudice, and frequently disorientated by external stimuli.. .not equipped to
994make decisions or engage in rational discourse’; yet it is precisely this flawed 
conception of democracy that representative democracy appears to give us both in 
theory, and in practice.
A real alternative to the democratic deficits of representative democracy, however, 
will not come from simply providing citizens a more participatory enfranchisement. 
Whilst considered by many political theorists to be the true democratic ideal, direct-
221 Bemays, E, 2005. Propaganda, pp., 37-168. (Ig Publishing; New York)
222 Wolff, R.P, 1998. In Defense o f Anarchism, p. 31. (University of California Press; Berkeley)
223 Lippmann in Bemays, E (Introduction by Mark Crispin Miller), 2005. Propaganda, p. 13. (Ig 
Publishing; New York)
224 Lippmann paraphrased by Miller, M. C; ibid., p. 16
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democracy, with its blueprint being the great city meetings of ancient Athens where 
every citizen had a voice, is just as liable to democratic failings as its representative 
cousin, if it is not bolstered beyond the polls by a complete culture of democratic 
participation and political freedom. Indeed, such a culture was missing even in the 
Athenian blueprint, for whilst every citizen debated and voted on every issue of 
government, with no law being passed or political decision made without the direct 
participation of every single citizen; the title of ‘citizen’ was denied to a large 
majority of the Athenian population.
Direct-democracy, when seen only as an emphasis on universal voting, removes it 
from the robustly ethical demands of political teleology and thus leaves it without the 
necessary commitment to protect and fulfill a citizen’s species-interests required of 
legitimate politics. Without this wider ethical understanding of the full teleological 
purpose of direct-democracy as a necessary means to a particular end, there is a 
danger of advocating only an empty gesture towards democracy rather than authentic 
democracy itself.
A perfect illustration of this can be found in Ian Budge’s book The New Challenge o f 
Direct Democracy. Budge begins with the revelation of what he calls ‘the startling 
fact’ that direct democracy ‘is now technically possible... The existence of electronic 
communications’ meaning that ‘physical proximity is no longer required’ for mass
' J ' J C
electoral participation.
This claim is important and, at least superficially, true. Historically, a major 
argument against the feasibility of direct democracy was the impossibility of large 
populations realistically being able to learn about and vote on the various political 
issues facing their country, but in this day and age of internet technology where the
225 Budge, I, 1996. The New Challenge o f Direct Democracy, p. 1. (Polity Press; Cambridge)
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mass distribution of information and ability to communicate instantly to people across 
the globe is possible from the comfort of one’s own home, such an argument would 
appear untenable. As Wolff had already pointed out, and Budge has picked up on,
‘the obstacles to direct democracy are merely technical’,226 and now, living in a world 
in which we have the capability for mass communications via telephone, television 
and the internet, such obstacles can be overcome.
Despite the new feasibility of direct democratic voting though, Budge then 
inadvertently illustrates how voting capability alone is not enough to turn a purely 
procedural direct democracy into an authentic democracy.
After his initial revelation about the new technological capacities for achieving 
direct and universal political participation, Budge then draws a blueprint of direct 
democracy which barely differs from current representative forms in any important 
way other than there being a huge increase in public voting.
‘It should be made clear’ Budge tells us, putting the minds of the ‘men of best 
quality’ at ease against fears of a democratizing ‘rascal multitude’, ‘that substituting 
popular voting on the most important decisions does not necessarily mean that 
parliaments need to be abolished.’ Parliaments of political representatives could, 
Budge suggests, ‘become a committee to debate and set the wording of the policy 
alternatives to be voted on by citizens’ or could ‘stage an advisory debate or even an 
advisory vote on the matter under discussion’ as well as ‘oversee detailed 
administration of policies endorsed by the population’. The political party system 
could also be retained, Budge tells us, as it ‘represents a necessary and constructive 
response to problems of policy consistency and co-ordination in a modem society’.
226 Wolff, R, P, 1998. In Defence o f Anarchism, p. 34. (University of California Press; Berkeley)
227 Budge, I, 1996. The New Challenge o f Direct Democracy, p. 36. (Polity Press; Cambridge)
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Indeed, he concludes,4it is practically inconceivable that, under modem conditions, a
• 928direct democracy could function without political parties’.
Budge is attempting to ostensibly advocate a system of mass public rule, whilst 
actually harbouring a fear of what the public might vote for if politics were left 
entirely up to them. If governance were left only to the self-rule of the citizens 
themselves, Budge tells us, (despite offering no proof to support this assertion),
990'decisions would often be inconsistent with each other and ill-considered’. He 
continues, equally without evidence, to allege that 'budgetary constraints would not 
be considered’ by the masses as ‘everything tends to be regarded as desirable and 
attainable, rather than any realistic rank-ordering of expensive policies being
9 0  A
made’, and warns us that 'limits on the energy and time even of an informed 
electorate would leave them open to manipulation by interest groups and
921demagogues’; an argument which, if true, would be just as applicable to a system of 
representative democracy, if  not more so.
A purely procedural direct democracy has other problems attached to it, even if we 
did not maintain Budge’s democracy-subverting political elites. As long as there is 
still a significant separation between agenda-setting and decision-making in a 
democracy, and between decision-making and the implementation of those decisions, 
there is always room for obstruction, delay, avoidance, and distortion.
Let’s imagine that some sort of voting technology can be placed in every home and 
public space which allows citizens to get information about, and vote upon, every 
single political issue that arises in their society. Immediately there are some glaring 
questions to be asked. Firstly, who sets the political agenda and determines what
228 Ibid., p. 40
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content will be transmitted through this technology into the homes of voters? If we 
are to take the authentic democratic ideal seriously then the only legitimate answer 
must be the people themselves, yet without placing this purely electoral procedure 
within the context of a wider programme of democratic reforms, we may find 
remaining anti-democratic obstacles within society at large. Perhaps, for example, the 
technological apparatus for direct democracy is implemented in this purely procedural 
way, whilst no other significant cultural changes are made to a nation, leaving it with, 
say, the economic framework of contemporary capitalism still in place. Under such 
conditions, it is not unreasonable to assume that, whilst certainly ensuring the 
mechanics of universal participatory suffrage for all, those citizens who possessed 
more money than others would still have the ability to procure many more methods of 
political influence to advocate policies in their own self-interest, than those available 
to others, or provided by the voting technology itself. Whilst everybody in such a 
society may well be aware of a certain issue and physically free to vote on it however 
they choose, if their effective framework of choice and understanding about the 
matter at hand has been ideologically limited by a concerted propaganda effort made 
by those economically powerful elites with vested interests in a particular political 
outcome, then that freedom and suffrage becomes meaningless.
Such techniques are unashamedly used in the entertainment world all the time. 
Whilst, on the one hand, the emergence of competitive ‘reality television’ 
programming in recent years has shown vividly that the idea of people sitting around 
their television screens once a week to watch a specified programme and then place 
individual votes electronically about its content is something that is both possible and 
appealing to the general public; on the other hand, the results of these reality- 
television votes have worryingly shown just how well clever editing, slick video
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packages, and subtle phrasing and framing of issues towards a programmer’s agenda 
can influence voters into making certain choices under the appearance of freedom, 
that have in fact been manipulated by a distorted presentation of the facts towards a 
specifically desired end.232 Whilst psychologically coercive voter-management like 
this on a TV show amounts to no more than a slightly cynical ploy to generate extra 
revenue; for authentic democracy we do not want simply the veneer of choice, we 
want the genuine enactment of our freely chosen and autonomously shaped needs and 
wants to fashion the political life of the society in which we live.
With vested economic interests maintaining significant power to influence that will, 
the freedom alone to simply vote, does not come close to ensuring the real freedom 
and autonomy our political teleology demands. Within a purely procedural version of 
direct-democracy, a very real possibility remains that much of the population would 
remain passive spectators in their own lives, responding at the ballot mainly to the 
influence of commercially pleasing sound-bites and substanceless slogans filtered 
through shallow and limited analysis in a manipulative and privately owned media; 
leaving them more like members of a multiple-choice focus group than the 
authentically democratic citizens legitimate politics requires.
Even if an equal ability to frame and influence the political agenda were to be held
by all though, and the presentation of issues and participation in voting held in
common rather than by privileged individuals or private economic interests, there still
remains the question of whether or not such deep reliance on technology for the
essential functioning of society would lead to an emergence of a new and powerful
non-democratic elite despite the best efforts at achieving inclusive egalitarianism -  a
technological elite, comprised of those people who create, build and maintain the
232 BBC 4’s media show: Charlie Brooker’s Screenwipe (Zeppotron Productions, 2007) gave multiple 
examples of the manipulative effects of editing narratives on ‘reality’ television shows in both seasons 
3 and 4 of its run.
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necessary machinery of direct democracy and thus, through no fault of their own, 
possess a powerful and unique knowledge which others do not.
With a certain technological specialism required for effectively recording, counting 
and transmitting the votes of a multi-million population of a nation-state, it is 
implausible that all members of the population would have equal knowledge of how 
this voting technology actually worked, leaving the accuracy of its results and its 
overall dependability largely unaccountable; for how is anyone to know that the 
choice they pressed into their electronic keypad at home, is the same choice that the 
voting machine actually registered when they are told the final election results?
These concerns are especially germane when one considers how electronic 
distortions made by privatized voting machinery undermined the democratic 
credibility of the U.S. elections in 2004, with privately operated computerized ballots 
losing, destroying, or simply ignoring, over three million votes.233
Authentic democracy requires more than the electoral framework of direct 
democracy alone, because it is more than merely a practical procedure of political 
resolution, or an arbitrary historic capability made possible through the contingencies 
of technological progress; it is a principled political idea founded on an underlying 
commitment to a legitimate political teleology. As well as having an obligation to 
ensure as much natural autonomy and freedom as possible in line with sustaining a 
similar level o f  natural autonomy and freedom for all (a requirement necessitating the 
direct-democratic demand that all people get to vote on all things and have equal say 
in framing and influencing the political agenda), an authentic democracy must ensure 
more still. It must ensure, for example, that each individual is protected as much as 
possible from unnecessary death and preventable sufferings not simply by providing a
233 Palast, G, 2006. Armed Madhouse, pp., 187-275. (Allen Lane; London)
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framework of protection from the sort of violence found in coercive political regimes, 
but going deeper than that and allowing citizens to erect similar protections from any 
arbitrary system or practice which they recognize as artificially creating unnecessary 
and preventable conditions which cause needless suffering or the loss of life. This 
could mean facilitating the enactment of fairly obvious protections, such as laws 
against murder and the implementation of clean sewage systems, but it must also 
mean being able to prohibit less obvious causes of unnecessary death and preventable 
suffering that might be publicly questioned, such as failing economic systems.
It is important to note, that as well as being representative, rather than direct, 
systems of democracy, contemporary Western democracies today are exclusively 
capitalist economically. This caveat is interesting, because, in line with our species- 
interests, an authentic democracy must ensure not only freedom and autonomy, but 
also the ability to make possible fa ir and unimpeded access to, and procurement of, 
the basic requisite material goods necessary for staying alive, to all of its citizens. 
This task might well involve the necessity of completely re-shaping hitherto accepted 
economic relations if they are believed to prevent any groups or individuals from 
obtaining these basic necessities of life.
Just as external structures of political power are artificial creations made by people 
to serve a certain purpose, the underlying justification for the very existence of any 
economic system, being itself an equally synthetic and purpose-built human enterprise 
legitimated only on the basis that it enables a distribution of goods in line with the 
establishing needs of its accompanying political structure, is itself bound to the exact 
same ethical obligations of political teleology as the political system which nourishes 
it. As such, an economic system which fails to protect and fulfill its citizen’s species- 
interests, or whose existence becomes an active obstacle to those interests, must be
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considered illegitimate, requiring much more change to a society than merely an 
adjustment in how often, and on what, people vote.
Under capitalism, the prevailing economic framework of contemporary 
representative democracies, there is immediately an obstacle to the fulfillment of our 
species-interest in obtaining fair and unimpeded access to, and procurement of, the 
basic requisite material goods necessary for staying alive; for under such a system, 
basic requisite material goods come at a cost which must first be met by a citizen if 
they are to obtain them. Obviously this same seeming impediment would exist under 
any economic system which put a price on basic goods. A successful and legitimate 
economic system, however, which fulfilled the justificatory obligations of its artificial 
existence by working out the ‘best’ arrangement for distributing goods within a 
society in line with the ethical requirements of political teleology, would be one in 
which, although such items came at a price, the money to cover that price would be 
easily obtainable by all. Whilst perhaps arguable that on a Keynesian, or 
Galbraithian, interpretation, the capitalist programme would put in place regulations 
and protections to ensure such requirements might be met, it has largely been Adam 
Smith’s take on capitalism (or in more recent times, the neoliberal co-opting of Smith 
by Milton Friedman) that has informed much of Western economic policy, leaving 
ethical assurances of welfare and protection, for the most part, down to the amoral and 
unpredictable ‘invisible hand’ of the free-market.
As a result of this we have a global economic system, created and sustained by 
capitalist democracies through institutions like the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, that sees, according to a 2001 report by the World Bank itself, 2.7 
billion of the world’s population living on just two dollars a day, and 1.1 billion living
190
on just one dollar a day.234 That is 3.8 billion of the world’s total of 6.5 billion living 
in extreme poverty. In other words: the majority; all finding their access to necessary 
goods severely impeded by neoliberal capitalism.
Domestically, in the United Kingdom, 3.4 million children lived in poverty in the 
year 2004/2005 (poverty here being defined as living in households earning less than 
60% of the contemporary median UK household income) despite half of those 
children living with at least one working parent. And 6.2 million adults of working 
age lived in poverty -  again, nearly half o f these people were in households where 
someone was in paid employment. In the same period, 17% of UK pensioners lived 
below the poverty line, a poverty which in that year alone caused nearly 30,000 
‘excess winter deaths’ amongst the elderly as they found themselves unable to afford 
central heating. In the United States, the year 2005 saw 12.6 % of its population 
living in poverty according to the U.S. Census Bureau; a figure which incorporated 37 
million people and 7.7 million families,236 whilst a December 2006 study by the 
World Institute for Development Economics Research revealed that more than half of 
all global household wealth in the world is owned by just 2% of the world’s 
population, with only 1% of global wealth held by the entire bottom half of the world 
adult population.237
Even if we ignore the gross disparities between rich and poor that the current 
capitalist system has generated, and concentrate only on those who do appear to have 
the economic means to buy necessary material goods, often we will still find that, in
234 World Bank:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPO VERTY/EXTPA/0„contentMDK:2 
0153855~menuPK:435040~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,OO.html (accessed 
1/2/07)
235 Palmer, G et al, 2006. Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion, (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
New Policy Institute; York). ISBN-13: 9781859355350. p d f -http://www.jrf.org.uk
236 Denavas-Walt, C et al, 2006. Income, Poverty and Health Insurance in the United States. (U.S. 
Census Bureau, U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C,)
237 Shorrocks, A et al, 2006. The World Distribution of Household Wealth. (UNU-WIDER; Helsinki)
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fact, they only possess borrowed credit rather than money of their own; credit which 
they will be required to pay back with interest. In October 2007 alone, according to 
Credit Action, a money-education charity in the UK, British consumers owed a total 
credit debt of two-hundred-and-twenty-two billion pounds, and in the U.S., 
according to the Federal Reserve Bank, American consumers owed over 2.4 trillion 
dollars in credit that same month.239 This problem is not limited to the citizens of 
these capitalist democracies though; in March 2007 the UK government owed 574.4 
billion pounds in national debt,240 whilst during the same time period the U.S. 
government owed over 8.7 trillion dollars in their own national debt.241 Whilst some 
of this deficit is internal, much of it -  especially in the United States -  is external, 
leaving these economies precarious and unstable.242
Marx and Engels famously noted that the gross exploitation of labour upon which 
capitalism relied, allowing a small minority to get rich off the backs of a majority of 
poor workers, produced ‘above all.. .its own grave-diggers’,243 believing the 
inequalities and disparity created by such a system, once recognized by the majority 
of people, would lead to popular revolt. When an economic system leaves half the 
world’s wealth in the hands of just 2% of the world’s population, and the majority of 
the world’s population living in conditions of extreme poverty, it would appear safe to 
say that it is an economic system which is unfit for purpose; yet the capitalist system 
remains the dominant economic system of contemporary democracy.
238 http://www.creditaction.org.uk/debt-statistics.html (accessed 13/12/07)
239 Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.19: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/Current/ 
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240 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp7kH277 (accessed 13/12/07)
241 US Treasury: http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np (accessed 13/12/07)
242 It has even been speculated that this reliance on foreign credit was one possible reasons for the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 -  the decision by Iraq to start trading their oil in Euros instead of Dollars 
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Warfare, (New Society; British Columbia)
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There are many reasons for this, some of which we shall go into in the next chapter, 
but a central one stems from the perceived failings of Marxism in Russia and 
communism’s observed compatibility with forms of totalitarianism. Capitalism -  
especially in its current free-market form -  like democracy, has long traded on the 
claim that it is the only system through which a society can have true freedom, being 
based in the notion of free individual buyers and sellers, and when the collapse of 
communism in the Soviet Union brought with it the clamour for free-markets across 
Eastern Europe and denunciations of dictatorial Soviet control, alongside Fukuyama’s 
‘end of history’ pronouncement, it certainly seemed as though free-market ideology 
had reached unquestionable levels of intellectual piety.
The preachers of the free-market though, have, I believe, committed the same simple 
fallacy over our species-interest in freedom, as the utilitarians committed regarding 
happiness.
As I have stressed throughout this chapter, the species-interests which legitimate 
politics must protect and fulfill, come in no order of priority. The protection and 
fulfillment of each one is equally necessary for life to truly be ‘better’ for the people 
that hold them, and no one particular interest can be held up as higher than any other; 
they are symbiotic to each other and incomplete in isolation. The rationale for 
accepting the capitalist economic system put forward by its proponents, however, has 
been based in the rhetoric of protecting individual freedoms above all else.
If one reads Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom, Hayek’s The Constitution o f  
Liberty, or even Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia purely as tracts about how best 
to preserve pure and unfettered freedom from unjustified external control, then they 
read almost like anarchist or socialist critiques of government. ‘How can we keep the 
government we create from becoming a Frankenstein that will destroy the very
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freedom we establish it to protect?’ Friedman asks. ‘Freedom is a rare and delicate 
plant.. .and history confirms that the great threat to freedom is the concentration of 
power.’244 Indeed, like a slightly watered down version of the anarchist solutions we 
have already looked at, Friedman claims that to best protect our freedom against 
external structures of political power we ought to limit government only to matters of 
security, utilized ‘at times to accomplish jointly what we would find it more difficult 
or expensive to accomplish severally’, whilst ‘relying primarily on voluntary co­
operation and private enterprise, in both economic and other activities.’ What 
government remains, Friedman suggests, ought to be decentralized; ‘if government is 
to exercise power, better in the county than in the state, better in the state than in 
Washington.’245 However, the problem with Friedman’s neoliberalism begins to arise 
when we discover that, for Friedman, we are seeking freedom in society as a sole end 
in itself, rather than as one of many necessary means to a complete fulfilling life.
The lack of any deeper teleological concerns becomes clear when he admits that 
whilst, ‘at any moment in time, by imposing uniform standards in housing, or 
nutrition, or clothing, government could undoubtedly improve the level of living for 
many individuals’ or ‘by imposing uniform standards in schooling, road construction, 
or sanitation, central government could undoubtedly improve the level of performance 
in many local areas and perhaps even on the average of all communities’; he 
concludes that ‘in the process, government would replace progress by stagnation’ 
because ‘government can never duplicate the variety and diversity of individual 
action’.246
244 Friedman, M, 2002. Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition, pp., 2-4. (University 
of Chicago Press; Chicago)
245 Ibid.
246 Ibid.
194
Unlike the anarchists, Friedman actually believes that government could improve the 
quality of life for people, and provide them with various features to protect and fulfill 
their species-interests; but by doing so he concludes that freedom will suffer, and 
human ingenuity will be destroyed. As a result, he claims that, to protect freedom, 
government should not interfere in the free functioning of society in this way, and 
ought to instead leave such provisions up to the ‘invisible hand’ of the marketplace, 
even i f  it is likely that government interference would be a success.
The idea of the invisible hand is simple; in the words of Adam Smith, ‘every 
individual...generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor 
knows how much he is promoting it’, however, by following one’s own self-interest, 
an individual may be Ted by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part
* \ A n
of his intention.’
Assuming self-interest to be the sole guarantor of human motivation, Smith believed 
that an ethical appeal to performing a particular action on the basis that it would help 
others or serve some sort of public good would be an appeal that was bound to fail. 
However, he also believed that leaving people to follow their own self-interest would 
beget a self-regulating economy of needs that would provide benefits to others 
unintentionally. ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We 
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them 
of our necessities but of their advantages.’248
247 Smith, A, 1776. An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: Book IV, Chapter 
II. (Adam Smith Institute; London); http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-b4-c2.htm (accessed 
13/12/07)
248 Ibid., Book I, Chapter II: http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-bl-c2.htm (accessed 13/12/07)
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If an individual wants economic prosperity for themselves, they must provide a 
service which somebody else wants to pay for, and so their self-interested desire for 
income will have the unintended consequence of satisfying the public interest too.
The central feature o f the market organization o f  economic activity is that it prevents 
one person from interfering with another in respect o f  most o f  his activities. The 
consumer is protected from coercion by the seller because o f the presence o f other 
sellers with whom he can deal. The seller is protected from coercion by the consumer 
because o f  other consumers to whom he can sell. The employee is protected from 
coercion by the employer because o f  other employers for whom he can work, and so 
on. And the market does this impersonally and without centralized authority.249
The invisible hand, then, is a rejection of the very notion of political teleology, for it 
reduces all question of protecting and fulfilling the species-interests shared by a 
community to an unintentional by-product of economic freedom, rather than as being 
the main focus of organized social life. Indeed, for Hayek, the necessary emphasis on 
freedom comes precisely because he believes such teleology to be unknowable. ‘The 
case for individual freedom’, Hayek tells us, ‘rests chiefly on the recognition of the 
inevitable ignorance of all of us concerning a great many factors on which the 
achievement of our ends and welfare depends.’250
Hayek rejects completely the viability of my constructivist project of political 
teleology, rejecting ‘rationalist demands’ that say ‘our action should be guided by a 
full understanding of the functioning of the social process and that it should be our 
aim, through conscious assessment of the concrete facts of the situation to produce a
249 Friedman, M, 2002. Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition, pp., 14-15.
(University of Chicago Press; Chicago
250 Hayek, F, 2006. The Constitution of Liberty, p. 27. (Routledge Classics; London)
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foreseeable result which they describe as the “social good”’, because such endeavours 
‘require knowledge which exceeds the capacity of the individual human mind’.251 
But as I hope I have shown, Hayek’s claim is simply not true. Such knowledge does 
not exceed the capacity of the individual human mind, it simply requires the 
hypothetical analysis of the concrete and fully knowable species -facts of the human 
condition, and the uncontroversial extrapolation of those facts into a limited set of 
plausibly supported normative universals that should not be beyond the grasp of any 
rationally autonomous human being familiar with the evidence.
Rather than recognizing economic structures as a purpose-built means only to the 
specific end of ensuring the legitimate distribution of goods, as dictated by the terms 
of our justificatory political teleology; neoliberal capitalism sees economics as an end 
in itself, perceiving ‘the basic problem of social organization’ not as how to make life 
‘better’ for ‘people’, but as how to ‘co-ordinate the economic activities of large 
numbers of people’ whilst retaining as much of their freedom as possible.
But seeing politics as purely an issue of economic freedom alone creates a tendency 
for disanalogy. ‘The great advantage of the market’, Friedman tells us, ‘is that it 
permits wide diversity’ in the choices and control individual people have over their 
own lives. ‘It is, in political terms, a system of proportional representation. Each 
man can vote, as it were, for the colour of tie he wants and get it; he does not have to 
see what colour the majority wants and then, if he is in the minority, submit.’253 But a 
life in which the full spectrum of human interests are satisfied, be they species- 
interests, individual-specific interests, or communal interests, requires a much more 
nuanced approach to satisfaction of those interests than does the ability to choose one
251 Ibid., pp., 58-59
252 Friedman, M, 2002. Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition, p. 12. (University of 
Chicago Press; Chicago) (emphasis added)
253 Ibid., p. 15
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coloured tie over another. Yes, we can theoretically choose the colour tie we want if 
we are in the market for a tie; but where is the correlating assurance that we can 
afford a tie in the first place, or more importantly, the price of bread, of water, of 
housing, etc?
To presume that markets and market signals can best determine all allocative decisions 
is to presume that everything can in principle be treated as a commodity.
Commodification presumes the existence o f property rights over processes, things, and 
social relations, that a price can be put on them, and that they can be traded subject to 
legal contract.254
The free-market might well lead to the freest economic outcomes and ensure 
unfettered trade between self-interested sellers and buyers, it may also ensure the 
most levels of individual freedom to those sellers lucky enough to make enough 
private profit to afford everything on sale that they need; but the ethical validity of 
these outcomes is not de facto obvious. Private profit is not a justified end in itself, 
and is no more legitimate an interest for an individual to hold, than is the interest of 
the killer to kill if the achievement of that interest comes at the expense of denying 
others the ability to meaningfully protect and fulfill their own essential species- 
interests.
Unless an argument can be made that free trade of this type can ensure the most 
effective distribution of goods in line with achieving the wider goals of the underlying 
political teleology from which legitimate economics must originate, then the 
desirability of such economic achievement remains in doubt.
254 Harvey, D, 2007. A Brief History o f Neoliberalism, p. 165. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
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Still, for the neoliberal, none of this matters. Freedom alone is the sole good to be 
protected by legitimate government. Although billions might well die in poverty, all 
that matters to the neoliberal is that they will be dying of a poverty that has occurred 
under conditions of economic freedom. This attitude is clear when Friedman 
acknowledges that ‘Fascist Italy and Fascist Spain, Germany at various times in the 
last seventy years, Japan before World Wars I and II, tsarist Russia in the decades 
before World War I -  are all societies that cannot conceivably be described as 
politically free’ but that ‘in each, private enterprise was the dominant form of 
economic organization’. Using this illustration to show that it is ‘clearly possible to 
have economic arrangements that are fundamentally capitalist and political 
arrangements that are not free’, he then crudely attempts to defend the free-market’s 
honour within its repressive circumstances, with the claim that ‘even in those 
societies, the citizenry had a good deal more freedom than citizens of a modem 
totalitarian state like Russia or Nazi Germany, in which economic totalitarianism is 
combined with political totalitarianism.’ His best example of this freedom: ‘Even in 
Russia under the Tzars, it was possible for some citizens, under some circumstances, 
to change their jobs without getting permission from political authority’.255
That Friedman’s economic program is just as compatible with repressive political 
institutions as its vilified socialist alternatives, if not even more so, has been made 
clear by Naomi Klein’s recent study of what she has dubbed ‘disaster capitalism’.256 
The obsession with unfettered market freedom above all else created in Friedman’s 
economics the glaring problem that no such free markets yet existed. Whilst I have 
pointed to some of capitalism’s current failings as reason to doubt its success, 
Friedman’s response to these damning statistics on world poverty would be to simply
255 Friedman, M, 2002. Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition, p. 10. (University of 
Chicago Press; Chicago)
256 Klein, N, 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise o f Disaster Capitalism. (Allen Lane; London)
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point out that such inequalities have come about not as a result of the failures of 
capitalism, but precisely because of governmental attempts at regulating and 
interfering with the market place. With the free-market corrupted by Keynesian 
social welfare programmes, capitalism is not operating in a realm of perfect freedom 
and so cannot successfully achieve the economic equilibrium of its theoretical 
promise. As Klein explains, ‘Friedman’s mission.. .rested on a dream of reaching 
back to a state of “natural” health, when all was in balance, before human 
interferences created distorting patterns.’257 To achieve as near to this ‘natural’ state 
as possible, Friedman’s proposals were threefold: ‘governments must remove all rules 
and regulations standing in the way of the accumulation of profits.. .they should sell 
off any assets they own that corporations could be running at a profit. And third, they 
should dramatically cut back the funding of social programs.’258
Such radical reforms could only be made though, and the distorting legacies of social 
and economic history wiped away, through a method best known as economic ‘shock 
therapy’.
As Klein explains, this ‘fundamentalist form of capitalism has always needed 
disasters to advance.’ Because the vast majority of citizens within a democratic 
country who benefit from public services are usually opposed to the idea of their 
sudden privatization, as well as the deregulation of previously existing government 
protections against the self-interest of private enterprise and the proposal of enormous 
cuts in social spending that free-market capitalism requires, what Klein calls the 
‘shock doctrine’ of neoliberal capitalism simply circumvents democracy by exploiting 
or manufacturing a nation’s emotional response to some cataclysmic disaster, such as
237 Ibid., p. 50
258 Ibid., pp., 56-57
259 Ibid., p. 9
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a war, or a coup, and shocking people into stunned and disoriented acquiescence of 
reforms they now feel, amidst such confusion, that they simply cannot resist.
Klein charts the application of the shock doctrine as a necessary centrepiece of 
Friedman’s economic theory and the applied economic programmes of his fellow 
Chicago School of Economics proteges; first in Chile, after Augusto Pinochet’s 1973 
coup d’etat, then in Brazil and Argentina under their juntas, in Uruguay under its 
military dictatorship, in post-coup Bolivia, and in both Poland and Russia during the 
height of their respective national crises.260 In each case, economic ‘shock therapy’ 
pushed through under conditions of extreme nationwide catastrophe, ensured private 
investors unqualified wealth, whilst condemning large numbers of citizens to poverty 
and starvation.
Friedman’s free-market principles were even adopted by the ostensibly socialist 
People’s Republic of China, with the imposition of free-market reforms meeting both
OA1protest and brutal repression at the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.
The list continues right up to the post-war Iraq and post-9/11 America of today, but 
the point remains the same; an emphasis on economic freedom, or even freedom 
itself, is no guarantee of the comprehensive package of social obligations that are 
required by legitimate politics under the terms of its justificatory contract. Indeed, 
much historical and empirical evidence suggests that, if anything, unfettered 
capitalism as an economic system has an inherent tendency to partner itself with 
political systems quite willing to cause unnecessary death and preventable suffering -  
in great numbers -  and leaves many people incapable of obtaining the fair and 
unimpeded access to, and procurement of, the basic requisite material goods 
necessary for staying alive.
The idea o f  freedom “thus degenerates into a mere advocacy o f  free enterprise”, 
which means “the fullness o f  freedom for those whose income, leisure and security 
need no enhancing, and a mere pittance o f liberty for the people, who may in vain 
attempt to make use o f  their democratic rights to gain shelter from the power o f the 
owners o f  property”.262
Friedman claims that the ‘central defect’ of attempting to ensure anything else but 
freedom in a society is that any such measures seek ‘through government to force 
people to act against their own immediate interests in order to promote a supposedly 
general interest.’ But just as we have rejected Hayek’s similar scepticisms, we 
must reject Friedman’s claim. The general interest a legitimate government must 
promote is the protection and fulfillment only of our species-interests, which 
ultimately amounts to nothing more than the unpacked shared-seZ/'-interest of all. 
Although such protection might well lead to the occasional limit being placed upon 
our freedom in some areas, or certain restrictions in the available choices of action we 
have before us, what it mainly does is ensure as much natural autonomy and freedom 
as possible in line with sustaining a similar level o f  natural autonomy and freedom for 
all\ and recognize that we can only fully ensure our own freedoms by simultaneously 
ensuring the freedoms of others.
It is neoliberal capitalism’s major intellectual defect that it fails to recognize the 
necessary truism that economics are a non-natural phenomena; they are merely 
synthetically created strategies of distribution, rather than an essential feature of 
reality. If the true goal of human teleology is, as Friedman claims, ensuring freedom
262 Polanyi, K in Harvey, D, 2007. A Brief History o f Neoliberalism, p. 37. (Oxford University Press; 
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as much as possible, then surely a much freer society than that found under capitalism 
would be one in which all goods were available without impediment; for as soon as 
we put a price on anything, we have created a barrier to freedom. If we accept the 
arbitrary barriers to freedom that the creation of an economy brings with it by 
Friedman’s principle that, under free-market conditions, those barriers are a mutually 
agreed arrangement between buyer and seller, then we must also be able to accept any 
other mutually agreed barriers to freedom that a society might choose to adopt, 
including agreements about ensuring certain levels of welfare for all and the need for 
making certain changes in approved economic structure to achieve such welfare.
The neoliberal doesn’t really want freedom qua freedom; they want a certain kind of 
freedom that exists only within a certain political and economic order. They seek to 
ensure the maximum potential for private profit because they feel that within the 
framework o f  a capitalist system, economic freedom is the best guarantor of 
individual freedoms; but this argument remains circular because the capitalist system 
itself has not yet been justified, and to justify it we need to explore the requirements 
of political teleology which, we have seen, demand much more than freedom alone to 
make life ‘better’ for ‘people’.
An authentic democracy, therefore, would require the creation of an economic 
structure compatible with the protection and fulfillment of all species-interests, and, 
despite its current ascendancy, it is not clear that neoliberal capitalism does this. 
Further still, the creation of alternative economic arrangements -  an undertaking that 
would require the free use of a citizenry’s innovative powers of creativity in itself-  
would have to demand of any replacement system much more scope in which that 
creativity could flourish, than is currently offered under capitalism.
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Despite the free-market rhetoric of neoliberalism’s great potential for producing ‘a 
social climate permitting variety and diversity’ that will nurture the ‘individual 
genius’264 of each self-interested citizen and provide them with bountiful 
opportunities to creatively pursue their freedoms; in reality, as Marx and Engels 
noted, for all but a few, the creative opportunities on offer to most people are 
restricted within the confines of creating what they are told to create by an employer. 
Due to the necessity for paid employment in an economic system where everything 
has a price, individual creativity must either be commodified into something 
profitable for its owner, or simply subsumed by the urgent need to find whatever work 
one can, with many jobs repetitive, monotonous, dull, unfulfilling, and done simply 
for the wage.
Not only does such a system stifle individual creativity, but it ensures that jobs and 
talent do not always match up, with many people who would be well suited to a 
particular field or profession sometimes financially unable to break into it, nurture 
their natural talents, or seize the limited and scarce opportunities available to them for 
pursuing it. More importantly though, regardless of actual talent at doing a particular 
job, the system also ensures that jobs and interest in doing them do not always 
correlate, with job satisfaction considered a highly sought after rarity rather than the 
expected norm of one’s employment, and productivity and profit the emphasis of the 
working environment rather than the human needs of the workers.
As it is convention for people to be paid a certain (and much varied) wage per hour 
for doing a job, the only way to make enough money from those jobs to pay for all 
essential items, and any other desired expenditures in life, is to amass enough hours of 
work to cover one’s costs, ensuring that the vast majority of one’s daily waking life is
264 Ibid., p. 4
204
spent on this endeavour. Jobs must become careers, worked at and maintained in 
order to keep a steady flow of income, regardless of whether the job is in any way 
enjoyable or fulfilling. And people therefore organize their lives in such a way as to 
maximize the amount of hours that they work in their lifetime above all else, leaving 
them ensnared in what Marx recognized as a state of profound ‘alienation’.265
Marx argued that under capitalism, as most workers are motivated in their actions 
purely by the external requirement of the potential income it might generate and not 
out of any internal intrinsic desire to perform their required task of their job, the 
product of that labour becomes seen as something outside of them, and thus alien. 
They work hard to guarantee a wage, but their wage is all that they get -  a dubious 
nominal fee, completely disconnected from the activity of their job. They do not get 
to keep the fruits of their labour, the profits their effort helped generate for their 
bosses, or in any other way benefit from their occupation other than its role in 
granting them a necessary wage. Instead, they are isolated from the end-product of 
their toil, severed from what becomes ‘labour embodied and made material in an 
object’, which belongs to another and not themselves.
The alienated product of their labour therefore transforms the act of labour itself into 
something equally alien to them; their work becoming nothing more than the cause of 
this peculiar sense of perpetual self-estrangement rather than a productive or fulfilling 
use of their time; it becomes a hostile act against themselves.
Marx considered the process of alienation a process of self-estrangement because, 
much as I have argued vis-a-vis there being certain universal species-interests that 
need to be observed if human life is to be truly fulfilling, Marx perceived in humanity 
an essential species-being that sought necessary expression through productivity and
265 Marx, K (Livingstone, R and Benton, G, trans), 1992. Early Writings, pp., 322-334. (Penguin 
Classics; London)
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creativity. Employment which produces only alienated output but which has not 
engaged with a worker’s creativity and intelligence at all, is employment which 
alienates the worker from something essential to themselves and their core being.
Such a worker ‘does not confirm himself in his work,’ as he should, ‘but denies 
himself, feels miserable and not happy, does not develop free mental and physical 
energy, but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind.’267 This alienation from themselves 
under capitalist systems of employment, in turn, makes workers ultimately estranged 
also from each other. As the products of their labour are seen as being alien to them 
and for someone else, they become isolated from all other people too, as they perceive 
others as being somehow responsible for their alienated state and their estrangement 
from themselves, corroding communal solidarity and the bonds of a flourishing and 
functioning society (and, furthermore, violating the species-interest in freely forming 
social bonds with others).
In the words of von Humboldt, ‘Whatever does not spring from a man’s free choice, 
or is only the result of instruction and guidance, does not enter into his very being, but 
still remains alien to his true nature.. .we may admire what he does, but despise what
u • >268he is.
The current system of wages-per-hour that causes this, however, is entirely arbitrary; 
especially when we consider that there are still large numbers of citizens living in 
capitalist democracies who remain unemployed. Whereas a world where wages of X 
pounds an hour requires one to work eight hours a day, six days a week just to make 
ends meet -  condemning people to a life-long career simply to ensure a roof over their 
heads and food in their stomachs -  there is no real reason, in a supportive economic 
system and after some redistribution of wealth, why one could not be paid the same
267 Ibid., p. 326
268 Humboldt, W (Burrow, J, trans), 1969. The Limits o f State Action, p. 28. (Cambridge University 
Press; Cambridge)
206
wage for only, say, two hours work each day and for only five days a week. Under 
such conditions a citizen would not be doomed to a career in something they have no 
interest in for the rest of their lives, just so that they can continue to afford to live that 
unfulfilling life; but instead would find themselves having thirty-eight extra hours 
each week in which to do other things that they enjoy. Meanwhile, an eight hour job 
which once employed only one person could now employ four.
A more moderate version of this proposal was put forward by Bertrand Russell after 
observing the ‘scientific organization of production’ during the First World War that 
made it ‘possible to keep modem populations in fair comfort on a small part of the 
working capacity of the modem world’. He suggested that ‘if the ordinary wage- 
eamer worked four hours a day, there would be enough for everybody, and no 
unemployment -  assuming a certain very moderate amount of sensible 
organization’.269
As Marx once envisioned, considering a future communist society with similarly re­
imagined stmcture to employment: without the necessity of wage-enforced careerism 
he could ‘hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, breed cattle in the evening, 
criticise after dinner, just as I like, without ever becoming a hunter, a fisherman, a 
herdsman, or a critic’;270 the options and opportunities of life emancipated by the 
liberation of one’s time and energy from the needless shackling of wage-slavery. 
Russell’s view was similar.
In a world where no one is compelled to work more than four hours a day, every person 
possessed o f  scientific curiosity w ill be able to indulge it, and every painter will be able 
to paint without starving, however excellent his pictures may be. Young writers will
269 Russell, B. In Praise o f Idleness, in Richards, V (ed), 1997. Why Work? pp., 27-29. (Freedom 
Press; London)
270 Marx, in Singer, P, 1980. Marx, p. 60. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
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not be obliged to draw attention to themselves by sensational pot-boilers, with a view  
to acquiring the economic independence needed for monumental works, for which, 
when the time at last comes, they will have lost the taste and the capacity. Men who, in 
their professional work, have become interested in some phase o f economics o f  
government, w ill be able to develop their ideas without the academic detachment that 
makes the work o f  university economists often seem lacking in reality. Medical men 
will have time to learn about the progress o f medicine, teachers will not be 
exasperatedly struggling to teach by routine methods things which they learnt in their 
youth, which may, in the interval have been proved to be untrue.
Above all, there will be a happiness and joy o f  life, instead o f  frayed nerves, 
weariness, and dyspepsia. The work exacted will be enough to make leisure delightful, 
but not enough to produce exhaustion.271
There would arise an added benefit of such a system for an authentic democracy; 
namely, that some of those thirty-eight newly freed hours each week could be used by 
the individual to better facilitate their necessary involvement in democratic politics -  
ensuring that they have time to become well-informed about the issues of the day, to 
discuss and debate with others controversial matters in a constructive and meaningful 
way, to bring forward issues arising of their own into the political discourse, and to 
otherwise participate actively in their democracy, without such participation 
encroaching into a limited amount of free-time more appealingly used to relax, 
socialize, or otherwise have fun after an exhausting working week.
In the current system, once we take, say, seven hours of sleep into account, an hour 
in the morning to get ready for work (shower, breakfast, dress, etc), twenty-or-so 
minutes each way to get to and from work, and a half an hour each evening to wind
271 Russell, B. In Praise o f Idleness, in Richards, V (ed), 1997. Why Work? p. 34. (Freedom Press; 
London)
down after work -  not to mention the minimum eight hours a day actually at work -  
we are left with only six hours and fifty minutes of the day to ourselves with which to 
do non-work things. This is of course discounting any overtime, preparation work, 
longer than average working hours, or any other accepted convention that increase 
one’s time of labour. When we realize that those six hours and fifty minutes each day 
is all that we have in which to see our family, raise our children, visit with friends, 
educate ourselves about the world, pursue our hobbies, and do anything else which 
brings us pleasure -  not to mention fit in all of our non-work-related chores, eat 
meals, use the bathroom, go shopping, do exercise, etc -  with this routine continuing 
six days a week, every week, until the age of retirement; it becomes clear that a 
worker’s entire existence is dominated by the external demands of employment.
Under such conditions, the idea of giving up a precious sliver of rare free-time to the 
various civic duties required of a properly functioning democracy is unappealing at 
best.
Whilst these manufactured circumstances might be a boon to the claims of those 
‘men of best quality’ who portray the ‘rascal multitude’ as incapable of meaningful 
political engagement, to those people seriously concerned with creating legitimate 
structures of political power and achieving the necessary demands of political 
teleology, the damaging effects of this arbitrary economic system on the democratic 
capabilities of the majority of citizens, is a significant concern. As even Adam Smith 
noted,
In the progress o f  the division o f  labour, the employment o f  the far greater part o f those 
who live by labour, that is, o f  the great body o f  the people, comes to be confined to a 
few very simple operations, frequently to one or two. But the understandings o f  the 
greater part o f  men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man
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whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, o f  which the effects 
are perhaps always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his 
understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing 
difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit o f such exertion, 
and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to 
become.272
3.6: Authentic Democracy is Anarchism; but is Authentic Democracy Possible?
Thus far, I have been looking at the potential for the authentic democratic ideal to 
ensure the protection and fulfillment of its citizens’ species-interests. What I have 
discovered is that the authentic ideal of democracy that can do this, seems not only far 
removed from the representative capitalist systems that are commonly called 
‘democratic’ in the world today, but also from any other democratic theories that 
place their emphasis on popular political participation in purely procedural terms.
The evidence for democracy’s potential here is obvious: in harmony with the 
species-fact of rational autonomy, the authentic democratic ideal perceives the self­
sovereignty of the individual as absolute, with all external authorities placed over 
them legitimated only by the voluntary consent of the individual themselves, beholden 
to serve only the public interest and never their own. By doing so, the democratic 
ideal allows people to sustain as much of their natural autonomy and freedoms as 
possible in line with sustaining a similar level of natural autonomy and freedom for 
all, and through such freedoms, allows a democratic citizenry direct control over 
forming and implementing their political life, thus ensuring them the means for 
protection from unnecessary death and preventable suffering that they seek and the
272 Smith, A, 1776. An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations: Book V, Chapter 
1, part III, article II. (Adam Smith Institute; London): http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-b5-cl- 
article-2-ss3.htm (accessed 18/12/07)
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ability to orchestrate fair and unimpeded access to, and procurement of, the basic 
requisite material goods necessary for staying alive for all. By creating their own 
social and economic framework through the innovative use of creativity and 
unfettered social dialogue, the individual and communal pursuit and achievement of a 
variety of goals and interests is made possible, producing an overall ‘quality of life’ 
and happiness for all.
Not only does this democratic ideal appear frustrated in practical application though, 
under contemporary conditions of capitalism, but it is an organizing principle which, 
in its purest form, is indistinguishable from certain forms of anarchism. As such, and 
as we have seen the many failings that have come from various historical attempts at 
watering down this authentic ideal into a ‘workable’ and ‘practical’ democratic 
compromise, I believe that we have no choice now but to concede that the authentic 
democratic ideal is therefore best understood as a version of anarchism.
Only the anarchist ideal fully embodies the democratic notion of political teleology; 
placing the political power to determine what happens to a community into the hands 
of the community itself, not a hierarchy of powerful leaders, and requiring the active 
involvement and agreed consent of all affected citizens within all aspects of political 
life; providing each individual with the freedom and autonomy to both set their own 
political agenda, and participate in its enactment, both as individuals and members of 
a shared community. Further still, it is only within the small-scale autonomous 
communities of a federated anarchism that genuine direct democracy is a viable 
possibility and the plurality of reasonable comprehensive ‘thick’ moral doctrines can 
meaningfully flourish; the federal system ensuring a connected accountability of 
overlapping consensus and solidarity regarding the ‘thin’ universal contract which 
informs them all.
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As we have already seen, the anarchists do not reject the idea of order or binding 
agreement, but only those orders and agreements coercively enforced by enduring and 
unquestionable structures of external authority. Whilst anarchism certainly prohibits 
the creation of enduring external structures of political power claiming sole authority 
over the decisions of people and communities; the idea of a community’s autonomy 
and self-rule does not expressly prohibit the idea of some sorts of formal organization 
(such as a direct-democratic decision-making system for determining group choices), 
nor even of establishing some sorts of limited ‘authority’ (such as a federal 
representative for the community in question) to hold responsibility for carrying out 
certain pre-defined tasks. By this measure, the democratic operation of each 
community within the federation is quite clear -  through voluntary arrangement and 
participatory discourse the community itself will decide how it will be organized. At 
the national level, if  issues needed to be discussed in a wider context, then 
representatives from each autonomous community could meet up at a federal level to 
discuss them. Representative democracy in such circumstances differs from its 
current incarnation in two vital ways: firstly, being autonomously unbound and 
committed to this reasonable pluralism, if the decision made at the federal level was, 
for compelling reasons, not acceptable to the communities at the local level, or in 
some way violated the underlying ethical contract, then they could still refuse to 
comply with that decision so long as their own actions remain within the parameters 
of ‘thin’ ethical acceptability. Secondly, the chosen representative, being an equal 
and participating member of their local community democracy and thus also 
accountable to that local group, rather than a detached and removed career politician 
with their own self-interest in maintaining a certain balance of power, would 
genuinely be able to represent the particular views of that community, rather than
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simply being a representative-of-best-fit for them. Importantly, with such societies 
being specifically small-scale and, by design, democratically manageable, the 
representative would be capable of acquiring a legitimate understanding of their 
whole community’s needs, instead of just a vague generalized account of a limited 
sampling of its members.
The same process can be extended to the international level, with an accountable 
representative (or representatives) chosen from the national level coordinating with 
similar representatives from other nations to create a global federal system of 
international discourse capable of reaching mutual agreement where necessary.
Such radical restructuring of political life could make possible an equally radical 
transformation in the structure of human employment. An economy based on human 
need and the needs of the community who created it, rather that the pursuit of endless 
private profit, would be one that ensured that individuals did not have to sacrifice the 
majority of their existence to the artificially necessitated task of ‘earning a living’, and 
an economy structured to facilitate unimpeded access and procurement of essential 
material goods could do just that.
There is no objectively necessary reason that the necessities of living have a 
financial price put upon them other than ideologically grounded theories of human 
motivation which assume hard work will not be done unless a profit can be earned. 
Though that might arguably be true of human motivation in a society which imposes a 
dependency on obtaining money for survival, it is not so clear that a different set of 
social circumstances would not nurture the same sorts of motivation in people through 
other means.
Whilst under the current economic set-up money certainly motivates, having long 
been established as the object of ultimate social value and the key to access for
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everything else one might need (including the freedom that comes with having 
enough of it to no longer have to waste one’s life in the process of earning it); this 
value exists only because of the contingencies of a specific economic system. 
Although certainly a person might be motivated to work hard, say, on a farm, to 
provide food to people other than themselves and their immediate family because of 
the allure of monetary reward; they might also be motivated to work on a farm to 
provide food to people other than themselves and their immediate family if such work 
were enjoyable, engaging, and took up only a few hours of their day. Further still, if 
given the choice of working within an economic system of purely financial 
compensation that condemns one to a life-consuming career as a farmer with little or 
no time left for anything else in their lives; or of working within a system of no 
financial reward nor monetary profit, but where one’s choosing to work for a few 
hours each day for free on a farm, alongside other similarly voluntary workers doing 
the same thing, guarantees themselves, their community, and anyone else who needs 
it, a free supply of food and other essential items at all times without the need for a 
life-consuming career; it is not a priori obvious that the first option is any more 
appealing or motivating than the second.
Whereas right now, under life-consuming conditions of employment, money is 
valued as being a means to the ends of our species-interests, if the ends themselves 
were offered as compensation for one’s voluntary, free, and minimal contribution to 
the general productivity of society, then the ends themselves -  free-time, free access 
to essential material goods, time spent with friends and family, ability to pursue non­
work interests, etc - would be just as valued and just as motivating as money is now.
Alongside the formal restructuring of employment under a new economy, the 
practical restructuring of the nature of work itself could also be liberated from
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contemporary hierarchical systems of alienating and self-estranging power, with the 
direct democratic practices of politics brought into the workplace too. The 
illegitimacy of needless external authorities who become obstacles to human 
fulfillment in politics, must logically be extended into all other areas of life and 
inform all other institutional structures with the same principles of free agreement and 
egalitarianism. Instead of employers and employees, places of work can become 
cooperatively organized as a mutually beneficial group-project. With work no longer 
done to generate limitless profits and thus with a mind only to maximize productivity, 
detached task-masters would no longer be needed, turning the working environment 
into a communal enterprise between people seeking to achieve a freely agreed upon 
and reciprocal goal rather than the self-interested organization of privileged owners 
exploiting others through the continual threat of their unemployment; furthering 
individual happiness and improving the quality of life for all.
Again, this is not to say that, when needed, certain individuals cannot be elected 
ostensible ‘leaders’, ‘bosses’, or ‘supervisors’ to serve some clear and agreed upon 
functional purpose within the workplace. The difference is that the authority given to 
such individuals would be given only on a reciprocal agreement and understanding 
between the authority figure and the fellow workers who have bestowed it -  a micro 
social contract balancing the gift of authority with legitimating obligations that make 
it accountable to the ultimate authority of the entire cooperative. As Bob Black put it, 
‘what I really want to see is work turned into play... under a system of permanent
' j n ' i
revelry... there won’t be any more jobs, just things to do and people to do them.’
At bottom, one thing is clear: capitalism, in its current form, appears incompatible 
with the ethical obligations of its legitimating teleology, and so an alternative would
273 Black, B, 1991. The Abolition o f Work: Revised Pamphlet (Loompanics Unlimited; Washington)
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have to be found. The benefit of the anarchist system over any others is that it 
provides the necessary room for experimentation within its organizational framework 
of principled autonomy, so that radical alternatives can be pursued without the 
assorted obstacles of more systemic structures. It is this same benefit which trumps 
its democratic potency over that of any other democratic form -  by bridging the gap 
between a people and its government and placing political power directly into the 
hands of the people themselves, there is no greater guarantee that the political reality 
of each individual community will facilitate the true needs and interests of its own 
self-governing citizens, whilst simultaneously ensuring the protection and observance 
of the universal species-interests of all; both because the community itself will be in 
charge of its own destiny, but also because the climate of increased political 
participation and engagement will bring with it more political and social awareness, 
both as individuals, and regarding the ‘plurality, connection and finitude’ of action 
affecting others.
Still, the endorsement of anarchism as the only ethically legitimate form of political 
power is a big step, and would ultimately require a momentous level of change and 
transformation in the world of both its politics and its people. Thus far, the contention 
that contemporary democracy is incapable of fulfilling the political teleology of the 
authentic democratic ideal; is exactly that: a contention. Although I believe that I 
have shown several theoretical problems with what the ethical contract of legitimate 
politics demands of authentic democracy, and how the various compromises that have 
been made to that authentic ideal in contemporary capitalist representative 
democracies have impeded its ability to meet them; at this stage our investigation has 
remained largely speculative and hypothetical. If I am right about what I have been 
arguing, then its significance is considerable, for it would imply that not only are our
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current democratic political systems largely undemocratic, but that they are arguably 
illegitimate. If that were proven; then, and only then, would it appear justifiable to 
call for the massive upheaval of current socio-political structures that an endorsement 
of anarchism would require.
The prospects for capitalist representative democracy’s capability of protecting and 
fulfilling the species-interests of its citizens may seem theoretically bleak right now, 
but its incumbent existence and historical endurance still gives it an advantage over 
the purely theoretical possibilities for anarchism. Although I have repeatedly stated 
that political reality is changeable, for such change to occur a will to change must first 
exist; for without that will the mere possibility is not enough. As Proudhon reminded 
us earlier, ‘the ideal is but a flower, whose root lies in the material conditions of 
existence’, and perhaps the authentic ideal of democracy may never be possible in 
political reality, despite its theoretical possibility, simply because the material 
conditions of existence have removed from those of us living in them the sufficient 
will necessary to achieve such grand ideals.
If that is so, and the account of political legitimacy which we have constructed, 
though interesting, can never be reached, then perhaps out of the myriad of even more 
illegitimate alternatives available, the existing variant of democracy is just the best of 
a bad bunch, imperfect, but manageable? Is Tom Athanasiou right when he says that 
‘our tragedy lies in the richness of the available alternatives and in the fact that so few 
of them are ever seriously explored’274 or is George Monbiot closer to the truth when 
he laments that ‘it is the unhappy lot of human kind that an attempt to develop a least- 
worst system emerges as the highest ideal for which we can strive’?
274 Athanasiou in: Danaher, K, 1996. Corporations are Gonna Get Your Mama, p. 199. (Common 
Courage Press; Maine)
275 Monbiot, G, 2003. The Age o f Consent, p. 41. (Harper Collins; London)
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The only way of fully assessing the legitimacy of currently existing democratic 
structures is to turn our enquiry now away from the purely theoretical and instead take 
a deeper look into the actual empirical reality of capitalist representative democracy 
and see then, all hypothetical ideals aside, if at least some basic standard of 
teleological satisfaction of universal species-interests can be obtained within such a 
framework of political power.
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4. The Illegitimacy of Capitalist Representative Democracy.
‘We are experiencing accelerating social and environmental disintegration in 
nearly every country o f  the world -  as revealed by a rise in poverty, 
unemployment, inequality, violent crime, failing families, and environmental 
deterioration...The continued quest for economic growth as the organizing 
principle ofpublic policy is accelerating the breakdown o f the ecosystem’s 
regenerative capacities and the social fabric that sustains human community; at 
the same time it is intensifying the competitions for resources between rich and 
poor -  a competition the poor invariably lose. ’
- David Korten, When Corporations Rule The World276
4.1: Capitalism and Ideology 1: Corporate Obstacles, Democracy and Education
Knowing now the full terms of political teleology, and thus the necessary obligations 
required by the justificatory contract of a legitimate structure of political power 
towards its otherwise autonomous citizens; I shall now attempt to determine, through 
some more empirical analysis of these ideas in practice, whether or not the capitalist 
representative democracies that already exist in the world today, successfully protect 
and fulfill the species-interests of their citizens as they should; if not completely, then 
at least to some acceptably minimum standard. I shall concentrate this analysis 
around the British and American examples as both countries are major architects of 
capitalist representative democracy, from which all other such systems gain their 
blueprint.
276 Korten, D, 2001. When Corporations Rule the World, 2nd edition, p. 21. (Kumarian Press; San 
Francisco)
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At first glance, the prognosis looks bleak. We have already discussed the growing 
levels of poverty and financial inequality caused by such a system, as well as the 
species-interest violating structures of employment which are a signature of capitalist 
representative democracies. With the World Health Organization reporting a 60% 
increase in global suicide rates between 1955 and the year 2000,277 the idea that such 
unfulfilling life circumstances might lead to high levels of individual and communal 
misery becomes no longer speculative. Indeed, with suicide now being one of the 
three leading causes of death amongst men and women aged 15-44 years of age, it 
seems that the ‘quality of life’ promised to citizens by the justificatory contract which 
legitimates their political system’s authority is far from being fulfilled. But rising 
levels of suicide are not the only indicator we have for growing levels of 
discontentment within such societies.
In the UK alone, the number of ‘alcohol-related deaths’ per year have more than 
doubled between 1991 and 2005 (from 4,144 people in 1991 to 8,386 in 2005)278; 
with a rising trend in ‘binge drinking’ (defined by the UK Office for National 
Statistics and British Medical Association as drinking eight or more ‘units’ of alcohol 
for men, or six or more ‘units’ for a women, on at least one day in the week and ‘often
97Qassociated with drinking with the intention of becoming intoxicated’ ). Meanwhile, 
the British Crime Survey shows that in 2001/2002, 26% of all sixteen to twenty-nine 
year olds questioned in England, 14.5 % of the same age-range in Wales, and 17% of 
that group in Scotland used illegal drugs;280 whilst in 2004, 25% of British adults 
regularly smoked (and of the 500,755 deaths of adults aged 35 and over, an estimated
277 SUPRE (World Health Organization initiative for the prevention of suicide press release: 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suicideprevent/en/print.html (accessed: 13/07/08)
278 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID= 1091 &Pos=&ColRank= 1 &Rank=374 (accessed 
01/02/07)
279 http://www.bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/Content/Hubhotpbingedrinking (accessed 01/02/07)
280 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D7806.xls (accessed 01/02/07)
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88,800 of them were caused by smoking). In 2005, 9% of children aged 11-15 
reported that they were regular smokers.281
It should be noted, these statistics suffer from the usual pitfalls of statistical research: 
the numbers are dictated by only those instances which are reported and admitted to 
(which, especially in the case of illegal substance abuse, is not likely to be a complete 
picture). In reality, the numbers are likely to be much higher; but even at the 
conservative levels given by the official figures, we can see a large -  though by no 
means majority -  percentage of the UK population are heavily involved with regularly 
using, arguably escapist, stimulants and narcotics in their lives. And these are only 
the citizens engaging in ‘problematic’ behaviour (drinking too much, or using illegal 
drugs rather than the litany of legal mood-enhancing drugs); there are many, many 
more who regularly drink alcohol without ‘binging’ on it, but still use it as a quick-fix 
route to a feeling of happiness they are incapable of achieving without it; whilst, 
according to government statistics, between 1991 and 2001 alone, the instances of 
legally prescribed anti-depressant drugs in the United Kingdom increased 
dramatically from nine million a year in 1991 to twenty-four million a decade later. 
Even without the use of stimulants and narcotics, according to Broadcasters’ 
Audience Research Board, just under twenty-six million domestic UK households 
owned television sets in 2007,283 with the average individual watching between
1 Q A  f
twenty-two to twenty-eight hours of television per week. By our earlier estimate of 
each person having just six hours and fifty minutes a day of free-time, this means that
281 http://www.ic.nhs.uk/pubs/smokingeng2006 (accessed 01/02/07)
282 Social Trends 33, Annual Report, 2003:
https://www.eustatistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Product.asp?vlnk=r9917&More=Y (accessed 05/02/07)
283 http://www.barb.co.uk/tvfacts. cfm?fullstory=true&includepage=ownership&flag=tvfacts (accessed 
01/02/07)
284
http://www.barb.co.uk/viewingsumm ary/trendreports.cfin?report=hours&requesttimeout=500«feflag:=vi 
ewingsummary (accessed 01/02/07)
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many individuals living in Great Britain spend up to twenty-eight of their total forty- 
eight hours of weekly free-time simply watching TV.
There are many other forms of easily available escapism, and one must ask, when so 
much of a person’s day is spent working, or in the related service of one’s work; why 
this limited free-time available is not being cherished and utilized in fulfilling and 
productive ways, and is instead being spent by so many people to indulge in various 
methods of avoiding the real world.
Even more worrying, are the statistics from a survey conducted by the British 
Department of Health in 2004 that showed one in ten children aged between five and 
sixteen in the country already has a clinically recognisable mental health disorder. 
Indeed, Oliver James, analysing a recent WHO study, has shown quite conclusively 
that citizens, of all ages, living in those developed industrial nations described as 
‘selfish capitalist’ in their neoliberal economic structures, suffer from notably higher
986rates of ‘emotional distress’ and psychological disorder than those who do not.
This is not a happy picture of a truly fulfilled humanity living the ‘better’ lives 
promised to them by the social contract they hold with their governments; it is already 
a picture of a people in turmoil -  depressed, suicidal, and desperate to escape from 
their lives. Yet one would think that in a supposed democracy, where policies ought 
always to be determined only by the needs of their citizens, such a populace would 
have elected to change things by now if  they were that bad; to solve whatever the 
problems are that are causing them such mental anguish and despondency?
If life were really so unbearable for these citizens, why have they not managed to 
communicate that to their leaders through the ballot?
285 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=1229&Pos=&ColRank=2&Rank=224 (accessed 
05/02/07)
286 James, O, 2008. The Selfish Capitalist: Origins ofAffluenza, (Vermillion; London); James, O,
2007. Affluenza, (Vermillion; London).
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We have already touched upon some major flaws in the applied practice of capitalist 
representative democracy vis-a-vis the demands of authentic democracy; discussing 
the problems of superficiality and generalization that come with the representation of 
so many by so few, as well as the increasing potential for electoral participation to 
become reduced to a series of empty procedures. But what each of these objections to 
capitalist representative democracy ultimately boil down to, is a more fundamental 
claim, starkly illustrated in this growing tendency towards escapism rather than 
striving for change in real life: that the available forms of political representation on 
offer within our ostensible democracies, do not necessarily reflect the actual views of 
the people they are meant to represent; leaving representative democracy of this sort 
incapable of fulfilling its justificatory task, and bereft of any recognizable connection 
to democracy’s authentic ideal.
Some might argue that this conclusion is too strong. Pluralist and corporatist 
sociologists like Dahl, Johnson, Beer, and Smith, have all looked into the various 
ways in which people’s voices still can be heard under current conditions through
9517 • ♦lobbying, pressure groups, economic influence, and NGOs. But I think it must be
noted that these concessions to democracy, no matter what their potential to be
effective, are exactly that: concessions. They are not the rule, but the exception;
288loopholes in accepted protocol where, with a lot of struggle, certain ‘outsider’ 
interest groups can manage to raise their voices loud enough to be heard. They are by 
no means the driving force of our political institutions though, nor a guarantee that 
each and every citizen living within a representative democracy shall be sufficiently 
represented. Indeed, their impact does not come easily or often, and these grassroots
287 Baggot, 1995. Pressure Groups Today. (Manchester University Press; Manchester); Smith, M,
1993. Pressure, Power and Policy. (Harvester Wheatsheaf; New York); Jones, B, et al, 2001. Politics 
UK, p. 224. (Pearson Education Limited; Harlow)
288 Grant, W, 1989. Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain. (Phillip Allan; Hemel 
Hempstead)
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movements can take years to finally ‘earn’ the ears of the political institutions 
supposedly representing them; years where the issue for which they seek political 
action continues unabated, and often years wherein the initial position of the group 
becomes so watered down, that by the time they do gain their political influence, their 
compromised goals are almost unrecognizable from the group’s original intentions.
Even with the existence of these small concessions though, the logistics of finding 
appropriate political influence to properly represent one’s position remains only the 
surface problem for a citizen seeking genuine representation in modem democracies. 
The more substantive obstacle in contemporary capitalist society that stands in the 
way of authentic democratic representation lies deeper than that. It lies in the power 
of ideological manipulation, and the question of who shapes the views of the citizenry 
in the first place.
Recalling Bachrach and Baratz’s critique of traditional power theories, and their 
important conclusions that power, at its most dangerous, can work at ‘creating or 
reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of 
the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are 
comparatively innocuous to’ it;289 and Lukes’ claim that ‘the most effective and 
insidious use of power’290 is to prevent the clashes of interest and conflict that could 
threaten it from ever arising; the extent of ideological control in contemporary 
capitalist representative democracies has been frankly stated by Bemays: ‘those who 
manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government 
which is the tme mling power’.291
‘Ideology’ was a concept first coined by Tracy in the late eighteenth century, but it 
was Marx and Engels who began to use the term as it is more conventionally
289 In Lukes, S, 2005, Power: A Radical View, 2nd Edition, p. 20. (Palgrave Macmillan; Basingstoke)
290 Ibid., p. 27
291 Bemays, E, 2005, Propaganda, p. 37. (Ig Publishing; New York)
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understood today -  as a distortion of reality employed by the powerful to propagate 
certain false perspectives to the masses in order to create a worldview that quells 
dissention and ensures their consent and acquiescence to a certain elite political 
agenda that may well go against their true best interests.
As Porter explains,
we are, Marx and Engels want to argue, inevitably caught up in ideology to the extent 
that we remain essentially unconscious o f  the fact that the real material conditions o f  
social life...actually shape how w e think, conceive, feel and ultimately act... Marx and 
Engels stress the importance o f  econom ic class relations, and, in particular, the power 
and influence o f  the ruling or dominant class in modem capitalist society...to  
disseminate and rationalize ideas that are tailored to suit their economic or material 
interests. In this way, then, the function o f  ideology is to give intellectual, moral and 
political currency to a deliberately distorted vision o f  social reality that ensures the 
dominance o f  specific class interests.292
As rational and thinking agents, human beings have ideas, and those ideas are shared 
and disseminated to others, often in the hope that those shared ideas shall be 
persuasive enough to be held as ‘true’ by those who hear them -  but not all shared or 
persuasive ideas can be meaningfully defined as ideologies. An ideological thought 
must be made distinctive from everyday persuasiveness and agreement, by 
recognizing it as a thought which is overtly contrary to the actual facts of reality, but 
held and perpetuated as real nonetheless; not as a result of reason or compelling 
argument, but merely by unquestioning commitment, either consciously or 
unconsciously, to an unsubstantiated theoretical agenda.
292 Porter, R, 2006. Ideology: Contemporary Social, Political and Cultural Theory, p. 4. (University of 
Wales Press; Cardiff)
Some ideology theorists, such as Ricoeur or Freeden, would deny the very existence 
of an ideology-free ‘reality’, but as Porter reminds us, ‘a critique of ideology is 
actually impossible to mount or maintain without intuitively relying on something like 
a non-ideological or pre-ideological real.’293 Whilst I shall concede that a reality 
completely free of any kind of interpretation at all would be difficult to defend, I think 
that to therefore define all interpretation as ideological is misguided. As I said earlier, 
to speak of the facts of how the world is, will always require some sort of evaluative 
interpretation, but so long as the evaluation is based on as much valid evidence as 
possible then it is fair to say, to the best of one’s knowledge, that something is the 
case. Non-ideological reality, therefore, is simply to be understood as that objectively 
derived empirical reality justifiably known about the world, to the best of our 
knowledge, when it is stripped of all of unsubstantiated interpretations and established 
only via well supported evidence. In other words, it is the same sort of reality 
appealed to throughout the constructivist approach that I have been utilizing.
In our present argument, therefore, we shall understand ideology as the conscious or 
unconscious manipulation and obfuscating of objectively known facts in order to 
perpetuate a specific and false  understanding of the world which suits the specific 
interests and goals of a particular powerful group or person.
I say conscious or wwconscious because the most successful use of ideology is not 
always that which is explicitly and overtly thrown at a population by its leaders, but 
rather an ideology which has largely become internalized as normality by a citizenry -  
an ideology that not only goes unquestioned, but unnoticed.
WTiat might once have begun as overt manipulation by ideologues attempting to 
massage public opinion in a certain direction becomes most successful when it breaks
293 Ibid., p. 132
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free of its elite origins and becomes a self-perpetuating perspective, possessed and 
repeated by the masses themselves without any real awareness that what they have 
before them is a deliberately obscured version of the truth.
Such an all-encompassing hegemonic ideology was most notably analysed by 
Gramsci.
Ideological hegemony could be exercised by a dominant class...not only through 
exerting state force but through various cultural means. Gramsci shifted ideology away 
from being solely a tool of the state. Ideology operated and was produced by civil 
society, the sphere of non-state individual and group activity.. .intellectuals surfaced as 
the major formulators and conductors of ideology and as non-govemmental leaders 
wielding cultural authority. Their permeation of social life was characteristically based 
on the manufacturing of consent among the population at large, so that the masses 
would regard their own assent as spontaneous. That process of forming consent -  
which Gramsci termed leadership as distinct from domination -  necessarily preceded, 
and paved the way for, the dominance wielded through governmental power. Gramsci 
was therefore inclined to sharpen the distinction between ideology as a more conscious 
creation for its producers, and a more unconscious one for its consumers.294
Essentially, what Gramsci tells us is that ideology is not just a one-way system of 
communication, where ideologues repeat distortion after distortion and trick the 
masses into believing it. It is much more devious than that. What begins as overt 
propaganda soon becomes repeated, often innocently, by others; becoming 
internalized and institutionalised until soon these propagated norms and ideas, heard 
so uniformly by many, are forwarded as fact into the national discourse, first to and
294 Freeden, M, 2003, Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, pp., 19-20. (Oxford University Press; 
Oxford)
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then by the citizens themselves. Soon this ideological perspective of reality -  
perpetuated unwittingly within the very culture of a society -  becomes an accepted 
and self-replicating ‘truth’.
What is important to note is that such manipulation does not have to come from the 
mouths of that ruling government itself, but rather, once the appropriate seeds have 
been sown, will generate organically from within the population at large. Indeed, 
dissemination in this way is necessary for such manipulation to work effectively 
within a democratic system because, unlike those totalitarian political enterprises 
usually associated with the practice of propaganda, structures of democratic political 
power do not have available the means of force and violence to assure ideological 
conformity in their citizens, nor would a democratic leader last long if they overtly 
tried.
Of course, ideological control and the aims of democracy seem at first glance to be 
the antithesis of each other; the former a complete violation of the freedoms and 
public sovereignty implied by the latter. But when one considers the significant levels 
of class conflict we have already documented lying at the very root of the democratic 
idea, then, the idea of such propaganda being used by political authorities within a 
democracy to control their citizens, should not be too surprising. When ‘men of best 
quality’ are forced to concede the power they believe to be theirs by right, to a ‘rascal 
multitude’ they consider incapable and undeserving, it is not beyond the realm of 
possibility to presume that certain tactical strategies might be undertaken to maintain 
the privileges they stand to lose.
As the very premise of democracy depends on a free citizenry though, who are 
deemed as the ultimate source of all political power, any coercion of that citizenry, if 
undertaken, must be a coercion that is effectively hidden from their view; a
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manipulation performed so cunningly that the ideas and opinions generated by such 
means would appear completely natural; perceived and repeated as the entirely 
spontaneous and autonomous beliefs of the individual citizens themselves.
Whilst the political power offered to citizens by democratic enfranchisement can be 
a significant route to self-governance, alone, it is not enough to constitute complete 
political control of their lives. As Dahl explains,
Because o f  inequalities in political resources, some citizens gain significantly more
influence than others over the government’s policies, decisions, and
actions.. .Consequently, citizens are not political equals -  far from it -  and thus the
moral foundation o f  democracy, political equality among citizens, is seriously
violated.295
Political power is largely economic, and under twenty-first century capitalism, 
economic power is split with great international disparity between a hugely wealthy 
minority and an impoverished majority. Further still; significant amounts of 
economic power are held not simply by individuals or countries, but in the collective 
coffers of abstract, multinational, corporations.
First created in the early years o f the American republic; David Korten explains how 
‘much of America’s history has been shaped by a long and continuing struggle for 
sovereignty between people and corporations’.296 In their early stages, corporations 
were a way within the burgeoning new capitalist economy to ‘combine the capital,
295 Dahl, R, 2000. On Democracy, p. 178. (Yale University Press; New Haven)
296 Korten, D, 2001. When Corporations Rule the World, 2nd edition, p.61. (Kumarian Press; San 
Francisco)
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and thus the economic power, of unlimited numbers of people.’297 They were created 
only through government issued charters and strictly guarded. As Korten explains,
The corporations that were chartered were kept under watchful citizen and 
governmental control. The power to issue corporate charters was retained by 
the individual states rather than being given to the federal government so that 
it would remain as close as possible to citizen control. Many provisions were 
included in corporate charters and related laws that limited use o f the 
corporate vehicle to amass excessive personal power.298
But this strict guardianship soon ended as ‘gradually...corporations gained sufficient 
control over key state legislative bodies to virtually rewrite the laws governing their 
own creation.’299 Eventually, in 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that a private 
corporation should be legally recognised as a person, and, following the decision, 
repeated Supreme Court rulings helped strengthen corporate rights and weaken the 
controls put in place by local communities and governments at their inception, 
essentially weakening the power of those citizens in the face of the growing 
collectivist power of these expanding corporate structures.
The subsequent claim by corporations that they have the same right as any 
individual to influence the government in their own interest pits the 
individual citizen against the vast financial and communications resources o f
297 Bakan, J, 2004. The Corporation, p. 8. (Constable and Robinson; London)
298 Korten, D, 2001. When Corporations Rule the World, 2nd edition, p. 63. (Kumarian Press; San 
Francisco)
299 Ibid., p. 65
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the corporation and mocks the constitutional intent that all citizens have an 
equal voice in the political debates surrounding important issues.300
After the Second World War, this mass domestic deregulation became international 
deregulation. In July of 1941, memorandum E-B34 issued to the president and State 
Department, outlined the idea of a post-war economic ‘Grand Area’ consisting of the 
UK, remaining British commonwealth and empire nations, the Dutch East Indies, 
China and Japan, dominated by the U.S. both economically and militarily and 
regulated by U.S.-dominated global financial institutions ostensibly to stabilize 
currencies and enable the investment of capital into underdeveloped regions.301
As the war’s end drew near, in July of 1944, elite representatives of forty-four 
nations gathered together in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to reach an agreement 
on how this post-war global economy would work and decided upon an institutional 
framework that created the World Bank, and International Monetary Fund, as well as 
establish the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, which would eventually evolve 
into the World Trade Organization in 1995. All of these institutions were autonomous 
of, and separate from, both the United Nations and their member-states, and all of 
them were essentially business institutions.
After the war, the U.S.-dominated World Bank and IMF ‘in their capacity as 
international receivers.. .imposed packages of policy prescriptions on indebted nations 
under the rubric of structural adjustment’, with each structural adjustment package 
calling for ‘sweeping economic policy reforms intended to channel more of the 
adjusted country’s resources and productive activity toward debt repayment, privatize 
public assets and services, and further open national economies to the global
economy.’ If desperate countries needed the money, they had no choice but to do 
what they were told and deregulate protections to allow foreign corporations into their 
countries.
As Susan George points out,
If the goals o f  official debt managers were to squeeze the debtors dry, to 
transfer enormous resources from South to North and to wage undeclared war 
on the poor continents and their people, then their policies have been an 
unqualified success. If, however, their strategies were intended -  as these 
institutions always claim -  to promote development beneficial to all members 
o f society, to preserve the planet’s unique environment and gradually to 
reduce the debt burden itself, then their failure is easily demonstrated.303
George describes a ‘debt boomerang’ that the World Bank and IMF created through 
their promotion of corporate interests over human interests, a boomerang of effects in 
the West, (such as environmental destruction, drugs, massive costs to taxpayers, lost 
jobs, immigration pressures, and heightened conflict and war) caused by neoliberal 
policies forced on the developing world. Meanwhile due to Article XVI in the GATT 
agreement that created the WTO during its Uruguay round in 1994, which states that 
‘each member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed agreements’,304 WTO 
member countries can now ‘challenge any law of another member country that it 
believes deprives it of the benefits it expected to receive from the new trade rules.
This includes virtually any law that requires imported goods to meet local or national
302 Ibid., p. 163
303 George, S, 1992. The Debt Boomerang, pp., xiii-xiv. (Pluto Press; London)
304 http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf (accessed: 07/02/08)
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health, safety, labour, or environmental standards that exceed WTO-accepted 
international standards.’ In other words, no matter what laws a democratic 
government might put in place, the immense power of transnational capitalist 
corporations and the institutions they control can reject these laws and demand that 
they change if they are considered a barrier to trade, with any appeal to such rulings 
performed in secret and presented to a panel of three anonymous judges selected by 
the WTO itself.
As a result of this clear and defined plan put in place since Bretton Woods to 
globalise the world’s economy and open up the world’s markets to a U.S. dominated 
corporate system, the corporation has become an effectively stateless legal unit with 
more political and financial power than any individual citizen or nation and all the 
rights of a human ‘person’, operating across national borders and influencing both 
domestic and international laws through the transnational business organizations 
corporate architects have created, and trade ‘liberalizing’ treaties such as NAFTA, 
GATS, and TRIPS, with few constraints and little accountability over their actions.
In a 2004 study of the corporation’s destructive influence within modem 
democracies, Joel Bakan conducted a simple test on this all-pervasive institution. 
Recognizing that the corporation ‘remains, as it was at the time of its origins as a 
modem business institution in the middle of the nineteenth century, a legally 
designated “person”’306, he decided to treat it as such and see what kind of a ‘person’ 
this powerful and dominant institution in our lives actually is? Asking the 
psychologist, Robert Hare, to ‘apply his diagnostic checklist of psychopathic
305 Korten, D, 2001. When Corporations Rule the World, 2nd edition, p. 167. (Kumarian Press; San 
Francisco)
306 Bakan, J, 2004. The Corporation, p. 28. (Constable and Robinson; London)
233
traits...to the corporation’s institutional character, he found there was a close 
match.’307
The corporation is singularly  self-interested and unable to feel genuine 
concern for others in any context...The corporation is irresponsible, Dr. Hare 
said, because “in an attempt to satisfy the corporate goal, everybody else is 
put at risk.” Corporations try to “manipulate everything, including public 
opinion,” and they are grandiose , always insisting “that we’re number one, 
we’re the best.” A lack o f  em pathy and asocial tendencies are also key 
characteristics of the corporation, says Hare -  “their behaviour indicates they 
don’t really concern themselves with their victims”; and corporations often 
refuse to accept responsibility fo r  their own actions and are unable to fe e l 
remorse: “if [corporations] get caught [breaking the law], they pay big fines 
and they.. .continue doing what they did before anyway. And in fact in many 
cases the fines and the penalties paid by the organization are trivial compared 
to the profits that they rake in.”
Finally, according to Dr. Hare, corporations relate to others superficia lly-  
“their whole goal is to present themselves to the public in a way that is 
appealing to the public [but] in fact may not be representative of what th[e] 
organization is really like.308
And yet the psychopathic corporation rem ains the prevailing econom ic institution o f 
our time and, as a result o f  its m assive econom ic power, a prevailing political 
institution, capable o f  underm ining dem ocratically endorsed laws and regulations both
307 Ibid., pp., 56-57
308 ibid
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minor and major, and influencing our perceptions and assumptions about the world in 
which we live.
When the historical ‘men of best quality’ in revolutionary England worried about the 
‘rascal multitude’ getting too much democratic power, they worried not only about 
losing their authority, but, crucially, their property. Chomsky reminds us that framers 
of the American constitution were similarly concerned about the transition to 
democracy being able to ‘protect the minority of the opulent against the majority’.309 
When one considers the impotence of procedural political power in the face of the 
concentrated economic power found within modem capitalist democracies, it appears 
that the way chosen to allay such concerns is clear, and consisted of two concomitant 
elements: the ‘rascal multitude’ would be given just enough power to feel 
democratized, but not enough to cause any real damage to the established systems of 
control; and corporate entities would be created and empowered as the Trojan horse 
of the ongoing class war.
Knowing full well that in a capitalist system true political power would always still 
be held by those with the most economic might; the realm of formal politics was 
finally allowed to be infiltrated by the ‘rascal multitude’, but this extension of the 
franchise was a hollow and empty gesture, made whilst the ‘men of best quality’ 
quietly slipped away to concentrate more fully on their finances, and thus their 
enduring source of real political power. Indeed, regarding specifically the particular 
form o f ‘selfish capitalism’ advanced through neoliberal economic theory since the 
1970s, David Harvey backs up this claim regarding our present circumstances. After 
the second world war, there was not only a ‘political threat to economic elites and 
ruling classes everywhere’ found in the persistent ‘conjoining of labour and urban
309 James Madison in: Chomsky, N, 2006. Failed States, p. 207. (Hamish Hamilton; London)
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social movements throughout much of the advanced capitalist world’ (movements 
which grew increasingly discontented as rising unemployment and inflation plagued 
their lives in the 1970s); but also an ‘economic threat to the position of ruling elites 
and classes.. .One condition of the post-war settlement in almost all countries was that 
the economic power of the upper classes be restrained and that labour be accorded a 
much larger share of the economic pie.’310
Neoliberalism, Harvey argues, was the theoretical foundation for restoring a 
diminishing class power shaken by two world wars. The weakened ruling classes, 
through the philosophy of neoliberalism, undermined the sorts of Keynesian social 
welfare projects that had helped erode their dominance, transforming the cultural 
attitudes that had supported the post-war consensus, and giving intellectual 
justification for the privatization of basic social goods and services, under the 
questionable, but highly appealing, conjecture that the free-market meant real 
freedom.
The evidence of a concerted attempt by economic elites to perpetuate this specific 
economic ideology is irrefutable. Through various professional organizations, 
members of the business classes of America spent nearly $900 million annually, 
throughout the 1970s and beyond, actively promoting the neoliberal agenda via think- 
tanks, academia, books, television, schools, churches, and other media outlets, in a 
concerted effort to saturate both the general public and other forgers of popular 
opinion with the image of neoliberalism as the economic solution to all the world’s 
problems.311
As Harvey explains,
310 Harvey, D, 2007. A Brief History o f Neoliberalism, p. 15. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
311 Ibid., pp., 43-44
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An open project around the restoration of economic power to a small elite would 
probably not gain much popular support. But a programmatic attempt to advance the 
cause of individual freedoms could appeal to a mass base and so disguise the drive to 
restore class power.. .It has been part of the genius of neoliberal theory to provide a 
benevolent mask full of wonderful-sounding words like freedom, liberty, choice, and 
rights, to hide the grim realities of the restoration or reconstitution of naked class 
power, locally as well as transnationally, but most particularly in the main financial 
centres of global capitalism.312
On the understanding then, that the domain of political power has two necessary 
components essential to it -  both social and economic control -  we can see that within 
a distinctly capitalist system, the inherent conflict between the authentic democratic 
ideal and the entrenched interests of pre-existing power and privilege was never fully 
resolved. Instead of the full transfer of political power from the ‘men of best quality’ 
to the masses that authentic democracy demands, capitalist representative democracy 
ensured that pre-existing power and privilege could still be maintained through 
exclusive possession of economic capital; conceding only one o f the two components 
necessary for political power over to the ‘rascal multitude’.
Being themselves part of the citizenry as well as holders of capital, and thus also 
entitled to their own share of democratic participation as well as their private ability 
for financial influence, the ‘men of best quality’ therefore ended up possessing both 
components necessary for real political power, whilst the masses remained only half­
way there, achieving only a necessary, but not sufficient, victory towards their 
political emancipation.
312 Ibid., p .40 ...p .l 19
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It is in this unresolved conflict at the heart of capitalist representative democracy 
then, that methods of ideological control find their origin; as the interests of powerful 
elites continued to clash with the interests of ordinary citizens a method was found by 
which to coerce acquiescence from those citizens without ever shattering their illusion 
of democratic freedom.
Whilst perhaps once the product of an overt intent, once this capitalist ideology has 
gained hegemony within a society, its assumptions and distortions simply become the 
accepted intellectual currency of everyday life. I have already spoken at length about 
one such widely-held hegemonic assumption: Proudhon’s ‘governmental prejudice’; 
the belief that external structures of political power are a permanent and necessary 
feature of human existence rather than a purpose-built, and ultimately changeable 
synthetic construct we have created for ourselves; but one can find many other deeply 
ingrained ideological assumptions and instances of propagandists manipulation 
underlying even the most basic routines and activities of everyday life.
For instance, all citizens living in UK and U.S. democracies are required by law to 
attend school from an early age. At first look this seems a wonderfully democratic 
notion -  educating the public to give them what Dahl calls the ‘enlightened 
understanding’ necessary for democracy’s proper functioning. But further 
inspection of this universal education reveals that such hyperbole is only a surface 
justification for a school’s real aims within capitalist societies.
There are many ways in which people can be educated, and many ways in which 
knowledge can be shared to captivate, engage and empower a people, but in both the 
UK and the U.S., the prime educational emphasis is on tightly quantifiable testing, 
rather than anything else. Immediately we can ascertain two things from this. Firstly,
313 Dahl, R, 2000. On Democracy, p. 37. (Yale University Press; New Haven)
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that the student is therefore not being taught to learn information for the sole sake of 
gaining knowledge. If the aim was to create thinking, intelligent and empowered 
citizens, the students would not necessarily need to be tested; they would be taught 
why the learning of certain things is important in themselves, and encouraged to 
develop a healthy inquisitive attitude and self-interest in their own education and their 
own questions. Instead, they are taught that they must learn certain preordained (and 
often arbitrary) facts by rote and repetition in preparation for regurgitation at the 
appropriate time or else they will be punished.
Punishment takes the form of either specific disciplinary action, or the long-scarring 
psychological abuse of being told that if you fail a certain test, you will fail your 
course, your year, your schooling, your life. . .the threat of failure instilled in students 
by their teachers to form the second thing that we can ascertain as a real aim of 
contemporary education: obedience.
From their very first day, students are told that they must respect and obey their 
teachers and do what they are told without question, or fear punishment: detentions, 
exclusions, and, ultimately, failure. This respect is not earned as genuine respect 
should be; it is instead expected regardless of whether or not it is deserved, and it is 
exacted not through mutual reciprocity, but through fear; the underlying lesson taught, 
whatever the class: obey your superiors, or fail.
There is no compelling or necessary reason for education to be this way, and there is 
certainly no body of evidence to suggest that it is the only way to educate a 
population, or even the best way,314 but such a system is the best way for capitalist
314 Indeed, experimental educational institutions like Summerhill which reject these conventional 
methods have been proven to work incredibly effectively by both independent adjudicators and 
grudging government inspectors alike. See: Ofsted Report, November, 2007:
http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/reports/pdf/?inspectionNumber=301621 &providerCategoryID= 163 84&fileN 
ame=\\school\\ 124\\s 163_124870_20071129.pdf (accessed: 24/01/08)
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democracies to ensure each young citizen becomes properly indoctrinated into the 
prevailing ideology of the day.
As Bowles and Gintis explained in 1976, the main function of education under 
capitalism is ‘to reproduce the labour force,’ and to do this ‘the schools are destined to 
legitimate inequality, limit personal development to forms compatible with 
submission to arbitrary authority, and aid in the process whereby youth are resigned to
i i f
their fate.’ With the key to getting ahead in school being to listen to the teachers’ 
instructions and obey them without question; those who use their own minds and ask 
questions, don’t adhere to rules, demand individual attention, get things wrong or seek 
better reasons than ‘because you’re told to’ as to why they should do a certain piece of 
work, are told off, punished, and threatened with jeopardizing their entire future if 
they do not learn to conform and obey.
This serves an important ideological function in wider society: do not question 
authority, do as you are told, perform all tasks demanded of you by superiors 
regardless of whether or not you can see their value, assume that you only need to 
know the things that the experts tell you that you need to know, believe as true all 
information given to you by authority sources, and do all of this, even if you think it is 
wrong, out of a crippling fear of failure.
The very idea of ‘failing’ as a person is, of course, a purely ideological construct in 
itself. As Erich Fromm wrote in 1955,
A new question has arisen in modem man’s mind, the question, namely, 
whether “life is worth living,” and correspondingly, the feeling that one’s life 
“is a failure,” or is “a success.” This idea is based on the concept of life as an
315 Bowles, S and Gintis, H, 1976. Schooling in Capitalist America, p. 266. (Routledge and Jegan 
Paul; London)
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enterprise which should show a profit... .This concept is nonsensical. We 
may be happy or unhappy, achieve some aims, and not achieve others; yet 
there is no sensible balance which could show whether life is worth while 
living. Maybe from the standpoint of a balance life is never worth while 
living. It ends necessarily in death; many of our hopes are disappointed; it 
involves suffering and effort; from a standpoint of balance it would seem to 
make more sense not to have been bom at all, or to die in infancy... .Life is a 
unique gift and challenge, not to be measured in terms of anything else, and 
no sensible answer can be given to the question whether it is “worth while” 
living, because the question does not make any sense.316
The ‘failure’ implied by the educational system is not that of failing as a human 
being in any meaningful way, but of failing along the arbitrary and contingent, 
socially constructed parameters o f ‘success’ within that society, i.e. not getting a 
qualification and thus not getting a job; yet despite such a concept of failure being 
‘nonsensical’, it is a failure embedded deep into one’s psychology, and thus the fear 
of such failure becomes the central motivating focus in all students’ actions both in 
school and once out of it.
As the entire process of living becomes repackaged as a grand-scale competition 
between oneself and everybody else, all vying for elusive success in the face of 
failure, any natural solidarity felt between people is eroded away into a highly 
individualist and competitive dog-eat-dog perception that i f  I  do not do all that I  can 
to benefit myself regardless o f  others; I  may lose and others will win. The idea that 
working together cooperatively could mean everyone winning doesn’t even come into 
it, and soon we can begin to understand perhaps what Rousseau meant when he spoke
316 Fromm, E, 2002. The Sane Society, pp., 145-146. (Routledge Classics; London)
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of contemporary society’s ‘corrupting’ influence on our malleable human nature: the 
foundations for Hobbes’ war are not inherent to us, they are taught.
Some theorists, such as Bourdieu, dispute such claims. Although agreeing that 
‘pedagogical processes were certainly the mechanisms adopted by different interest 
groups to reproduce themselves,’ and that ‘the motivation for reproduction was that of 
sustaining the pre-existing distinctions between culturally arbitrary groups’, Bourdieu 
believed that ‘autonomous fields strategically assimilate aspects of other fields in 
order to strengthen their resistance to the absolute threat which other fields might
Oj <7
pose.’ In other words, although there is a social structure attempting to mould and 
reproduce individuals in a particular fashion, ‘nevertheless, free human agents would
■710
devise their own strategies within the framework of the structures’, by which they 
could express an individuality and rebellion of sorts.
Now I would certainly agree with some aspects of that theory; human beings, as we 
have discussed at length, are not passive and obedient drones, awaiting instruction and 
incapable of autonomously rejecting the attempted manipulation of their interests, 
indeed, the body of literature written about the effects of ideology in education would 
not exist if the propaganda were that infallible -  no one would have ever identified it 
to write about it in the first place. That said though, such resistance is rare, and, when 
it does occur, it is importantly still resistance, rather than somebody experiencing the 
intended process of education.
A fitting analogy would be that of advertising. Advertising is unashamed and 
explicit propaganda, wilfully distorting reality into a specific perception aimed at 
glorifying an advertised product and luring the consumer into wanting to buy it. We 
know this. And we also know that for many people, such advertising does not work;
317 Robbins, D, 2006. On Bourdieu, Education and Society, p. 343. (The Bardwell Press; Oxford)
318 Ibid., p. 295
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such individuals resist the commercials and propaganda and devise their own 
strategies within the framework of a world saturated with advertising, to ignore it and 
overcome its attempt at indoctrination.
At the same time though, from sales and marketing statistics we know that many 
more people do not resist such propaganda, and there is a close correlation between 
successful brands and the marketing campaign that went into promoting it into public 
awareness. We know that, despite the resistance of the few, the advertising still 
works on the many, and we also know that the resistance of the few is, although 
possible in anybody with a certain level of self-awareness, an anomaly rather than the 
norm; a concerted effort against indoctrination, rather than the intended effect of the 
advertising they have been exposed to.
Yes, ideological manipulation is not impossible to overcome, and not all of those 
subjected to it will be susceptible to its attempt to distort their way of thinking, but 
these instances of individual rebellion and resistance do not negate the claim that the 
structural and systematic intent of education, albeit for the most part unconsciously 
internalized by its perpetrators as simply ‘how things are done’, is an ideological one.
4.2: Capitalism and Ideology 2: Authentic Democracy and the Media
A wider understanding of ideology, as a dominant hegemonic understanding of the 
world found within all social institutions, not just from specific ideologues, is another 
reason why theories of individual rebellion in education such as Bourdieu’s are too 
simplistic; they do not take into account how the ideological assumptions of the 
classroom are reinforced in all other areas of social life and how a classroom rebellion 
in one instance, does not necessarily translate into a complete rejection of that 
ideology in other areas of life. Ideology through education simply provides the
243
development at a young age of an intellectual framework through which all other 
ideological input is filtered in the future. The ideological assumptions of our 
education become combined with the life-consuming and equally ideological system 
of employment which that education prepares us for; operating in tandem to limit the 
parameters of acceptable thought and activity citizens believe to be realistic or 
possible within their capitalistic society, and creating a wider social culture of 
unquestioning obedience in which more specific methods of propaganda can operate 
effectively.
We began this discussion by questioning the ability of a citizen living within a 
capitalist representative democracy, to truly know what it is that they want their 
political representatives to represent for them. Already then we can see; taught 
ideological assumptions about ‘how things are’ create logical barriers to asking for 
any changes which have been artificially made to seem like impossible demands.
Within these already stifled ideological parameters of thought though, another 
obstacle to political representation occurs: for one to elect a representative 
successfully, one has to understand fully both what it is that they want represented 
and whether or not the representative in question concurs with their view. Therefore 
an authentically democratic citizen must be as informed as they possibly can.
If I am to vote for a representative in government, I need to know what their position 
is on the issues that I care about, as well as every available and relevant piece of 
information about the issues so that I can know which ones I do care about, and that 
my reasons for holding my political opinions are soundly based.
I may believe that a tax increase is the best possible way to inject more money into 
healthcare and education and place my vote accordingly, put perhaps I would have 
voted much differently if more facts had been revealed to me that showed how much
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of the currently available tax revenue was being spent on projects that I don’t agree 
with, say, (for the sake of example) the £851.91 million per year spent currently by 
the British government on subsidizing the arms industry.319 I might have instead 
opted to vote for a representative or law which banned arms-trade subsidies rather 
than advocating tax increases, freeing up an extra eight hundred and fifty million 
pounds or so for schools and hospitals without affecting a single person’s income.
Without accurate information to analyse and assess in my decision making, my 
democratic right to vote is a meaningless and hollow gesture. It would seem a very 
minimal requirement, therefore, for the full participation in the running of their 
society that a citizenry of an authentic democracy be able to know what exactly is 
going on within it. Indeed, this is the proclaimed and expected function of the news 
media in contemporary democracies, be it in print, on TV or online: the news media is 
supposed to be the societal tool used to give crucial political information to the public 
so that they can gain ‘enlightened understanding’ and intelligently involve themselves 
in the democratic process.
The availability of alternative and relatively independent sources of information is 
required by several of the basic democratic criteria.. .How can citizens acquire the 
information they need in order to understand the issues if the government controls all 
the important sources of information? Or, for that matter, if any single group enjoys a 
monopoly in providing information? Citizens must have access then, to alternative 
sources of information that are not under the control of the government or dominated 
by any other group or point of view.320
319 Thomas, M, 2006. As Used on the Famous Nelson Mandela, p. 147. (Ebury Press; London)
320 Dahl, R, 2000. On Democracy, p. 97. (Yale University Press; New Haven)
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Yet in capitalist democracies, the news media does not work this way. As Colin 
Crouch warns,
Control over politically relevant news and information, a resource vital to democratic 
citizenship, is coming under the control of a very small number o f extremely wealthy 
individuals. And wealthy individuals, however much they might compete against each 
other, tend to share certain political perspectives, and have a very strong interest in 
using the resources at their command to fight for these.321
As Harvey has already shown,
While this disparate group of individuals embedded in the corporate, financial, trading, 
and developer worlds do not necessarily conspire as a class, and while there may be 
frequent tensions between them, they nevertheless possess a certain accordance of 
interests...they also possess, through organizations like the World Economic Forum at 
Davos, means of exchanging ideas and of consorting and consulting with political 
leaders. They exercise immense influence over global affairs and possess a freedom of 
action that no ordinary citizen possesses.322
Such corporate control of the media, especially in the United States, has led to a 
newsroom rife with ideological bias and doctrinal dogmas, with reporting 
systematically showing evidence of what Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman have 
described as a hegemonic, ‘propaganda model’,323 serving only ‘the interests of state 
and corporate power, which are closely interlinked, framing their reporting and
321 Crouch, C, 2004. Post-Democracy, p. 50. (Polity Press; Cambridge)
322 Harvey, D, 2007. A Brief History o f Neoliberalism, p. 36. (Oxford University Press; Oxford)
323 Chomsky, N and Herman, E, 1994. Manufacturing Consent: the political economy of the mass 
media. (Vintage; London)
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analysis in a manner supportive of established privilege and limiting discussion and 
debate accordingly.’324
When we recall the list of species-interests which legitimate structures of political 
power are obliged to protect and fulfill as the basic minimum requirement of their 
justificatory political teleology, capitalist representative democracy already seems 
profoundly incapable of satisfying these ethical obligations to its citizens. We have 
already seen in great depth how the capitalist structures of economy and work act as 
frequent obstacles towards fair and unimpeded access to, and procurement of, the 
basic requisite material goods; to citizens’ ability to pursue and achieve ‘quality of 
life’ and happiness; to freely form social bonds with one another; to freely use the 
innovative powers of their own creativity; and to meaningfully sustain as much of 
their natural autonomy and freedom as possible. We have also started to see how, 
through ideological control and doctrinal education, there is a pervasive impediment 
put in place against individuals freely forming and holding interests that conflict with 
the dominant ideological narrative of entrenched power.
Once we begin to expose the greater ideological distortions at play within such a 
society, however, and separate what is a truly unavoidable result of unchangeable 
circumstance from what is, in fact, a completely avoidable outcome, brought about 
through the influence of distorting propaganda; then the fulfillment of yet another 
species-interest comes under scrutiny: the avoidance of unnecessary death and 
preventable suffering.
At its most basic, as we have seen from Hobbes, down to Hume, down to Nozick, to 
make life ‘better’ for ‘people’ than it would be without formal politics, is to ensure 
people some security that will protect them from avoidable forms of death and
324 Chomsky, N, 1989. Necessary Illusions, p. 10. (Pluto Press; London)
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preventable causes of suffering. Even if we accept that perfection in politics will 
always be too utopian a task, and that the job of completely fulfilling the demands of 
political teleology is one which will forever be impossible; the bare minimum ethical 
obligation a legitimate structure of political power must make to its people is the offer 
of security and the promise that its citizens will not be unnecessarily killed or made to 
suffer.
In the discussion that follows, however, utilizing Chomsky and Herman’s 
‘propaganda model’ of mass media, I will show that ideological manipulation of 
relevant political information within contemporary capitalist democracies often leads, 
intentionally and consistently, to the widespread death and suffering of both citizens 
and non-citizens alike, through the promotion and engagement of illegitimate, entirely 
avoidable, and entirely preventable, economically motivated wars.
As Chomsky explains; the propaganda model of commercial mass media ‘does not 
assert that the media parrot the line of the current state managers in the manner of a 
totalitarian regime; rather, that the media reflects the consensus of powerful elites of 
the state-corporation nexus generally, including those who object to some aspects of
O '}  c
government policy, typically on tactical grounds.’ It does this through a process of 
hegemony; a system of internalized self-censorship whereby, just as at school when 
the way to get ahead was to do what was expected of you by teachers without 
question, for a journalist to be a ‘success’ in their job they must recognize that 
‘conformity is the easy way, and the path to privilege and prestige; dissidence carries 
personal costs that may be severe’.326
325 Chomsky, N, 1989. Necessary Illusions, p. 149. (Pluto Press; London)
326 Ibid., p. 10
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The very structure of the media is designed to induce conformity to 
established doctrine. In a three-minute stretch between commercials, or in 
seven hundred words, it is impossible to present unfamiliar thoughts or 
surprising conclusions with the argument and evidence required to afford 
them some credibility. Regurgitation of welcome pieties faces no such 
problem.. .the media serves the interests of state and corporate 
power.. .framing their reporting and analysis in a manner supportive of 
established privilege and limiting debate and discussion accordingly.327
It is not so much that journalists necessarily lie outright about the things they report; 
but rather that, through their underlying hegemonic ideological assumptions, they 
unthinkingly, yet consistently, limit their parameters of discourse and thus artificially 
establish an ideologically restrictive framework of acceptable debate.
The propaganda model argues that there are five ‘filters’ which work to limit and 
shape the news-media’s content, and that these filters become internalized within the 
mind of any working journalist who wishes to be ‘successful’ in their careers, leading 
to an unconscious self-censorship which pervades most major media outlets.
The first filter relates to the ‘size, ownership and profit orientation’ of dominant 
media companies. Put simply, as the major media organizations are themselves 
owned by powerful elites there is an immediate clash between their business interests 
and their roles as democracy-enhancing watchdogs of elite power, and yet, as the 
dominant resource for most news information, they have an inescapable influence in 
shaping many people’s views. This filter has been studied comprehensively by Ben 
Bagdikian in his book, The Media Monopoly, which shows how, in America, with an
327 ibid
328 Chomsky, N and Herman, E, 1994. Manufacturing Consent: the political economy o f the mass 
media, pp., 3-14. (Vintage; London)
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ever-decreasing number of powerful corporations owning the vast majority of the 
nation’s media, ‘with that power comes the ability to exert influence that in many 
ways is greater than that of schools, religion, parents, and even government itself.329 
This filter ensures that many stories which could harm the business interests of the 
owning conglomerate are either under-reported, under-played, or sometimes not 
mentioned at all; with journalists working for the company preferring to drop a 
controversial story and look elsewhere for news, rather than risk rocking the boat and 
jeopardizing their careers.330
1The second filter is that of advertising. With the majority of media revenue 
relying on advertising income as its main source of profit, the news media’s role as a 
democratic tool with which all citizens can inform and educate themselves is 
increasingly compromised as it becomes merely a conduit for income-generating 
commercials, creating ‘a programme environment that reinforces our corporate 
messages’, and therefore aiming not at educating all people, but only at selling 
products to an economically desirable demographic of the more affluent sectors of 
society. Further still, news stories which conflict with the commercial interests of 
advertisers are more likely to be pulled than those which do not, directly affecting the 
news which is being reported. This includes, of course, the commercial interests of 
any of the myriad affiliate companies of the original owning conglomerate, again 
placing the interests of economic power over and above the interests of authentic 
democracy and its corporate role over and above its duty to public service.
329 Bagdikian, B, 1997. The Media Monopoly, p. ix. (Beacon Press; Boston)
330 Sanders, B and Baker, R, 1998. Fear and Favour in the Newsroom, in: Phillips, P (ed), 1998. 
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York)
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Since 1976, Sonoma State University’s ‘Project Censored’, has been researching 
annually into how important news stories are often under-reported or simply not 
covered in corporate-owned news media organizations because of such conflicts, and 
have shown, each year, ‘a congruence of attitudes and interests on the part of the 
owners and managers of mass media organizations’ that creates a ‘non-conspiracy 
conspiracy, when combined with a variety of other factors’ which leads to ‘the 
systematic failure of the news media to fully inform the public.’
The third filter concerns the sourcing of the news that is reported, and the reliance by 
journalists on ‘official’ elite sources.334 Essentially this is the consistent prioritizing 
of official press releases and public relations materials as primary source material 
over alternative information outlets and the assumption that such items are always 
valid and free from self-interest, without the need for fact-checking. As Chomsky and 
Herman explain, ‘the mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with 
powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest.’
Put simply: access becomes key. The media needs regular access to official sources if 
it is to consistently turn out product on demand, especially in the day and age of 
twenty-four hour rolling news; and a journalist needs to maintain such access or else 
miss out on stories, and risk losing their job.
Access can be cut off by officials if the reporting generated is consistently negative, 
and so critical stories are avoided or played-down in order to preserve a good working 
relationship with the source.336 Once the ‘official’ version of events has been reported 
and repeated though, expressing views which run counter to the agreed ‘facts’ of the
333 Jensen, C, 1997. 20 Years of Censored News, pp., 14-15. (Seven Stories Press; New York)
334 Chomsky, N and Herman, E, 1994. Manufacturing Consent: the political economy o f the mass 
media, pp., 18-25. (Vintage; London)
335 Ibid., p. 18
336 See: Goodman, A, 2004. The Exception to the Rulers, pp., 169-180. (Arrow Books; London); 
Rampton, S, and Stauber, J, 2003. Weapons o f Mass Deception, p. 185-187. (Robinson Books; 
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matter becomes a Herculean task, especially when coupled with the expected 
‘concision’ of commodified reporting in an age where airtime and column inches are 
seen simply as necessary ‘filler’ sandwiched between the main content of 
advertisements.
As Chomsky explains, ‘if you’re marching in a parade, you don’t need any 
evidence...Either you repeat the same conventional doctrines that everybody else is 
saying, for which you don’t need any proof.. .or else you say something which in fact 
is true and it will sound like it’s from Neptune,’ the repetition of agreed and 
familiar pieties becoming much easier than the hard work of mounting an 
impenetrably evidenced case for an alternative perspective.
The fourth filter of the propaganda model is related to the difficulties of straying 
from the official version of events. Called by Chomsky and Herman ‘flak and the 
enforcers’, what it ultimately means is that ‘controversial’ statements made in the 
media, that counter the dominant narrative of events, will receive a negative backlash. 
Such flak can be letters, phone-calls and petitions against a network or organ for 
allowing such things to be broadcast or published, but other forms of flak can include 
withdrawal of advertising from offended sponsors and boycotts of networks, papers or 
specific programming as a result of their broadcasting or publishing ‘controversial’ 
thoughts.
When someone puts forward a ‘Neptunian’ idea, therefore, they will often receive 
flak, and this flak is often generated disproportionately from groups and individuals 
with powerful elite interests, often via dedicated organisations designed for the job
337 Chomsky, N and Barsamian, D, 2001. Propaganda and the Public Mind, p. 50. (Pluto Press; 
London)
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such as the Media Research Centre, Accuracy in Media and the Centre fo r  Media and 
Public Affairs, funded by business and industry.
A prime example of flak was served up en masse to the people of France by the 
United States’ media after the French government’s unwillingness to join the so- 
called ‘coalition of the willing’ and go to war against Iraq in 2003. Instead of 
accepting the position as a perfectly arguable, logically justifiable, and rationally 
based one that, as a sovereign nation, un-beholden to American power, it was entirely 
their right to hold; there was the encouragement of national anti-French feeling across 
both broadcast and printed media in the United States that, at its most absurd 
moments, led to the U.S. Congressional Cafeteria re-naming French Fries, ‘Freedom 
Fries’.339 Another example from around that time would be the firing of U.S. political 
talk show host Bill Maher from his Politically Incorrect programme after he disagreed 
with the President and other commentators’ opinions that the terrorists who attacked 
New York’s World Trade Centre on 9/11, were cowards. ‘We have been the cowards, 
lobbing cruise missiles from 2,000 miles away’, he said. ‘That's cowardly. Staying in 
the airplane when it hits the building, say what you want about it, it's not 
cowardly.’340
The statement was meant as a joke, is arguably true, and certainly wasn’t saying 
anything that should be considered too controversial in a country rooted in freedom of 
speech, yet his saying it led to so much flak that his job and his show were both axed 
as a result.
He was not the only such casualty.341
The fifth and final filter was originally described by Chomsky and Herman as ‘anti­
communism as a control mechanism’;342 an ideological filter which allowed
339 French Fries remained ‘Freedom Fries’ in the Congressional Cafeteria until July o f 2006.
340 Goodman, A, 2004. The Exception to the Rulers, pp., 192-195. (Arrow Books; London)
341 Ibid.
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journalists to see the world in a certain way and tell a certain story (i.e. America 
versus Communists, with communist countries and their satellites depicted, as a 
matter of course, as evil and their actions sinister, whilst America and its allies are 
painted as the good guys, with all of their actions undertaken only for the noblest of 
causes). Though Manufacturing Consent, and the research which led up to it, was 
written at a time when the Cold War was still ongoing and thus under a historical 
backdrop of decades of media framed in such a way, and whilst such terminology 
might seem out of date now; despite the collapse of Soviet communism and cessation 
of the traditional America versus communism Cold War narrative, Chomsky argues 
that this ideological filter is still very much in place. Although the nineties saw a 
variety of different demons take the place of communism as official state enemy once 
the Cold War had ended -  drugs, terrorists, welfare mothers, immigrants etc -  there 
was always some threat of which the country should be scared, and since 9/11 and the 
declaration of a ‘war on terror’ that followed, we can simply replace the word 
‘communism’ with ‘terrorism’ and see how anti-terrorism now works as a control 
mechanism in media reporting.
Although Chomsky, with and without Herman, documented in great detail various 
U.S. and UK atrocities committed during the Cold War and beyond, right up to 
September eleventh 2001 -  all of which were kept hidden and distorted in the media 
through this final filter of the propaganda model -  for reasons of space and political 
relevancy, I shall concentrate my own analysis in this thesis only to the ongoing ‘war 
on terror’. Because of the overwhelming empirical evidence to support it, I subscribe 
to what Doug Stokes calls Chomsky’s ‘continuity theory’ of U.S. foreign policy. ‘For 
Chomsky, post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy is characterised by overwhelming
342 Chomsky, N and Herman, E, 1994. Manufacturing Consent: the political economy o f the mass 
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continuities with its earlier Cold War concerns, and continues to be malign and anti­
democratic when U.S. elite demands are opposed’.343 This is a viewpoint consistent 
with that of Stephen Kinzer, who details a century of U.S.-sponsored regime-change 
from Hawaii in 1893 to Iraq in 2003 which, in all cases, has ‘cloaked its intervention 
in the rhetoric of national security and liberation’, whilst in reality acting ‘mainly for 
economic reasons -  specifically, to establish, promote, and defend the right of 
Americans to do business around the world without interference.’344 
This perspective of ideological continuity is echoed vis-a-vis UK foreign policy by 
Mark Curtis, who argues that ‘British interests and priorities have changed very little 
over time; essentially, the only variation has been the tactics used to achieve them’, 
and that ‘foreign policy is made by a secretive elite protected even from any serious 
democratic scrutiny, let alone any systematic influence over that policy by the public’, 
with there being ‘no fundamental difference between the Labour and Conservative 
parties in foreign policy.’345 
When one separates fact from ideology and propaganda, then the historical evidence 
paints a compelling picture of consistent foreign policy aims within these two 
countries -  the aims of contemporary capitalism and elite power -  sought over the 
years by a variety of different governments and political actors, ostensibly claiming in 
public to be pursuing new and different goals, whilst in reality achieving only the 
same consistent ideological objectives time and time again.
Through an analysis of the propaganda which helped justify the ‘war on terror’, I 
shall show clearly how media manipulation and the ideological manufacturing of 
consent within these capitalist representative democracies between 2001 and 2003
343 Stokes, D, Why The End Of The Cold War Doesn ’t Matter: The US War O f Terror In Columbia, in 
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severely impeded the informed democratic functioning of their citizens, and paved the 
way for a series of illegitimate and unjustified wars of aggression that have, at the 
time of this writing, already caused the unnecessary death and preventable suffering, 
as well as the violation of many other species-interests, of hundreds of thousands of 
people; in strict contravention of the justificatory terms of contract on which 
legitimate political power is based.
4.3: Demystifying the ‘War on Terror’
The ‘war on terror’ began in September of 2001 and has been sustained ever since 
through a news-media unwittingly, but consistently, conforming to the propaganda 
model, and thus a democratic public made purposefully unfamiliar of important facts. 
Although mainly conceived as an American foreign policy initiative; the UK’s own 
foreign policy since 9/11 has been largely determined by ‘war on terror’ rhetoric; and 
through British support and involvement in the war, established through repetition of 
the same ideological distortions of reality on both sides of the ocean, the war gained a 
perception of legitimacy it might otherwise have lacked, endangering British lives 
alongside their American counterparts. The treatment of the media contained herein, 
therefore, has significant ramifications for both U.S. and UK democracies.
f L
When terrorist attacks occurred across the United States on September 11 , 2001, 
they were quickly reported as being the work of Islamic militant group, al-Qaeda, and 
less than a month later, on October 7th, the new ‘war on terror’ got underway with a 
castigatory battle declared against Afghanistan, the country heralded as al-Qaeda’s 
home-base.
As an immediate consequence, ‘between 3,125 and 3,620 Afghan civilians were 
killed by US bombing’ and ‘between 10,000 and 20,000 people died as an ‘indirect’
256
result’.346 This is not to mention that ‘according to the UN in March 2002, 
Afghanistan had become littered with 14,000 unexploded bomblets’,347 landmine-like 
devices left behind by cluster-bombs with the potential to go off at any time.
The way these two events were reported at the time in the commercial news media 
and by the politicians in charge of it, made it appear that the attack on Afghanistan 
was an entirely justified response to an initial aggressive act, and fully permitted 
under traditional just war theory and international law. America was attacked, the 
papers said, and al-Qaeda did it. Al-Qaeda must be destroyed, the TV newscasters 
told us, and so too therefore must Afghanistan because, the politicians told us, that’s 
where al-Qaeda is based and, in the words of President Bush, ‘if you harbour 
terrorists, you are terrorists. If you train or arm a terrorist, you are a terrorist. If you 
feed a terrorist or fund a terrorist, you're a terrorist, and you will be held accountable 
by the United States and our friends.’348 
Closer inspection of the full context and total body of evidence surrounding these 
events outside of the five filters of the propaganda model, however, show us a very 
different picture indeed, and a clear example of how the news media misinformed the 
public and crippled their ability to democratically function.
The most immediate difference between reality and perception concerning 9/11 was 
the very idea that a retaliatory war needed to be fought at all, especially against 
Afghanistan. America had been attacked, but one cannot call the suicidal acts of an 
autonomous terrorist cell, no matter how well-orchestrated, a war-declaring act of 
international aggression from an enemy nation.
It was a crime, without a doubt, but it was a crime committed by one autonomous 
cell of individuals in a loosely affiliated network of cells with no overall leadership
346 Curtis, M, 2003. Web o f Deceit, p. 49. (Vintage; London)
347 Ibid., p. 54
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structure. Whilst Osama bin Laden made a perfect personification of the Jihadist 
bogeyman for front-page photographs, and certainly provides key funding for al- 
Qaeda activities; in reality, as each cell runs its own operations independently, 
without any overarching authority, the group cannot be tied down to one individual 
leader, let alone any single ‘base’ country of operations.
As a crime, a criminal investigation of the 9/11 attacks should have been undertaken 
immediately and the perpetrators brought to justice as soon as possible. Of course, 
that is hard when the perpetrators themselves are as dead as their victims, but if the 
claim that it was al-Qaeda and bin Laden was true, as was repeatedly and 
unquestioningly reported, there should have still been many leads to go on for finding 
the terrorist group legally. A good start would be basic intelligence gathering from 
those with connections to the terrorists responsible, but within hours of the attacks 
‘top White House officials authorized planes to pick up 140 Saudis, including two 
dozen members of the bin Laden family, from ten cities and spirit them back to Saudi 
Arabia’ without interrogation -  this at a time when all commercial flights in the 
country had been suspended until further notice.349
Fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, like bin Laden, were Saudi Arabian. They also 
had legal visas to enter the U.S., gained from the Saudi Arabian government. The 
other hijackers received their visas to enter the U.S. legally from both Germany and 
the United Arab Emirates. According to the 9/11 Commission’s report on the attacks 
(a report from which twenty-eight pages relating to Saudi Arabia’s role in the attacks 
were withheld by the Bush administration350), ‘beginning in 1997, the 19 hijackers 
submitted 24 applications and received 23 visas.. .the 19 hijackers entered the United 
States a total of 33 times. They arrived through ten different airports, though more
349 Goodman, A, 2004. The Exception to the Rulers, p. 43. (Arrow Books; London)
350 Ibid., p. 47
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than half came in through Miami, JFK, or Newark’.351 Why then, with no seeming 
connection to the crime, was Afghanistan bombed and not, say, Saudi Arabia?
Possibly, because Saudi Arabia is an American ally, to which the indebted U.S. 
economy is intricately tied, or perhaps because of the Bush administration and Bush 
family’s longstanding business connections to the bin Laden family and Saudi 
Arabian oil industry? There are many possibilities, but none that were raised by the 
press at the time. Instead Afghanistan’s culpability was simply asserted, without 
evidence or argument, and its legitimacy as a military target was never seriously 
brought into question. The official fiction was repeated and repeated as fact: bin 
Laden (a Saudi) runs al-Qaeda (not strictly true) and has been hiding out in 
Afghanistan (as I write this, over half a decade since Afghanistan was invaded, bin 
Laden has yet to be found there) so Afghanistan must be bombed (not the only logical 
conclusion if the 9/11 attacks are considered the crime that they were instead of an act 
of war).
The rationale repeated and repeated until considered unchallengeable was that al- 
Qaeda had committed the attacks and ‘if you harbour terrorists, you are terrorists’, 
therefore Afghanistan, who is harbouring bin Laden, is a viable target of war.
Except that the Afghani Taliban government were not harbouring terrorists. Before 
the October 7 strikes, they had offered to give bin Laden over to American 
authorities several times, so long as the U.S. government could provide evidence to 
back up their accusations about bin Laden’s involvement; a common legal convention 
in preparation for extradition, especially to a country where it is unlikely that the 
extradited individual will receive a fair trial. Yet the Taliban requests were not only 
rebuffed; the Taliban themselves became equated with al-Qaeda in both governmental
351 http://www.9-l lcommission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_l.pdf (accessed: 07/02/08)
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speeches and the news. ‘For their part, the media effectively suppressed evidence of 
the Taliban’s offers to extradite Mr bin Laden, and distorted the Taliban’s position, 
thereby making war seem natural and inevitable.’353 
As Chomsky reminds us, the assertion that al-Qaeda was responsible at all was itself 
still questionable as the first bombs dropped on Afghani soil.
Support for the bombing was based on a crucial presupposition: that those 
responsible for 9-11 were known. But they were not, as the government 
quietly informed us eight months after the bombing. In June 2002, FBI 
director Robert Mueller testified before a Senate committee.. .Mueller 
informed the Senate that “investigators believe the idea of the Sept. 11 attacks 
on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon came from al Qaeda leaders in 
Afghanistan,” though the plotting and financing may trace to Germany and 
the United Arab Emirates. “We think the masterminds of it were in 
Afghanistan, high in the al Qaeda leadership,” ... If the indirect responsibility 
of Afghanistan could only be surmised in June 2002, it evidently could not 
have been known eight months before, when President Bush ordered the 
bombing of Afghanistan.354
In Peter Singer’s words, it is ‘possible that the horrendous nature of the attacks of 
September 11, still fresh in everyone’s memory, swayed people’s judgment and 
prevented the kind of calm reasoning that is desirable before making a momentous 
decision that puts at risk the lives of many people, including innocents.’355 But I think 
such an opinion is too charitable. It ignores the wealth of evidence for a ‘continuity 
theory’ of Western foreign policy, and its history of ideological manipulation, and
353 Rai, M, 2002. War Plan Iraq, p. 38. (Verso; London)
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leaves out the notion that such grief and horror might also sway people’s judgement if 
it is used to do precisely that; which is exactly what it seems the media unwittingly 
but methodically did after 9/11.
The media also neglected to give important context to the attacks, preferring to 
repeat the President’s hollow platitudes that the hijackings happened out of the blue, 
because the terrorists were irrational ‘evil-doers’ who ‘hate our freedoms’.356 Even if 
we are to accept al-Qaeda’s responsibility for the attacks, important questions about 
who al-Qaeda are, how they came into existence and why they did what they did were 
not answered until long after it was too late.
As John Cooley remarks, the ‘Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the event 
which was the fateful first link in the chain of dark destiny which led the United 
States to its present serious crisis.’357 When Russia invaded, America’s CIA, together 
with Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI), funded, trained and armed 
‘a mercenary army of Islamist volunteers’ called the mojahidin, to repel the Soviets 
in what they called ‘jihad’ or ‘holy war’. The holy war took a decade and it was not 
until 1989 that the Russians were defeated. By this time, ‘Afghanistan lay in ruins, 
wasted by the jihad. Its society and people were ravaged by drugs, poverty and 
horrific war injuries from fighting and land mines.’359 Worse still, as government 
funding for the extremist army ran out whilst the war took its course, the anti-Soviet 
jihad was forced to find private money from wealthy individuals like Osama bin 
Laden to fund it, who ‘was paying with his own money to recruit and train the Arab 
volunteers who flocked to Pakistan and Afghanistan.. .the CIA even helped bin Laden
356 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (accessed: 07/02/08)
357 Cooley, J, 2002. Unholy Wars, p. xiv. (Pluto Press; London)
358 Ibid., p. xv
359 Ibid
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build an underground camp in Khost, where he was to train recruits from across the 
Islamic world.’360
Britain too was involved in the genesis of al-Qaeda. As well as supplying weapons 
to the jihad,
A British private “security” company, KMS, undertook training of small 
numbers of mojahidin commando units in Afghanistan and at an MI6 base in 
Oman, cleared by the Foreign Office. Ex-SAS men took over the KMS 
training programmes while a few other SAS veterans also trained Pakistani 
forces...selected Afghan fighters were smuggled into Britain disguised as 
tourists and trained in three-week cycles at secret camps in Scotland. Some 
SAS officers’ role went beyond that of trainers and they were involved in 
scouting and back-up roles with the mojahidin.361
This U.S./UK-created jihad eventually, and inevitably, turned against its masters 
once the war with the Soviets was over and they could turn their attention towards 
other enemies of Islam. Similarly the Taliban, created and manipulated only to serve 
U.S. and Pakistani power interests in the region, eventually, and predictably, grew out 
of control.
Was America targeted because ‘they hate our freedoms’ as the President told us?
No. As Palast states, ‘there should be no confusion’ over bin Laden’s aims because,
'if.') #
‘Al Qaeda states its mission, like most enterprises, on its Web site’. The reason bin 
Laden declared his holy war on his former American masters was not because he 
hates freedoms, but because of his opposition to the presence of U.S. military bases in
360 Curtis, M, 2003. Web of Deceit, p. 61. (Vintage; London)
361 Ibid., pp., 62-63
362 Palast, G, 2006. Armed Madhouse, p. 10. (Allen Lane; London)
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the holy Islamic cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia.363 Also because, as we 
have been discussing vis-a-vis power protecting power, bin Laden does not want to 
damage his own economic interests and power in the region, claiming that ‘the 
presence of the U.S.A. Crusader military forces on land, sea and air in the states of the 
Islamic Gulf is the greatest danger threatening the largest oil reserve in the world.’364
The idea that the terrorists might have had rational aims and a defined agenda, no 
matter how flawed their chosen method of obtaining them, or misguided their ultimate 
goals may be, and were not simply raving madmen was seldom, if at all, mentioned in 
the mainstream media. But even with this new perspective on things and the 
revelation of U.S. and UK complicity in the original genesis of al-Qaeda, we still do 
not yet entirely have the full story. Another essential piece of information, relevant to 
a true contextual understanding of 9/11 is that the group known as al-Qaeda ‘was 
barely mentioned in U.S. intelligence reports until 1998.’ In that year, U.S. 
embassy buildings in Kenya and Tanzania were blown up by a terrorist group linked 
to Osama bin Laden. U.S. President, Bill Clinton, responded to the attacks by 
unilaterally bombing Sudan and Afghanistan despite there being little or no evidence 
that the countries were involved, and destroying the El Shifa Pharmaceutical 
Industries factory in the process, a major supplier of medicines and veterinary drugs 
to Sudan and other third world countries that had no military connections at all.
This ‘bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 effectively created Al Qaeda, both 
as a known entity in the intelligence world and also in the Muslim world’, says 
Chomsky. ‘In fact, the bombings created Osama bin Laden as a major symbol, led to 
a very sharp increase in recruitment and financing for Al Qaeda style networks, and
363 Fukuyama, F, 2007. After the Neocons, p. 79. (Profile Books; London)
364 Palast, G, 2006. Armed Madhouse, p. 12. (Allen Lane; London)
365 Chomsky, N, 2005. Imperial Ambitions, p. 108. (Hamish Hamilton; London)
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tightened relations between bin Laden and the Taliban, which previously had been 
quite hostile to him.’366 
This fact was echoed by Adam Curtis in his 2005 documentary The Power o f  
Nightmares,
Al Qaeda as an organisation did not exist. The attacks on America had been 
planned by a small group that had come together around bin Laden in the late 
90s. What united them was an idea: an extreme interpretation of Islamism 
developed by Ayman Zawahiri. With the American invasion, that group had 
been destroyed, killed or scattered. What was left was the idea, and the real 
danger was the way this idea could inspire groups and individuals around the 
world who had no relationship to each other. In looking for an organisation, 
the Americans and the British were chasing a phantom enemy and missing 
the real threat.367
Curtis explains that ‘In January, 2001, a trial began in a Manhattan courtroom of four 
men accused of the embassy bombings in east Africa. But the Americans had also 
decided to prosecute bin Laden in his absence.. .to do this under American law, the 
prosecutors needed evidence of a criminal organisation.. .that would allow them to 
prosecute the head of the organisation even if he could not be linked directly to the 
crime.’ In other words, the idea of a definite and cohesive organization was essential 
in order to achieve the criminal prosecution of bin Laden under American law and so 
the FBI, alongside an ex-associate of bin Laden’s, Jamal al-Fadl, strung intelligence 
together in such a way as to create the necessary organization as a useful fiction.
367 Curtis, A, 2005. The Power o f Nightmares: The Rise in the Politics o f Fear, BBC
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Although terrorism and terrorist groups clearly did exist, ‘the American and other 
governments.. .transformed this complex and disparate threat into a simplistic fantasy 
of an organised web of uniquely powerful terrorists who may strike anywhere and at 
any moment’, and as time went on, ‘the scale of this fantasy just kept growing as 
more and more groups realised the power it gave them’, be it the small-scale terrorist 
groups who could utilize the identity of the U.S.-created al-Qaeda monster to boost 
their own image, or the Western governments using the al-Qaeda idea and ‘war on 
terror’ to forward their own agenda and fill the ideological gap left by the end of the 
Cold War.
The pure invention of the ‘al-Qaeda’ name was even admitted by former UK foreign 
secretary Robin Cook, a month before his death in 2005, when he explained, ‘Al- 
Qaida, literally "the database", was originally the computer file of the thousands of 
mujahideen who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the 
Russians.’368
In short, there is ‘no evidence that bin Laden used the term “Al Qaeda” to refer to 
the name of a group until after September the 11th, when he realized that this was the 
term the Americans have given it.’369 Al-Qaeda was merely a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
an idea created by the U.S. government to name a phantom enemy but, oft repeated in 
the media’s echo chamber; eventually this fantasy became a reality.
Despite governmental reaction and mass media reporting, the idea that the atrocities 
of 9/11 were committed for inexplicable, freedom-hating reasons by a clear-cut 
organized enemy led by Osama bin Laden and called al-Qaeda, based in the definitive 
territorial location of Afghanistan and criminally harboured by the Taliban regime is 
very far removed from the truth. It is an entirely ideological construct. In actual fact,
368 Cook, R, The Struggle Against Terrorism Cannot Be Won By Military Means: The Guardian, July 
8th, 2005: http://www.guardian.co.Uk/terrorism/story/0,12780,1523 838,00.html (accessed 10/9/07)
369 Curtis, A, 2005. The Power o f Nightmares: The Rise in the Politics o f Fear, BBC
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America was attacked by an autonomous and independent group of mostly Saudi 
Arabian individuals, largely trained and created by the U.S. themselves, who had 
come into the country legally from a variety of destinations and been accepted by U.S. 
immigration services. They may, or may not have had, financial backing from Osama 
bin Laden, but not enough information is known -  possibly because ‘the Bush 
administration blocked key [FBI] investigations into allegations that top Saudi 
Arabian royals and some members of the bin Laden family, not just Osama, funded 
and supported al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations’ in the months before 9/11370 
- and they certainly did not attack the World Trade Centre and Pentagon because they 
hated freedom; they did it because they were clear and symbolic targets of American 
militarism and economic imperialism, and their problem with the U.S., clearly stated 
for those who cared to listen, was its continued unwanted military and economic 
presence on Islamic holy lands in Saudi Arabia.
But the ‘war on terror’, and its ideological support from a compliant mass media, did 
not end with the invasion of Afghanistan. Its next phase was the invasion of Iraq in 
March 2003, a country which had already once before fallen victim to the ideological
"371propaganda of Western capitalist mass media.
A spurious connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein was posited and 
repeated, without any credible evidence, within days of 9/11 by Dick Cheney and 
other senior members of the Bush administration. Citing the crime of gassing his own 
people at Halabja in 1988 as proof of Saddam’s tyranny (whilst neglecting to mention the 
U.S. / UK support for it at the time), with the war in Afghanistan already raging, it was 
alleged that Iraq was in possession of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMDs), and thus 
a threat to international security which had to be thwarted.
370 Palast, G, 2002. The Best Democracy Money Can Bay, pp., 91-92. (Robinson; London)
371 See Appendix
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Such claims, since proven to be entirely unsubstantiated despite their furious 
repetition and unqualified assertion in the mass news media in the run up to war, were 
surprising to anyone actually familiar with the facts. As long ago as 2001, the man 
who would conversely later try to convince the UN of Saddam’s WMD threat, former 
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, had admitted publicly that Saddam Hussein ‘has 
not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass 
destruction.’372 Similarly, former UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter claimed in 2002 ‘a
* •  0 7 090 to 95 percent level of verified disarmament’ from when he and his team of 
inspectors left the country in 1998.
Two years previously, Ritter had reported that ‘as long as monitoring inspections 
remained in place, Iraq presented a WMD-based threat to no one’,374 and it should be 
noted that the only reason these recommended monitoring inspections did not remain 
in place, was because inspectors were pulled out by the U.S. themselves in 1998 in 
order to allow the increased U.S. bombing of the country.
The increase in bombing was in alleged response to Iraqi non-cooperation, but in 
Ritter’s own words, in 1998 UNSCOM became compromised from fulfilling its 
original task of seeking out weapons of mass destruction, and instead of cooperating 
with Iraq on disarmament, ‘inspectors were sent in to carry out sensitive inspections 
that had nothing to do with disarmament but had everything to do with provoking the 
Iraqis.’ As soon as Iraq was provoked, and questioned the reasoning behind these 
new demands for the inspection of sensitive sites; instead of seeking diplomatic 
negotiation with them, the U.S. decided to immediately use force and pulled out the 
inspectors in preparation for bombardment. This lack of serious concern at
372 In Singer, P, 2004. The President o f Good and Evil, p. 162. (Granta Books; London)
373 In Rampton S and Stauber J, 2003. Weapons o f Mass Deception, p. 85. (Robinson Books; London)
374 Rai, M, 2002. War Plan Iraq, p. 72. (Verso; London)
375 Ritter, S and Rivers Pitt, W, 2002. War On Iraq, p. 52. (Profile Books; London)
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attempting peaceful disarmament, coupled with the fact that the American CIA had 
largely taken over the supposedly multilateral UNSCOM and had began using it as a 
means to spy on Iraq for the U.S., led to Ritter’s eventual resignation.
The contempt for the inspection process did not end there however. When a new 
inspection team, UNMOVIC headed by Hans Blix, was formed in late 1999, it was 
immediately undermined by the United States and the UK through opposition in the 
UN security council; unreasonable demands for access in Iraq which immediately 
antagonized the country instead of gaining its cooperation; strategic leaks of 
Washington war plans and CIA plots to assassinate Saddam which led to Iraqi distrust 
of the already once-infiltrated inspection team; a refusal to answer Iraq’s questions 
about the inspectors in the security council; and attempts at smearing Blix himself, 
thus discrediting both him and his team.376
The final undermining came just before the 2003 invasion, when UNMOVIC’s 
reports of finding no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and needing more time to 
inspect, were systematically ignored and war was declared anyway, despite there 
being no definite evidence of a clear and present threat and no grounding in UN 
resolutions or international law to justify it.377
A democratic media truly concerned with holding power to account, might well have 
brought all of this up when governmental leaders began their talk of fantasy WMDs 
and spurious Iraqi non-cooperation, but in both the UK and the U.S., just as it had 
with Afghanistan, the ideologically capitalist media -  whilst offering the occasional 
superficial critique -  stuck close to the propaganda model; keeping the general public 
misinformed by repeating, unedited, the words of official sources, without searching
376 Rai, M, 2002. War Plan Iraq, pp., 57-63. (Verso; London)
377 Sands, P, 2006. Lawless World, (Penguin; London); see also: Norton-Taylor, R, 2005. Attorney 
General Told Blair War Could Be Illegal', Guardian.co.uk, April 27th, 2005: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/apr/27/iraq.iraql (accessed: 13/07/08)
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any further for proof; perpetuating ideological fictions that sent many of their citizens 
off to die.
4.4: Democracy Without the Demos: Continuity Theory, Corporate-Interests and 
Species-Interests
Even though the ideological assumptions of both media and elite power kept the 
public largely uninformed about the facts of both Afghanistan and Iraq, many still 
found out the truth, or at least disbelieved the reporting, and attempted to exercise 
their democratic right to raise questions and oppose these proposed wars. Although 
many people are heavily affected by the constant repetition of propaganda as fact and 
the intellectual climate created by ideological manipulation; as we have already 
discussed, human beings are ultimately autonomous creatures who make their own 
minds up about everything they are exposed to and so, for some, the information 
being presented to them was further scrutinized.
Those individuals on whom the propaganda model had failed, intending for their 
opposition to their government’s dubious and dishonest foreign policies to be made 
clear, protested the proposed wars in record numbers. On October 13th, 2001, less 
than a week after the bombing of Afghanistan began, between 20,000 to 50,000 
people took to the streets of London to demonstrate against the war, while at the same 
time in New York, thousands also protested that day. These mass-protests had all 
followed a variety of smaller localized actions across both countries in the run up to 
war, including marches, vigils and demonstrations, and represented a growing tide of 
public opinion against the declared ‘war on terror’.
Afghanistan, of course, was invaded anyway, the voices of these citizens ignored by 
the leaders supposedly beholden to them. But undeterred, on February 15 , 2003, as
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the invasion of Iraq loomed ahead, over one million people took to the streets of 
London in one of the largest anti-war protests the country had ever seen. With the 
revolution of modem communications technology, these protests were a global 
phenomenon; 400,000 demonstrated in New York city, despite a court order banning 
the march, and by February 17th it was reported that ‘huge waves of demonstrations 
not seen since the Vietnam war jammed more than 600 towns and cities around the 
world over the weekend as protesters from Tasmania to Iceland marched against war 
in Iraq. Up to 30 million people demonstrated worldwide, including around 6 million
0 7 0
in Europe, according to figures from organisers and police’.
The difference between this new wave of anti-war protests and the oft-referenced 
Vietnam War protests that pre-dated them was that the 30 million people 
demonstrating worldwide that February weekend were demonstrating before the war 
took place. As Chomsky reminds us, for Vietnam, ‘the protests came only after years 
and years of war. By then, hundreds of thousands of people had been killed and much 
of Vietnam had been destroyed.’379 This time, the citizens of the world’s democracies 
were stating their position as loud as they possibly could before anybody had been 
killed and a country destroyed, in the hope that their democratic representatives would 
hear them and represent them effectively, calling off this unwanted war before it 
began.
According to polls conducted by the Pew Research Centre, public opinion in March 
2001 in the UK was 51% opposed to the war. German public opinion also had an 
even larger majority opposing the war with 69%. Poland and France saw public 
opinion oppose the war in higher numbers still, at 73% and 75% respectively, while 
Spain and Italy saw an incredible opposition at 81%, and both Russian and Turkish
378 Chrisafis, A, et al, 2003. Millions Worlwide Rally For Peace: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/antiwar/story/0„897098,00.html (accessed: 07/02/08)
379 Chomsky, N, 2005. Imperial Ambitions, p. 41. (Hamish Hamilton; London)
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public opinion opposed the war by massive majorities of 87% and 86%. Meanwhile, 
U.S. public opinion was completely different, with a 59% majority supporting the
380war.
Propaganda played a massive part in such disparity, as Chomsky explains:
Abroad, “public diplomacy...failed badly,” the international press reported, 
but “at home it has succeeded brilliantly in linking the war on Iraq with the 
trauma of September 11... [N]early 90 percent believe [Saddam’s] regime is 
aiding and abetting terrorists who are planning future strikes against the 
US.”...It is immaterial that the alleged link between Saddam Hussein and 
Osama bin Laden, in fact, his bitter enemy, was based on no credible 
evidence and largely dismissed by competent observers.381
With such numbers of people radically misinformed about the true facts of the 
matter, and with a small majority supporting the war throughout the U.S. and loudly 
calling non-supporters unpatriotic traitors, it only makes the relatively large numbers 
of those who actually did protest the war within that country even more impressive. 
Combined with the prevalent public opinion worldwide in opposition to the war, one 
would have thought a democratic media would somehow find access to these readily 
available facts, and that a democratic government would have listened to the people it 
claimed to be representing -  and the international institutions it was signed up to -  
and put a cease to its unilateral drive to unjustified and unpopular war.
Instead though, the American public were given rhetorical flourishes about ‘standing 
strong’, ‘firm and decisive leadership’ and how the President was ‘driven with a
380 http://www.pewtrusts.org/pdf/vfjpew_research_war.pdf (accessed: 09/04/07)
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mission from God’ to invade Iraq. And when the increasingly unpopular war 
translated into outraged protest votes in the 2006 mid-term elections and President 
Bush’s Republican party lost control of both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, forcing then Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld to resign from his 
administration position in response, the ‘firm and decisive’ leader’s reaction -  rather 
than listen to the loud and clear voice of public opinion -  was to send a further 20,000 
troop ‘surge’ into Iraq and escalate the war.
Rather than operate on the understood tenets of authentic democracy and remark that 
good democratic leadership means informing and listening to the people, representing 
their views, and adapting one’s position accordingly, the British public too, were told 
to ‘trust in the prime minister's "courage, integrity and honesty"’383 in the prelude to 
war, and that he does ‘not seek unpopularity as a badge of honour. But sometimes it is 
the price of leadership and the cost of conviction.’ Indeed, Tony Blair’s conviction
continued in direct disregard for genuine democracy, even as 122 of his own MPs 
revolted against him in a February, 2003, Commons vote, arguing that the case for 
war in Iraq was ‘unproven’; and even after the resignation of former Foreign 
Secretary, Robin Cook, from his cabinet position because he refused to accept 
collective cabinet responsibility when ‘Britain is being asked to embark on a war 
without agreement in any of the international bodies of which we are a leading 
partner’. As former Foreign Secretary, Cook clearly had relevant credentials to give 
his comments compelling weight when stating that ‘on Iraq.. .the prevailing mood of
382 http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2005/10_october/06/bush.shtml (accessed: 
07/02/08)
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the British people is sound’,385 so it seems hard to follow why that prevailing mood, 
as demanded by the allegedly accepted protocols of democracy, was not listened to?
An answer can be found, however, once we look at what was gained from the Iraqi 
invasion. Whilst much was lost for ordinary people; indeed, the ‘war on terror’ cost 
American taxpayers over $430 billion and UK taxpayers nearly five billion pounds in 
its first five years alone,386 whilst economists Linda Bilmes and Joseph Stiglitz have 
projected that the total cost to present and future tax-payers of paying for the war in 
Iraq, including the price of looking after the 23,000-50,000 (estimates vary) severely 
wounded but living, soldiers returning from battle will be around $2.5 trillion}*1 This 
is not to mention the 4,430 coalition soldiers who have been killed in Iraq at the time 
of this writing,388 nor the, conservative, estimate of 85,862 -  93, 672 excess civilian
i o q
deaths the invasion has caused.
Whilst much was lost for ordinary people, for neoliberal capitalism and the small 
minority of corporations and individuals who benefit from it, the Iraqi invasion led to 
great gains in wealth and power.
Whilst much has been made in the public arena about a distinctly neoconservative 
philosophy guiding the policies of the Bush administration, I believe this notion is just 
another ideological distraction from the true ‘continuity theory’ of U.S. foreign 
policy. Whilst the neoconservative outlook of the Bush administration certainly
385 http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk_politics/2859431.stm (accessed: 22/02/08)
386 Randall, D and Gosden, E, 2006. 62, 006 -  the number killed in the ‘war on terror ’ in: Independent 
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387 In Stephen, A, 2007. Iraq: The Hidden Cost of the War. New Statesman, 12th March, 2007, pp., 26- 
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shaped the ‘war on terror’ into the particular apocalyptic ‘us against them’ narrative 
in which it was ultimately executed; what caused the war was not neoconservativism, 
but neoliberalism', the extreme and unfettered fundamentalist version of the same 
enduring capitalist ideology which has informed all major U.S. foreign policy 
decisions since at least the 1940s.
Neoconservativism was bom out of the Cold War, as a response to Stalin’s atrocities 
in the name of communism. It was created and fleshed out by thinkers such as Irving 
Kristol, Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Nathan Glazer in the 1930s and 
‘40s; taken up in the fifties and sixties by people such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
and Charles Murray; merged with the philosophy of Leo Strauss in the seventies and 
eighties by his students Allan Bloom and Harry Jaffa; and took on an overtly 
militarized tone through the teachings of Albert Wohlstetter; but through all of its 
many incarnations, four underlying principles remained unanimous:
A belief that the internal character of regimes matters and that foreign policy must 
reflect the deepest values of liberal democratic societies.. .A belief that American 
power has been and could be used for moral purposes, and that.. .as the world’s 
dominant power, the United States has special responsibilities in the realm of 
security... A distrust of ambitious social engineering projects... And finally, scepticism 
about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law and institutions to achieve 
either security or justice.390
However, it was a later version of neoconservativism, founded by Robert Kagan and 
Iriving Kristol’s son, William, which became linked most closely with the Bush 
Presidency, largely due to members of that administration’s involvement in Kagan
390 Fukuyama, F, 2007. After the Neocons, pp., 48-49. (Profile Books; London)
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and Kristol’s neoconservative group, The Project for a New American Century 
(PNAC), prior to taking office. In a pre-9/11 strategic paper entitled Rebuilding 
America’s Defences, the PNAC advised that the goals of U.S. foreign policy ought to 
be the ability to ‘fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theatre wars’ 
against regimes like Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Iran, which they believed threatened 
U.S. interests.
Helping fan the conspiratorial flames of a neoconservative coup in the White House, 
this document made clear that the radical changes in foreign policy which it had 
proposed, would take a very long time to be implemented ‘absent some catastrophic 
and catalyzing event -  like a new Pearl Harbor’; an idea which gained uncanny 
prescience after the tragedy of the 9/11 attacks was ultimately used by former 
members of PNAC, to push through their sweeping programme of foreign policy 
reforms.391
But neoconservative philosophy, though distinct in superficial ways from other 
mainstream schools of thought in conventional debate about American foreign policy, 
still ultimately conforms to the same basic ideological parameters of acceptable 
political discourse; with its aims, objectives and expectations, though perhaps 
presenting a different approach to achieving conventional goals, differing in no 
substantive way from any other mainstream position. Whilst the neoconservative 
vision may wrap up its own attempted promotion of those conventional goals in the 
specific rhetorical narrative of a newly derived moral vision, that of America’s 
benevolent hegemony; this technique is not uncommon. Called by Chomsky ‘the 
doctrine of “change of course’” ,392 this ideological tool is the simple shielding of the
391 Donnelly, T, Kagan, D, and Schmitt, G, 2000. Rebuilding America’s Defences: Strategy, Forces 
and Resources For a New Century:
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public’s eyes from the truism of policy continuity through the unproven and artificial 
assertion that that was then, this is now, ignoring the systemic problems present within 
established power structures and the ‘continuity theory’ of their policy aims, by 
concentrating only on the transient variables of its current players. As Chomsky 
explains, it is a technique ‘invoked in the United States every two or three years’393 
which allows ‘any past horror to be cheerfully dismissed’.394 But the claim of 
‘change of course’ is one that the actual historical record of U.S. foreign policy 
simply does not bear out.
So whilst it is true that many of the major architects of the war in Iraq, and the ‘war 
on terror’ in general were, for the most part, committed neoconservatives; their 
particular subscription to one set of intellectual justifications for their actions over 
another is really not as important as the question of what those justifications were 
ultimately being used to justify: yet another economically motivated war, consistent 
with foreign policy objectives that have remained largely unchanged throughout 
recent history; a foreign policy which, regardless of the particular character of 
neoconservative language used to justify it during the years of its current incarnation, 
is ultimately, as it always has been, systemically beholden to the economic and 
strategic interests of elite power.
To that end, the real significance of the ‘war on terror’ was not the transient political 
ideology which created it, but the enduring economic one. This war, more than any 
other war which came before it, was about more than its singular goals within the 
targeted countries of Afghanistan and Iraq, but rather about a broader economic 
project: establishing a brand new way of thinking about warfare and national security 
itself; as a business run for private profit.
393 Chomsky, N, December 21st, 2003. Selective Memory and False Doctrine. On ZNet: 
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Before becoming president, George W. Bush, whilst showing no great commitment 
to the neoconservative agenda, was certainly a staunch nQoliberal ideologue, and had 
long been an advocate of privatising any state-run service which he believed could be 
outsourced from public hands to private subcontractors. As governor of Texas he 
oversaw the large-scale privatization of Texan jails, and attempted (unsuccessfully) to 
put Texan social services completely into private hands. As president, he took this 
same pro-privatization approach to state-run services on a national scale, and by 
September 11th, 2001, amongst many other newly privatized areas of public service, 
the Bush administration had subcontracted out many aspects of the military and 
security services in America; from privately hired mercenary groups like Blackwater 
supplementing traditional armed forces in battle, to subcontracted army bases, owned 
and operated by Halliburton and catered for by McDonalds and Pizza Hut. So when 
the ‘war on terror’ was declared, there were many private companies who now stood 
to gain a lot of money from a sudden boom in this newly created private defence and 
security market. Indeed, as Naomi Klein observes,
Every aspect of the way the Bush administration has defined the parameters of the 
War on Terror has served to maximize its profitability and sustainability as a market -  
from the definition of the enemy to the rules of engagement to the ever-expanding scale 
of battle... From a military perspective, these sprawling and amorphous traits make the 
War on Terror an unwinnable proposition. But from an economic perspective, they 
make it an unbeatable one: not a flash-in-the-pan war that could potentially be won but 
a new and permanent fixture in the global economic architecture.395
395 Klein, N, 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise o f Disaster Capitalism, pp., 300-301. (Allen Lane; 
London)
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Not only did the invasion of Iraq allow the growing private sector of the military 
continue to cash in on the emergent market created by the ‘war on terror’, as well as 
send billions of dollars in reconstruction money back to American owned companies 
awarded the contracts to rebuild the ravaged country without competition; but once 
Iraq had been invaded, the interim Coalition Provisional Authority established by the 
occupying troops, enacted an even more serious business proposal. Paul Bremner, as 
leader of this de facto government, concentrated his efforts in office solely on opening 
up Iraq to the many foreign investors hungry to make money out of this previously 
closed market. In a series of economic laws put in place even before electricity or 
clean running water had returned to the country, Bremner auctioned off a vast 
quantity of previously nationalized industries to foreign bidders, with no guarantee -  
or even request -  for their profits to be reinvested into Iraq. He also lowered 
corporate tax to a flat rate of 15% and took away all tax on company profits, further 
ensuring that as much money as possible could be taken out of the country and placed 
into private hands. These tax laws were setting Iraq’s economic future in stone, with 
Bremner’s economic order 37 announcing that these new rules would stand ‘for 2004 
and all subsequent years.'396 Likewise, contracts and leases for Iraqi resources and 
industries sold to these foreign investors ‘would last for forty years and then be 
eligible for renewal, which meant that future elected governments would be saddled 
with deals signed by their occupiers.’
The only national industry which wasn’t sold off immediately by Bremner for 
private profit in Iraq, was the nation’s oil, but the hesitation here was mainly tactical; 
as the simplistic notion of the war’s real motives being purely for oil had gained some 
popular credence in the absence of WMDs, confirming that theory so blatantly would
396 In Palast, G, 2006. Armed Madhouse, p. 71. (Allen Lane; London)
397 Klein, N, 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise o f Disaster Capitalism, p. 345. (Allen Lane;
London)
be a public relations disaster. The oil revenue, in the meantime, could also help offset 
the costs of the war. But eventually, and inevitably, even Iraqi oil finally succumbed 
to the ffee-market, and in 2007 became yet another commodity in the Iraqi fire-sale, 
sold into private hands.
As Klein reminds us, invoking Kinzer; during the ideologically distorted build up to 
war, ‘Saddam did not pose a threat to U.S. security’, but what he did pose was ‘a 
threat to U.S. energy companies, since he had recently signed contracts with a Russian 
oil giant and was in negotiation with France’s Total, leaving U.S. and British oil firms 
with nothing’.398
Whilst the invasion of Iraq did great damage to the lives of the Iraqi people and the 
coalition soldiers, and whilst, according to consecutive leaked National Intelligence 
Estimates from the U.S. government, far from protecting the world from terror 
attacks, the invasion of Iraq ‘has made the overall terrorism problem worse’,399 what 
is clear is that ‘Saddam’s removal from power has opened up vistas of opportunities 
for the oil giants, including ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell and BP’.400
As Klein concludes,
Made possible by the September 11 attacks, the war in Iraq represented nothing less 
than the violent birth of a new economy.. .since every possible aspect of both 
destruction and reconstruction has been outsourced and privatised, there’s an economic 
boom when the bombs start falling, when they stop and when they start up again -  a 
closed profit-loop of destruction and reconstruction, of tearing down and building up.
398 Klein, N, 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise o f Disaster Capitalism, p. 313. (Allen Lane; 
London). See also: Clark, W, 2005. Petrodollar Warfare, (New Society; British Columbia).
399 Mazzetti, M, 2006. Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat’. The New York Times, 
Sunday, September 24th, 2006, p. 1
400 Klein, N, 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise o f Disaster Capitalism, p. 313. (Allen Lane; 
London)
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For companies that are clever and farsighted, like Halliburton and the Carlyle Group, 
the destroyers and rebuilders are different divisions of the same corporations.401
During the creation of this new economy, any pretence of a distinction between 
business and government was hard to find. Whilst holding the office of Vice 
President, Dick Cheney maintained a large quantity of his increasingly lucrative 
shares in the Halliburton corporation of which he was previously C.E.O.; even as he 
helped wage the wars from which they benefited financially. Indeed, it was Cheney 
himself who commissioned Halliburton subsidiary Brown & Root back in 1991 to 
study private military outsourcing as a possible Pentagon policy in the first place; the 
very same outsourcing which he then helped implement in 2001.402 Meanwhile, his 
wife remained on the board of directors at Lockheed Martin, a weapons and 
technologies company which has also done very well from the privatization of war 
and the subsequent ‘war on terror’.
Similar to Cheney, Defence Secretary until 2006, Donald Rumsfeld failed to divest 
many of his own shares in security and defence companies he owned stock in, 
allowing himself to profit nicely from the wars he helped create. As did Henry 
Kissinger who, as both a long-time foreign policy advisor to the Bush/Cheney White 
House and, through his company Kissinger Associates, the representative of 
engineering company Fluor; profited greatly from the reconstruction contracts Fluor 
received in Iraq.
So too did The Carlyle Group, a business with longstanding ties to the Bush family 
which profited not only through sales of its robotics and defence communications 
systems; but was awarded a major contract to train Iraqi police through its holding
401 Ibid., p. 381
402 Goodman, A, 2004. The Exception to the Rulers, p. 66. (Arrow Books; London)
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USIS. Likewise, there is George Schultz, a member of the Bechtel corporation’s 
board of directors who, whilst still on the board, was subcontracted by the Bush 
administration in 2002 to head the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. This 
Committee, which also counted representatives from Lockheed among its members, 
was formed to help publicly build the case for war at the request of the White House; 
a war in which both Bechtel and Lockheed made a lot of money.
The conflicts of interest present in the Committee are similar to that of the Defence 
Policy Board, a group chaired by Richard Perle, who was a very vocal advocate of the 
Iraqi invasion and, through his venture capitalist group Trireme Partners, had major 
investments in homeland security and defence firms that stood to gain from the 
invasion he was hired to promote.
Once the war in Iraq began, Perle stepped down from the Defence Policy Board to 
reap the rewards of the war he had helped create, continuing an emerging pattern of 
war-profiteering from the business-minded lawmakers in charge of the ‘war on 
terror’.403
John Ashcroft, former attorney general and prime mover behind the Patriot Act, now 
heads up the Ashcroft Group, specializing in helping homeland security firms procure 
federal contracts. Tom Ridge, the first head of the Department of Homeland Security, 
is now at Ridge Global and an advisor to the communication technology company 
Lucent, which is active in the security sector...Richard Clarke, counterterrorism czar 
under Clinton and Bush.. .is now chairman of Good Harbor Consulting, specializing in 
homeland security and counterterrorism...Joe Allbaugh, head of FEMA on September 
11, cashed out just eighteen months later to start New Bridge Strategies, promising to 
be the “bridge” between business and the lucrative world of government contracts and
403 Ibid., pp., 48-69 for even more details.
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investment opportunities in Iraq. He was replaced by Michael Brown, who bolted after 
only two years to start Michael D. Brown LLC, specializing in disaster preparedness.404
Whilst taken to grotesque new levels by the Bush administration, government 
complicity in war profiteering and disregard for the species-interests of their citizens 
over the interests of private corporations is not new, nor is it limited to the U.S. In 
2002, as India and Pakistan balanced on the precipice of a potential nuclear 
confrontation and British citizens were being evacuated from the region, half of 
Britain’s democratically elected Cabinet ‘set about a series of high profile lobbying 
visits to India in order to sell £1 billion worth of Hawk jets’ for British arms 
manufacturers, BAE systems, with which to attack Pakistan and increase the potential 
for hostilities instead of trying to end them. This coming after they had already sold 
India the very Jaguar combat aircraft with which they were threatening to drop their 
nuclear bombs.405 Likewise, a cursory look at the UK government’s relationship with 
the arms trade, shows that its ongoing compliance with the corporate agenda over the 
rights of its citizenry has led to repeated instances of weaponry and torture equipment 
being made in the UK, and sold by UK companies, only to be ultimately used on UK 
citizens in foreign countries, most noticeably in the first Gulf War where not only 
were many of the Iraqi army’s weapons that were used against British and American 
soldiers originally sold to them by UK and U.S. arms manufacturers; but where the 
UK tax-payer even footed some of the bill for the assault on their own army under the 
government’s system of Export Credit Guarantees, which underwrites private arms-
404 Klein, N, 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise o f Disaster Capitalism, p. 315. (Allen Lane; 
London)
405 Thomas, M, 2006. As Used on the Famous Nelson Mandela, pp., 120-122. (Ebury Press; London)
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deals with public money wherever there is a high likelihood of a client’s non­
payment, to ensure that no private profit is lost in any transaction.406
In short, the war in Iraq, and the ‘war on terror’ in general -  all conflicts willingly 
entered into by these ostensibly democratic governments either in defiance of the will 
of their citizens, or -  due to the persistent ideological manipulation of that citizenry’s 
will -  without any opposition at all; whilst causing the preventable and avoidable 
suffering and death of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, and decreasing 
global security exponentially, have benefited tremendously the economic interests of 
elite power and the neoliberal system which sustains it.
There has also been another ideological victory scored by the ‘war on terror’.
After nearly a decade without the distraction of the Cold War, and after suffering the 
domestic effects of a 1980s full of mass privatization and job insecurity, and a 1990s 
of constant downsizing, outsourcing, further job insecurity, increased privatization, 
and the WTO; in the latter years of the twentieth century, people living within the 
capitalist representative democracies of the West were finally beginning to 
meaningfully question the economic system that dominated their lives. With 
technological advances like the internet opening up new frontiers of global 
communication, workers on one half of the globe were no longer detached from their 
plurality, connection and finitude with workers on the other half; and the fact that the 
poor were getting poorer and the rich richer became no longer an abstract concept; the 
damaging effects of a globalized economy structurally re-adjusting desperate third 
world countries into exploitation was no longer hidden from view.
On June 18th, 1999, over six thousand people protested in the city of London in what 
was dubbed a ‘carnival against capital’, engaging in the first major mass
406 Ibid., pp., 118-177
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demonstration of its kind on Western soil -  specifically against neoliberal capitalism -  
and firing the opening salvo of a burgeoning new international anti-capitalism 
movement. Around the world on that day, simultaneous protests against capitalism 
occurred in forty different countries.
Later that year, a Seattle meeting of the WTO in November that intended to push 
forward a new round of free-market trade negotiations was disrupted and made 
unworkable due to the mass protesting of over a hundred thousand members of this 
new movement. This was followed by similar actions against the IMF and World 
Bank in April of 2000, when ten thousand anti-capitalist protesters demonstrated 
outside their Washington headquarters.
Importantly, this ten month period of protest and action led to major cracks in the 
ideological veneer of contemporary capitalism as the mainstream media were forced 
not only to report, but to explain, why this phenomenon was occurring across the 
globe, and suddenly a radical anti-corporate agenda was beginning to break through 
into the public discourse.
A search for the phrase ‘anti-capitalism’ mentioned in any major English-language
tfi tVi •newspaper in the period between March 18 1997 and June 18 1999 on the Lexis 
Nexis database, gives a grand total of only twenty-three mentions of the concept in 
this entire two-year and three months period preceding the ‘carnival against capital’. 
But that same search in the two years and three months after the London protests sees 
the number of references to ‘anti-capitalism’ rise dramatically to 371.
During this period of intense public scrutiny of previously ignored economic policies 
and the widespread publicizing of reclusive financial meetings, the OECD’s three- 
year long attempt at passing a Multilateral Agreement on Investment collapsed; a 
trade agreement which, if adopted, would have ceded sovereignty of domestic law
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further away from signatory countries to an unelected authority legally bound to 
promote the needs of international trade and investment over those of the domestic 
populace.407
Clearly beginning to affect real policy decisions, this growing anti-capitalist 
movement was starting to seriously worry -  at least one -  capitalist government. In 
the wake of rioting between police and protesters on both June 18th and the following 
May in London, the Terrorism Act of 2000 was fast-tracked through British 
Parliament to change the legal definition of ‘terrorism’ to include protest groups. 
Claiming to be concerned about ‘domestic terrorism’ from both groups who had 
already ‘mounted, and continue to pursue, persistent and destructive campaigns’ and 
the ‘possibility that new groups espousing different causes will be set up and adopt 
violent methods to impose their will on the rest of society’;408 the definition of 
‘terrorism’ was changed from its previous incarnations as action ‘directed towards the 
overthrowing or influencing, by force or violence, of Her Majesty's government in the 
United Kingdom or any other government de jure or de facto’409 and ‘the use of 
violence for political ends’;410 to the more wide-ranging definition of any ‘use or 
threat... made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause’, 
and included, for the first time, amongst its list of arrestable offences, ‘serious damage 
to property’; whether or not any people were harmed as a result of that damage.411
407 Chomsky, N, 1999. Profit Over People, pp., 131-155. (Seven Stories Press; New York)
408 Legislation Against Terrorism CM 4178 Home Office & Northern Ireland Office December 1998 
paragraphs 3.8-3.13: http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-101.pdf (accessed: 
7/2/08)
409 Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993, Chapter 18, Section 2: 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/actsl993/Ukpga_19930018_en_l (accessed: 7/02/08)
410 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, Part Five, Section 20: 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts 1989/ukpga_l9890004_en_6#pt5-l 1 g20 (accessed: 7/02/08)
411 Terrorism Act 2000, Part 1, Section 1:
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_2000001 l_en_2#ptl-llgl (accessed: 7/02/08)
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With symbolically smashed McDonalds and Starbucks shop-fronts a repeated feature 
of these anti-capitalist actions due to a militant minority of troublemakers,412 and the 
inclusion of ideological causes appearing alongside traditional political and religious 
causes of terrorism, it was clear that the growing anti-capitalist movement within 
Britain was one of the Terrorism Act’s new targets and the law was strongly opposed 
by both protest and civil liberty groups in the country.
Confirming their worst fears, once passed, new police powers granted in the Act 
were quickly utilized by the authorities to make impotent any attempts at anti­
capitalist protesting that occurred thereafter. Peaceful protest groups deemed possible 
‘terrorist threats’, were detained in closed-off areas, away from the public they were 
trying to influence, and kept engaged in lengthy stop and search operations;413 but the 
more that this happened, the more protesters fought against the new law, laughing at 
the absurdity of being arrested as a ‘terrorist’ for simply holding a placard and 
shouting slogans at a protest.
After 9/11, however, being called a ‘terrorist’ by authorities and risking the wrath of 
increasingly draconian anti-terror laws was no longer such an appealing prospect. It 
was one thing to be inconvenienced by a politically motivated stop and search on the 
streets of London, but quite another to be taken, through extraordinary rendition, to be 
tortured in Guantanamo Bay after being arrested on terrorist charges.
More importantly, the series of unjustified wars the September attacks heralded 
made the continued protesting of abstract economic ideals no longer as important a 
mission as the more pressing concerns of impending military violence, and so the
412 Unconfirmed reports from both Seattle and London protests make claims that some, if not all of this 
anti-corporate vandalism, was largely instigated by undercover police who had infiltrated the 
movement.
413 Liberty: http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/issues/6-free-speech/s44-terrorism-act/index.shtml
(accessed: 7/02/08)
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anti-capitalist movement soon dropped their long-term revolutionary goals for the 
more immediate crisis, logically evolving into an anti-war movement.
By concentrating their collected energies on stopping the multiple illegitimate wars 
that were now being fought across the globe; the anti-capitalists were ultimately 
silenced from their more systemic critique of prevailing economic structures, and 
focused instead on the specific task of opposing an unjust war. This form of protest, 
though still important, was one which Western capitalist governments had dealt with 
successfully since Vietnam, and although damaging to the ideology of the ‘war on 
terror’ itself, no longer threatened the deeper economic structures which had created 
it.
Our Lexis Nexis research supports this conclusion. From the rise to 371 references 
o f ‘anti-capitalism’ in major world newspapers between June 18th 1999 and 
September 11th 2001; in the following two years and three months after the ‘war on 
terror’ had been declared, that number dropped to only 208 mentions; and by the end 
of the next two year and three month period in February 2006, it was down to just 
133. Though still a much higher number than it had been before the anti-capitalist 
movement began due to their lasting legacy of their conscious-raising efforts, it is 
clear that a sustained conversation about opposing the capitalist system and seeking 
better alternatives had been successfully taken off the public agenda by the ‘war on 
terror’.414
414 The number of references may also have dropped because of the ideologically motivated 
mainstream media name-change of the movement from ‘anti-capitalist’ to the more confusing ‘anti­
globalization’ moniker; a name which no longer makes clear precisely what it is about globalization 
that is being opposed: capitalism.
287
4.5: A Critical Examination of Ethical Justifications for Political Power: A 
Conclusion
I began this far-reaching enquiry by looking first at plausible justifications for the 
erection of synthetic structures of external political power over autonomous human 
life. Acknowledging the state’s artificial nature and the self-sovereignty of people, it 
became clear that some form of independent justificatory argument was needed to 
legitimate its existence and claim to authority; and by unpacking the underlying 
principles upon which all attempted justifications for the external state are necessarily 
made, I unearthed a universal and enduring social contract argument of political 
teleology and ethical obligation. This necessary contract, simply put, was the 
agreement that artificial structures of external political power are given their 
justification only on the basis that they make life ‘better’ for ‘people’ than it would be 
without them.
I then analysed what, exactly, such a contract must entail and what a deeper 
unpacking of this political teleology must mean if we are to take its demands 
seriously: who are the ‘people’, and what can we reasonably say would be ‘better’ for 
them.
After determining a universally inclusive definition of the term ‘people’, I 
constructed a vindicated account of seven innate species-interests arguably held by 
all, by looking at human beings from their most uncontroversial and fundamental 
perspective: as shared members of the same biological species. This basic 
requirement of political teleology, stemming from a constructivist account of its 
foundational human teleology, gave us the most reasonably supported account we 
could plausibly construct of the ethical obligations demanded of justified political 
power if it is to truly make life ‘better’ for ‘people’: all human beings, as members of
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the same biologically fragile, sentient, and psychologically complex species, share 
these same seven core interests inherent to their being, and the legitimacy of external 
political structures is based on the notion that such structures are necessary for 
ensuring the fulfillment and protection of those essential interests when they have 
otherwise been thwarted in a pre-political state of nature.
What this conclusion importantly showed is that the legitimacy of an external 
structure of political power is not a de facto given, but is entirely conditional on its 
commitment to and capability of fulfilling the justificatory tasks demanded by 
political teleology. If a structure of political power fails to protect and fulfill the 
species-interests of its citizens and others affected by its actions, then it has no claim 
to legitimacy. Further still, legitimacy being conditional in this way, it follows that if 
the teleological tasks can be fulfilled without an external structure of political power 
in place, by the actions and agreements of self-governing autonomous people alone, 
then there appears to be no justification whatsoever for such structures to legitimately 
exist.
It was with this in mind that I did not immediately equate the authentic democracy 
that the conditions of political teleology appeared to require of legitimate politics, 
with traditionally understood democratic structures. Instead, I attempted to show that 
the authentic democracy demanded by legitimate political teleology was far better 
understood to be a form of anarchism rather than the distorted compromises of the 
democratic ideal found within democratic systems today.
Conceding the possible criticism that advocating anarchism as the only ethically 
justified form of political power would require too many radical changes in existing 
social structures to be a workable solution though, I decided to give contemporary
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democracy its due, and further assess its capabilities at realistically protecting and 
fulfilling the species-interests of its citizens.
As we have now seen from this empirical analysis, it appears that such systems are, 
as predicted in chapter three, incapable of providing the authentic democracy that the 
justificatory contract requires, as the central guiding principle which informs the 
majority of political decisions within such a regime is not human need or the true 
interests of its populace, but instead only the interests of small minority of powerful 
individuals who benefit greatly from the inequality and exploitation of a questionable 
system of capitalist economics.
This capitalist system remaining largely unjustified in terms of political teleology, 
far from making life ‘better’ for either its own ‘people’ or those affected through 
plurality, connection and finitude to the consequences of its actions, the species- 
interests of those who live in capitalist representative democracies have long been 
forsaken in the pursuit of private profit for a privileged and powerful few, leaving the 
majority, for the most part, as the unfulfilled, psychologically damaged populace 
illustrated at the start of this chapter; a people desperate to escape from the 
dissatisfying reality of their everyday lives, and a circumstance which is entirely 
avoidable and unnecessary were the political and economical structures which 
encouraged such disengagement and despondency to be changed.
Foreshadowing Bakan, fifty years earlier Erich Fromm remarked that the very 
structure of society in capitalist democracies, due to the psychosis of its economic 
framework, is psychologically sick; a state of affairs which creates an entirely 
alienated and psychologically damaged citizenry, and the prognosis that ‘mental 
health can be attained only by simultaneous changes in the sphere of industrial and 
political organization, of spiritual and philosophical orientation, of character structure,
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and of cultural activities.’415 A similar need for change was posed by E. F. 
Schumacher:
What is the meaning of democracy, freedom, human dignity, standard of living, self- 
realisation, fulfillment? Is it a matter of goods, or of people? Of course it is a matter of 
people. But people can be themselves only in small comprehensible groups. Therefore 
we must learn to think in terms of an articulated structure that can cope with the 
multiplicity of small-scale units. If economic thinking cannot grasp that it is useless. If 
it cannot get beyond its vast abstractions, the national income, the rate of growth, 
capital/output ratio, input-output analysis, labour mobility, capital accumulation; if it 
cannot get beyond all this and make contact with the human realities of poverty, 
frustration, alienation, despair, breakdown, crime, escapism, stress, congestion, 
ugliness, and spiritual death, then let us scrap economics and start afresh.416
By unpacking the underlying ethical argument upon which a political power must 
base its foundational claim to legitimacy, if it is to have one, we have discovered that 
which Marx once eloquently expressed: ‘that all forms of state have democracy for 
their truth and that they are untrue to the extent that they are not democracy.’417 But 
the democracy legitimacy demands is not the lobotomized democracy of everyday 
parlance, but democracy’s authentic ideal; an active and participatory democratic 
system which gives each individual within a society true political power by 
obliterating false lines of distinction between government and governed; enabling the 
people themselves to protect and fulfill their shared species-interests together, as a 
democratic community of social, yet autonomous, individuals.
415 Fromm, E, 2002. The Sane Society, p. 264. (Routledge Classics; London)
416 Schumacher, E. F, 1974. Small is Beautiful, p. 62. (Abacus; London)
417 Marx, K (Livingstone, R and Benton, G, trans), 1992. Early Writings, p. 89. (Penguin Books; 
London)
The obstacles that the prevailing capitalist economic system presents for fully 
realizing this authentic democracy are not mere theoretical possibilities; they are 
demonstrably real. More importantly, they are arbitrary and unnecessary. Yet 
worryingly, it is only this corrupted and illegitimate form of democracy which we can 
find in contemporary existence.
As I have shown over the past two chapters; time and time again in capitalist 
representative democracies, the interests of capitalism significantly clash with the 
species-interests of democratic populations, but due to the vast economic power of the 
small number of elites who control them, it is the species-interests of the ‘people’ 
which invariably lose out. Through this rapacious economic system, innocent people 
suffer and die needlessly each day from preventable wars and unnecessary poverty; 
billions of people around the world find themselves without access to, or means to 
procure, the abundance of food, water, shelter and other necessary material goods for 
survival that exist but cannot be afforded; lives are sold on an alienating job-market 
into existence-consuming careers which limit one’s freedoms, creativity, solidarity, 
and ability to meaningfully pursue any other interests; and individual thought and 
opinion is meticulously controlled and manipulated through pervasive systems of 
hegemonic propaganda. All of which leaves these contemporary democracies 
incapable of fulfilling the political teleology for which they were built, and on which 
their claims to legitimacy rest.
That the radical change from such state systems to anarchism ought to be made, 
therefore, now has a compelling ethical basis; for what unearthing the underlying 
principles of social compact has shown us is that the creation of external structures of 
political power is ineluctably predicated on a specific ethical objective; justified only
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as a purpose-driven instrument to help achieve a specific set of goals, universal to all, 
which are necessary for living a fulfilling human life.
In these ostensibly democratic societies the existing power structures have not been 
given their authority simply because they are there, or because they have demanded 
their obedience by the barrel of a gun; they have it because their citizens believe, 
either consciously or unconsciously, that their existence and authority serves this 
necessary ethical purpose: to protect them from unnecessary death and preventable 
suffering; to ensure access to, and procurement of, the basic requisite material goods 
necessary for staying alive; to offer sufficient ‘quality of life’ and opportunities for 
individual happiness; to keep people as free and autonomous as they possibly can be; 
to not needlessly restrict their movements, thoughts, relationships or activities; and to 
better enable people to fulfill their manifold interests, be they individual, communal, 
or universal. In other words: to make life ‘better’ than it would be without them.
If the structures specifically created to do this task do not fulfill the ethical 
obligations on which their existence is predicated, indeed, if they actively work only 
to impede and obstruct them, then, being changeable constructs that have failed to 
achieve the goals for which they were constructed (necessary goals essential to our 
ability to live meaningful and fulfilling lives), then the same argument by which they 
were first created becomes the strongest argument for their demolition: alternative 
arrangements must be found to better fulfill this enduring political teleology.
Owing to the evident failings of traditional democratic structures in achieving, in 
practice, the authentic democracy of its promise, we are therefore left looking towards 
the only remaining form of social organization theoretically capable of achieving the 
authentically democratic goals necessary for political legitimacy: the stateless and 
radically decentralized system of federated democratic anarchism.
293
As well as requiring a radically different economic structure from capitalism, 
authentic democracy requires other fundamental changes in our current political 
arrangements. As the demand for democracy is fundamental to fulfilling our species- 
interests as autonomous human beings, we must recognize that the needs of 
democracy must be serviced over and above not only economies, but also the arbitrary 
circumstances of history and geography: democracy cannot function over too large- 
scale a society but must remain manageably participatory.
Anarchism acknowledges this by advocating small-scale democratic communities as 
the self-governing building blocks of a loosely-federated world; but also by 
normalizing those principles of democracy into everyday life, so that be it at work, at 
school, or at play, there is constant participation and involvement in every aspect of 
one’s own life; creating a profoundly democratic culture throughout all of society that 
is not limited solely to politics.
The advocacy of anarchism in this conclusion therefore, is not based in unfounded 
ideology or arbitrary choice, or by abstract metaphysics or unvindicated argument. It 
comes from the reasoned and publicly comprehensible drawing out of the same 
underlying arguments we already use to justify current systems of power, taken 
beyond ideology and to their logical conclusions. It is not replacing our current 
political beliefs with new and untested anarchist principles; but rather to recognize 
that once we have looked objectively at the current political beliefs that we already do 
hold, then it becomes clear that the justificatory arguments we presently use to 
legitimate existing structures of political power are, by necessity, anarchist in nature; 
that the ethical goals of our political teleology in which all legitimate politics is based, 
demand of our politics an authentic democracy which only anarchism can provide if 
we are to finally get right, what we have been trying to achieve all along.
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Of course anarchism still has lots to prove in practice, having not had much 
application beyond the theoretical in recent history. To make such radical changes in 
our current situation will certainly take a great amount of work, dedication, and 
experiment. But in the words of John Dewey, the intellectual traits necessary for true 
social and moral democracy ‘do not grow spontaneously on bushes. They have to
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planted and nurtured’; and this does not mean that such planting and nurturing is 
impossible, simply that radical changes will take time.
As I have already said, Rawls reminds us all that ‘political philosophy is realistically 
utopian when it extends what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable 
political possibility’.419 By coherently unpacking the underlying ethical justifications 
for political power necessarily present in all such legitimating arguments, I hope I 
have shown that what we ordinarily think about justified politics is, in reality, a 
demand for something much more than we are currently getting; and that the 
illegitimate structures of political power currently masquerading under the mantle of 
legitimacy, therefore ought to be transformed, if we are to ever fulfill the teleological 
purpose for which they were originally built.
The history of human progress is not one of hopelessness, or of settling for ‘least- 
worst’, but one of constant political evolution, and we are no more ineluctably bound 
to the current political and economic conditions of our society today, than medieval 
peasants were bound to their own repressive feudal systems.
To realistically achieve such radical changes in our societies would, without a doubt, 
be a slow process, requiring a lot of hard work -  to unlearn the ingrained assumptions 
and teachings of generations is a difficult task that will most likely take generations in 
itself. But to say that such change is unattainable or impractical, is to ignore
418 Dewey, J, 1993. The Political Writings, p. 122. (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc; Indianapolis)
419 Rawls, J, 2000. The Law o f Peoples, p. 11. (Harvard University Press; Cambridge) (emphasis 
added)
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humanity’s rich social record of cultural, attitudinal and ethical progression that has 
already brought social organization this far; and with no small amount of struggle, 
might yet take us further still.
Perhaps, in time, we may discover that anarchism might not be the perfect political 
system to fulfill our political teleology; it might not work and, in the end, it might 
well fall foul of all the problems its critics have predicted. But we will not know this 
for sure until we have meaningfully tried it out, and until we do have such clear-cut 
knowledge, then anarchism’s theoretical potential to fa il is no more or less convincing 
than anarchism’s theoretical potential to succeed. Importantly though, whilst any 
possible failings that could be encountered by such an experiment remain now purely 
speculative, anarchism’s untested but strong theoretical possibilities for teleological 
success still make it a much more viable proposition for legitimate politics than our 
empirically discredited contemporary democracies, whose concrete and demonstrable 
failures to fulfill even the most minimal of justificatory ethical obligations necessary 
for political legitimacy, are now only all too clear.
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APPENDIX
As important background to the 2003 invasion, andfurther evidence o f  the 
propaganda model in action, Ife lt it necessary to include the following account o f  the 
1991 U.S. and UK invasion o f  Iraq, removedfrom my main argument fo r  the sake o f  
brevity and focus.
Ideology and the First Gulf War
Back in 1991 U.S. and UK troops were deployed to Iraq to fight the first post-Cold 
War Gulf War. The story was, as usual, seemingly clear-cut: Iraq had invaded its 
neighbouring country Kuwait, proving that its tyrannical leader, Saddam Hussein was 
a loose cannon capable of anything who must be stopped before he attacked anyone 
else.
That Iraq invaded Kuwait was indeed true, but once again there is necessary 
contextual information, unreported, that throws a shadow of doubt onto the official 
version of events.
A year before they invaded Kuwait, Iraq was a country economically crippled by its 
long-time, U.S.-sponsored war with Iran. It was so broke in fact, that its economy 
‘was in worse condition than during the war, with inflation at 40 percent and its 
currency plummeting’.420 It is important to note the U.S. sponsorship here. Iraq’s 
actions had been aided and supported by America throughout this entire period with 
no concern for the atrocities being committed by Hussein. This included the use of 
chemical warfare against some of his own Kurdish citizens in the town of Halabja in 
March of 1988, using weaponry sold to him by America itself. It is important because
420 Edwards, D, 1998. Free To Be Human, p. 25. (Resurgence Books; Devon)
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it was this incident of gassing his own population that was put forward by the United 
States and UK governments in 1991, and again in 2003, as a key example in 
attempting to justify the war against Iraq, as to why Hussein was such a threat to the 
world at large and not just countries in the Middle East. As Chomsky suggests, if this 
given reason were genuine though, America wouldn’t have responded to this terrible 
act the way that it did when it actually happened back in 1988 -  by increasing aid to 
the country and further supporting Saddam Hussein.421
Such moral hypocrisy is not limited to the United States. As Mark Curtis explains:
Many militaiy-related exports were approved to Iraq after March 1988; in 
fact, London deepened its military support for Saddam after Halabja. First 
the government expressed its outrage over the use of chemical weapons by 
doubling export credits for Baghdad, which rose from £175 million in 1987 
to £340 million in 1988... Second, the government made it easier to sell arms 
to Iraq by relaxing the export guidelines 422
With Iraq economically crippled, the overproduction of oil by its neighbouring 
country Kuwait forced down Iraqi oil prices to such a low level that it could not begin 
to recover financially from its U.S.-funded war with Iran, but Kuwait refused to 
negotiate with Iraq about it, much to the confusion of the international community, 
leaving Iraq (in its opinion) with little option but to invade. According to analysts in 
the region, including former U.S. Attorney General, Ramsey Clark; Iraq’s plan was 
never to stay and occupy the country forever, but to get the world’s attention and
421 Chomsky, N, 2000. Case Studies in Hypocrisy: U.S. Human Rights Policy (lecture). (AK Audio; 
Edinburgh)
422 Curtis, M, 2003. Web of Deceit, p. 36. (Vintage; London)
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force negotiations with Kuwait before drawing out again with an improved financial
423situation.
That did not happen. Instead, the invasion was seen as an act of aggression, not 
simply against Kuwait, but as a possible threat towards all other nations; a notion 
Chomsky points out is ridiculous when one considers that even when the Iraqi army 
was at its strongest and had full U.S. support, it couldn’t even defeat neighbouring 
Iran, let alone the rest of the world.424 It is also important to note, that just as the 
Taliban did offer to extradite bin Laden in 2001; in both August and October of 1990, 
before the January war began, Saddam did offer a diplomatic deal ‘to pull Iraqi forces 
out of the country in return for sole control of the Rumaila oil field, guaranteed access 
to the Persian Gulf, the lifting of sanctions, and resolution of the oil price/production 
problem.’425
By December he had released all foreign citizens caught in Iraq or Kuwait during the
tViinvasion, but there was still no deal. Finally, four days before the January 15 
deadline given by the U.S.,
Arab diplomats at the UN said that they had received reports from Algeria,
Jordan and Yemen, all on close terms with Iraq, that Saddam planned an 
initiative soon after the 15th that would express his willingness “in principle” 
to pull out of Kuwait in return for international guarantees that Iraq would not 
be attacked, an international conference to address Palestinian grievances, 
and negotiations on disputes between Iraq and Kuwait. The Iraqi leader, the
423 Edwards, D, 1998. Free To Be Human, p. 27. (Resurgence Books; Devon)
424 Chomsky, N, 2000. Case Studies in Hypocrisy: U.S. Human Rights Policy (lecture). (AK Audio; 
Edinburgh)
425 Blum, W, 1995. Killing Hope, p. 327. (Common Courage Press; Maine)
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diplomats said, wanted to wait a day or two after the deadline had passed to 
demonstrate that he had not been intimidated.426
These were obviously not unconditional offers of withdrawal, and it is fair to say 
that had Saddam’s post-January 15th request been granted, whilst making Saddam 
look strong to his neighbours it would have made America look a little weaker to the 
world, but still -  there were clear, face-saving roads of diplomacy left to travel and 
deals that could have been made before war was declared. The U.S. government were 
certainly willing fifteen years later to allow its long-time ally Israel weeks and weeks 
of time to invade Lebanon and kill over a thousand civilians in its battle with 
Hezbollah, despite single-handedly having the power to call for a ceasefire in the UN 
-  so why not the same luxury for Iraq in Kuwait in 1991?427
There are many theories, most centring around control of Iraqi oil and other strategic 
resources; but, regardless of its true causes, the war went ahead and propaganda 
played an essential part in the process, most famously when the U.S. government 
hired public relations firm, Hill & Knowlton, to sell the case for war with fabricated
4 9 o
accounts of Iraqi soldiers throwing babies from incubators.
Soon after it started, media coverage eventually ended and it seemed the war was 
shortly over.
It was not.
426 Ibid., p. 329
427 Seymour Hersh uncovered that the US helped Israel plan its assault on Lebanon, long before Israeli 
soldiers were kidnapped -  the officially given justification for Israel’s actions. Ref: Hersh, S,
Watching Lebanon: Washington’s Interests in Israel’s War. The New Yorker, August 21st, 2006, p. 28.
428 Rampton, S, and Stauber, J, 2003. Weapons o f Mass Deception, pp., 71-74. (Robinson Books; 
London)
300
The region was put under severe economic sanctions which Mark Curtis points out, 
writing in 2003, ‘helped to kill more children per month in Iraq than were killed on 
September 11th/ 429
The UN estimates that 500,000 Iraqi children under five have died since 
1990, as a result both of the sanctions and the effects of the Gulf War in 
1990-1. Former UN humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, Denis Halliday, has 
said that the death toll is “probably closer now to 600, 000 and that’s over the 
period 1990-98. If you include adults, it’s well over 1 million people.” An 
August 1999 Unicef report found that under-five mortality had more than 
doubled since the imposition of sanctions.430
As well as sanctions,
From 1991 to December 1998, the RAF flew 15,500 sorties in the northern 
and southern [No Fly Zones]. By November 1999, US and British forces had 
flown 28,000 sorties, dropping over 1,800 bombs and missiles on 450 targets.
The bombing was secretly stepped up in 1998: 150 bombs were dropped on 
southern Iraq between December 1998 and June 2000.431
The war continued right up until the renewed attack in 2003, only the reporting of it 
did not.
429 Curtis, M, 2003. Web o f Deceit, p. 29. (Vintage; London)
430 ibid
431 Ibid., pp., 25-26
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